PESHAWAR: "HERE I COME AGAIN" OPERATION IN BARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002209 E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS PK SUBJECT: PESHAWAR: "HERE I COME AGAIN" OPERATION IN BARA WEAKENS MANGAL BAGH; SMALL IDP OUTFLOW REF: PESHAWAR 183 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gerald M. Feierstein for reasons 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: After just over a week of fighting under the "Here I Come Again" operation in Khyber Agency, the joint army/Frontier Corps/Frontier Constabulary/police actions in Bara tehsil appear to be drawing to a close as army and Frontier Corps troops are pulled out to concentrate on other operations. Despite threats by the leader of Lashkar-i-Islam (LI - the militant organization that has been the primary target of the operation),there has been little violent response by the group. A small outflow of IDPs from the conflict-affected area drew media attention but has not yet received any government support. It is unclear whether this partial operation, which appears to have hurt but will not destroy LI, will improve security in the Peshawar area in the long run. End summary. Six Days of Operation -------------- ¶2. (C) Two battalions of the regular army and two wings (battalion equivalents) of the Frontier Corps were deployed into Khyber for the operation, essentially doubling the military presence in the Agency; these included one wing that had been demobilized from Buner. Beginning on September 2, these forces moved into the Bara tehsil of Khyber Agency, securing entry and exit points and targeting suspected locations of homes, private prisons, and other facilities occupied by LI and other militants. 500 additional police were deployed in areas of Peshawar district bordering Bara in order to arrest militants fleeing toward the district; a large number have reportedly been detained. Daily casualty figures for suspected militants released by the military,s Inter-Services Public RELATIONS (ISPR) indicate that over 100 suspected militants have been killed and 150 captured so far, but Khyber POLITICAL agent Tariq Hayat Khan on the evening of September 6 told Consulate that the tally of confirmed militants who had been killed in the operation to that point was "over 80." ¶3. (C) From September 5, helicopter gunships began aerial bombardment of suspected militant training facilities and hideouts in the Tirah valley. FATA Additional Chief Secretary Habibullah Khan had told Consulate as the operation began (reftel) that such strikes would be launched at locations to which LI leadership would be likely to flee from Bara; Tariq Hayat Khan claimed on September 6 that on two occasions, these airstrikes had nearly killed LI leader Mangal Bagh. In a nearby but apparently separate development, Pakistani fighter jets struck eleven suspected training camps for the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in neighboring Orakzai Agency; such strikes on installations in Orakzai continued for much of the following week. PA, Mangal Bagh Make Threats -------------- ¶4. (C) While Khyber PA Tariq Hayat Khan publicly announced that the operation's intent was to arrest criminals and militants regardless of group affiliation, he told Consulate that the primary target of the operation was indeed Mangal Bagh's LI, the strongest group in Bara. The Khyber PA also told press on September 5 that the operation might also be extended to other areas of Khyber Agency from Bara, prompting many residents of adjoining locations such as Jamrud to make plans to move their families temporarily to Peshawar; however, the threat was never carried out and the two regular army battalions were pulled out of Khyber on September 8-9, making an expansion of the operation unlikely. ¶5. (SBU) On the evening of September 4, Mangal Bagh announced for the first time on his illegal FM station that LI members should attack the security forces, including employing suicide bombs. He promised to make follow-up announcements over the same channel on following days. There were initially no further broadcasts from the FM station, and there have been no significant clashes between militants and security forces and no suicide bombings since the beginning of the operation. A radio-broadcast threat by Mangal Bagh against khassadars on the evening of September 9, however, caused approximately a quarter of the khassadars in the Bara area to fail to show up for work before the Khyber PA threatened to fire them. IDP Outflow Not Yet Supported By Government -------------- ¶6. (C) Though physical damage in the Bara area is still relatively low, the curfew on all movement that has been in place for all but a few hours since the beginning of the operation has caused considerable hardship. This, along with the apparently increasing intensity of the operation, had prompted many of the residents of Bara tehsil to flee into Peshawar district. While press reports have speculated about as many as 30,000 displaced, UNHCR Peshawar Sub-Office chief Felipe Camargo estimates that the operation has produced an exodus of 1,000 families (7-8,000 individuals) to date. So far, there has been little effort by the government (which has been sending mixed signals to international as to whether they want assistance given to the displaced Bara residents) to deal with these relatively small numbers of displaced, many of whom have relatives in Peshawar. However, UNHCR is surveying the population and intends to give assistance as needed. Also, the Al-Khidmat Foundation (the charitable arm of the Islamist POLITICAL party Jamaat-i-Islami) had set up reception areas as the people were initially displaced, gaining some favorable press attention. With the winding down of the operation and lifting of the curfew, the Pakistani government's Special Support Group (SSG) told UNHCR that the displaced were beginning to return to Bara as of September 9. ¶7. (C) Comment: Our contacts at the FATA Secretariat, who have been asking for military action in Khyber for months, are pleased with the results of the Bara operation to date. The lack of a significant response by LI so far may indicate diminished capacity to hit high-profile targets as a result of two months of low-intensity fighting and the past week of significant combat operations, though the response of the Bara khassadars to Mangal Bagh's threats implies fear of LI in the area remains strong. Without the deaths of any of the group's leadership or any ground operation into the Tirah valley, however, the operation is not likely to destroy the organization. While the improvement in the level of security in the Landikotal and Jamrud areas of Khyber after the December 2008-January 2009 FC operation there has continued to the present, the previous FC operation in Bara (in June 2008, named "Operation Here I Come") did not leave any lasting security improvements. The long-term implications of the current Bara operation for the Peshawar area remain unclear. End comment. PATTERSON