THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE UN IN PAKISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 002696 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PREF EAID PK SUBJECT: THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE UN IN PAKISTAN Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The UN continues to struggle in structuring itself to play its full role in Pakistan. The departure of Jean Arnault as the Secretary General's representative to the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP) not only reduces the UN's leadership role in the group, but also complicates the FODP,s ability to organize effectively. Continued security challenges, highlighted by last month's bombing of the World Food Program headquarters in Islamabad, complicate efforts to build staff, implement programs, and carry out critical UN activities in conflict-affected areas. The absence of a strong focal point for the UN has lead to organizational confusion and dysfunction. In his October 31 courtesy call on the Ambassador, the newly appointed Special Envoy for Assistance to Pakistan, Amb. Jean Maurice Ripert, acknowledged many of these shortcomings in UN operations, but was not able to articulate a strategy that would address them. ¶2. (C) We are not convinced that Ripert has either the ability or the commitment to provide effective leadership to the UN system in Pakistan. But, in the absence of any alternatives at this point in time, we believe we have no choice but to insist that the UN provide him with the tools and the support that he requires in order to have a chance to succeed. ¶3. (C) The bottom line is that we are not sure that Ambassador Ripert can succeed. But we are 100 percent certain that he will fail without strong US backing. In that context, we were very concerned by the comments of Under Secretary Holmes to Deputy SRAP suggesting that the UN does not see a requirement for Ripert to have a dedicated staff to support his operation. We should not accept this position. Given our enormous national security equities in Pakistan, we should certainly be able to fund his staff. Ambasador Ripert also needs to live full-time in Islamabad. ¶4. (C) Embassy also requests that the Department and Treasury reach out to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank at the highest possible level to urge their cooperation with Ripert. Both, but particularly the World Bank representative, have indicated they have little intention of cooperating with him. The lack of donor coordination in Pakistan continues to be a major impediment to achievement of our goals in Pakistan. If the major donors can finally speak with one voice to the government of Pakistan -- through the FODP process and elsewhere ) the chances for advancing much needed reforms (like increased tax collection) within the GOP are greatly enhanced. End summary. The UN is an Essential Partner in Pakistan -------------- ¶5. (C) The international donor community looks to the UN to play three distinct, critical roles in Pakistan: ¶6. (C) Conflict-Affected Areas Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction: UN agencies, especially the World Food Program and UNHCR, have played outstanding roles in providing for the immediate needs of Internally Displaced Persons throughout the period since last year of Pakistani military engagement in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Malakand Division. Staffed by dedicated, experienced, and capable personnel, UN specialized agencies established and administered camps, provided essential food and non-food relief goods, and partnered effectively with Government of Pakistan, Pakistan military, and international donors, NGOs, and relief organizations. OCHA head Manuel Bessler and Humanitarian Coordinator Martin Mogwanja have made substantial progress in increasing coordination at the operational level and improving UN information dissemination and donor briefing. ISLAMABAD 00002696 002 OF 004 ¶7. (C) While the emergency response effort continues, especially in relation to current military operations in South Waziristan, the emphasis for UN engagement has now turned more towards the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases in Malakand Division and, to a lesser extent, in the two northern Tribal Agencies, Bajaur and Mohmand. In this regard, UN performance has been less satisfactory. The long hiatus between Amb. Ripert's appointment in August and his actual arrival in Pakistan on an initial visit in late October has meant a period of drift for the UN effort and a lack of follow-up to the FODP-sponsored Malakand Strategy approved by the FODP Istanbul Ministerial. The UN,s decision to raise the security threat level for NWFP and FATA to Phase IV will affect all but emergency operations, and will also likely result in delays to the completion of the Post-Crisis Needs Assessment originally targeted for early 2010 but now probably not ready for completion until mid- to late-Spring. ¶8. (C) International Donor Coordination: More broadly, the UN has failed to provide leadership for the international donor community in coordinating donor activities in Pakistan. Undoubtedly, the Government of Pakistan, which has obstructed donor coordination, bears a great deal of responsibility for the absence of effective coordination mechanisms. Nevertheless, the lack of a coherent UN structure, or the appointment of senior, experienced UN personnel to lead the UN system in Pakistan, has magnified the extent of the problem. The Embassy has been pressing the UN for some time to address this glaring deficiency in its operations in Pakistan, but until now the UN has made no move towards strengthening its internal coordination or taking a lead in organizing the other donors. The UN's inability to resolve this issue has also weakened the role of international financial institutions, primarily the World Bank, which has not worked effectively with other donors in the absence of clear leadership from the UN. ¶9. (C) Friends of Democratic Pakistan: With the appointment of Jean Arnault as the Special Advisor to the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP),the UN took on the central organizing role for the FODP. (Although he was willing to commit only to spend two weeks each month in Pakistan, Arnault established good working relations with Government of Pakistan counterparts as well as members of the FODP in Pakistan.) His presence as the visible face of the FODP was essential in reducing the perception that the organization was a U.S.-UK-EU dominated pressure group on Pakistan. Arnault's engagement was especially significant over the summer during the preparation of the FODP Malakand Strategy paper when he ensured that there was buy-in on the process from the smaller FODP members and that the Government of Pakistan was also supportive of the result. It remains unclear to the Embassy whether Amb. Ripert understands the positive role that the FODP can play as a political support mechanism for broader donor engagement with the Pakistanis or his own essential involvement with FODP. Exit Arnault, Enter Ripert -------------- ¶10. (C) Jean Arnault,s decision to resign from his position as Special Advisor to the FODP is a further blow to the UN system,s already weak presence in Pakistan. Although Arnault did not view his mandate to include donor coordination or engagement on the UN,s responsibilities beyond FODP, nevertheless, the presence in Pakistan of a senior, experienced UN civil servant of Arnault's standing did provide for a degree of coherence in the UN system's organization. Although he was only in Pakistan part-time, Arnault was also successful in establishing solid working relations with key interlocutors in the Government of Pakistan, including Secretary General Salman Farooqi and Minister of State for Economic Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar. Arnault's success in establishing cooperative relations with ISLAMABAD 00002696 003 OF 004 both Pakistani officials and representatives of the FODP member states was instrumental in achieving progress for the FODP as a credible interlocutor with the government on the sensitive political and policy issues that underlie many of the development challenges that confront Pakistan, especially in the conflict-affected areas. Without such political engagement, it is unlikely that the counter-insurgency strategy in NWFP and FATA can succeed. ¶11. (C) In his initial call on the Ambassador, October 31, newly-arrived Special Envoy for Assistance Amb. Jean Maurice Ripert did not demonstrate a strong grasp of the intricacies of the UN position in Pakistan. Like Arnault, Ripert intends to be only a part-time presence in Pakistan, dividing his time evenly between Islamabad and Geneva. He also emphasized in his comments that he expects to be in the position for not more than six months-one year. Most importantly, although he commented gamely about the need to organize the international donors, he did not appear to have a clear vision of how he intends to do that and he had little understanding of how he could use the FODP as a vehicle to advance donor coordination or the policy dialogue with the government. ¶12. (C) We have heard separately that Ripert,s initial contacts with key government interlocutors and with the IFIs were not smooth. In a meeting with IDP donors, November 4, Ripert indicated that he sees his job as political, working with the highest levels of the GOP, not replacing the UN Country Team, the ResRep or the Humanitarian Coordinator. Ripert described vaguely his vision of getting everyone ) the GOP, donors, the FODP, and the UN ) to agree on a long-term comprehensive strategy, not just to assist conflict-affected areas but also to address law enforcement, economic reform, and governance. ¶13. (C) Despite our reservations, Ripert remains our best opportunity for advancing the role of the UN in Pakistan. As he returns to New York for consultations, we should make clear that the UN leadership must do a better job of establishing clear Terms of Reference for Ripert in fulfilling his responsibilities. To succeed, moreover, it is essential that he receive a degree of backing from the UN leadership ) political, budgetary, and staff ) that New York never provided for Arnault. In that regard, we read with some dismay the report of SRAP DAS Feldman's meeting with UN U/SYG Holmes in which Holmes asserted that Ripert did not need staff. As we have made clear regularly, it is inconceivable that the UN could expect Ripert to be effective without providing him with a basic level of administrative and professional support to carry out his mission. We have recommended that the UN establish an office of approximately ten people to provide back up. The U.S. should take the lead in providing funding for an appropriately staffed office. Given our overwhelming national security objectives in Pakistan, this would be an exceedingly modest expenditure. ¶14. (C) Such support is particularly important if Ripert intends to be absent from Pakistan for much of the time. Having said that, however, the Ambassador pressed Ripert hard on the point about absences. We need to continue making clear to both Ripert and the UN leadership that the situation here is too complicated and the challenges too great to leave the direction of the programs in Pakistan in the hands of part-time and absentee management. Ripert should plan on being present during the duration of his tenure. ¶15. (C) The UN should also be pressed to review overall staffing of key agencies in Pakistan. The UN presence here, with good leadership, could evolve into a very significant influence, possibly including an eventual DDR process for insurgents that would mirror the process on the other side of the border. While Ripert will be in a senior position in Pakistan for the UN, his lack of experience in UN affairs and his outsider status within the UN system will limit his effectiveness. His comments to the donors group this week ISLAMABAD 00002696 004 OF 004 reinforced the impression that he intends to take a hands-off approach to the daily workings of the UN agencies here. Therefore, it is essential that the UN provide the kind of leadership within the agencies that can provide strong support to Ripert. Regrettably, this is not now and has not been the case in regard to most of the UN's management in Pakistan. ¶16. (C) Embassy also requests that the Department reach out at a high level with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the largest donors here. Both have indicated they have little interest in serious donor coordination. While both are willing to share their ideas and programs ) as well they should be given the degree of financial support from the U.S. ) they have little interest in donor coordination that would actually avoid duplication and reduce costs. The World Bank in particular is concerned about undermining its relationship with the government of Pakistan. The GOP is notoriously resistant to donor coordination ) partly because they do not want the donors to urge a unified message on reforms and partly because of inefficiency. PATTERSON