Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ISLAMABAD2161
2009-09-08 13:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

NGOS DISCUSS ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY IN SWAT

Tags:  PREF PHUM EAID PREL PGOV PK 
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RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 7807
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 6818
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002161 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: PREF PHUM EAID PREL PGOV PK
SUBJECT: NGOS DISCUSS ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY IN SWAT

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002161

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: PREF PHUM EAID PREL PGOV PK
SUBJECT: NGOS DISCUSS ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY IN SWAT

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary: In September 4 discussions, representatives
from 14 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs),
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
confirmed that humanitarian relief was being delivered in
Swat despite insecurity and substantial challenges. The army
has control of main population centers and main roads, but it
continues to battle significant pockets of active Taliban
resistance. The group noted persistent though
unsubstantiated reports of extra-judicial killings, but noted
the local culture of revenge and did not attribute them to
the military. Participants emphasized the need for flexible
long-term engagement to build trust with a community unused
to a foreign aid presence. Most of the Taliban presence is
local, prompting concern that ongoing conflicts with local
law enforcement are likely to perpetuate local family feuds
and violence. So far no international humanitarian
assistance providers have had access to areas north of
Mingora where NGOs fear the worst destruction has occurred.
The UNHCR Acting Representative advocated investing in
peace-keeping skills and redeploying Pakistani UN
peace-keepers at home in conflict-affected areas. NGOs spoke
highly of the role of provincial assistance authorities and
of the army,s treatment of civilians but said that local and
party politics sometimes hindered assistance delivery. ICRC
said it was encountering political objections to the
neutrality of its assistance, and UNHCR said the government
was in denial of the continuing emergency and reluctant to
have humanitarian eyes and ears focused on protection issues.
The humanitarian assistance providers understood the need
for visibility of U.S. assistance but highlighted security
risks of branding and the need to build government capacity.
They outlined both long and short-term assistance priorities.
End Summary.


2. (SBU) On September 4, the Ambassador held an iftar and
round-table discussion at the Residence with INGOs, UNHCR and
ICRC to discuss security and assistance issues in areas of
displaced return. Participating NGOs included Concern, Oxfam
UK, ACTED, Merlin, Mercy Corps, International Medical Corps,
World Vision, International Relief and Development, Save the
Children U.S., International Catholic Migration Commission,
Relief International, Islamic Relief, Catholic Relief
Services and the International Rescue Committee.

-------------- --------------
Coping with Insecurity in Swat: Be Flexible, Build Trust

-------------- --------------


3. (C) NGOs are providing humanitarian assistance and early
recovery help in Swat despite an uncertain and unpredictable
security situation. The key to implementing programs in
Swat, said several, is being flexible and gaining access
gradually by building trust. The army has focused on
control of the major populations centers and roads, but there
is no consistent army presence off the main road. Pockets of
resistance where the Taliban are still present and active
remain across the region. "One day everything is fine, but
the next day something has happened," commented one NGO
representative.


4. (SBU) Access in general is difficult for external actors,
and there is no international humanitarian access north of
Mingora where NGOs suspect there is extensive destruction and
the need may be the greatest. There is widespread initial
mistrust of NGOs in the Swat communities, and one NGO worried
about the safety of its beneficiaries. Now in Swat for a
year, ICRC fears that the rush of humanitarian actors into
Swat will lead to a security incident which will affect the
safety of all.


5. (C) UNHCR noted that, with the exception of the purely
humanitarian role played by ICRC, "our making people happy is
making the Taliban unhappy." An NGO added that
reconstruction projects will be safe where militants are
local and have a vested interest in the project, perhaps a
school for their children, but if militants are outsiders
(even from a neighboring area),then reconstruction projects

ISLAMABAD 00002161 002 OF 003


would make good targets for the Taliban.


6. (C) ICRC stressed that the conflict was not over but was
moving from frontline confrontation to asymmetric warfare
with guerilla tactics. The NGOs have heard persistent but
unsubstantiated reports of extra-judicial killings but noted
the culture of revenge in the area and did not attribute
these deaths to the military. One NGO had visited two
villages where a week or two later 14 and 17 people were
killed respectively. Another noted allegations of frequent
desecration of bodies.


7. (SBU) UNHCR stressed the need to invest in the training
of security forces to handle the current situation in
insecure areas of return. Noting that Pakistan is the
largest force contributor to UN peace-keeping operations, he
advocated investing in peace-keeping skills and training
returned peace-keepers for this task. He commented that the
Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, when visiting
Pakistan, had emphasized to UNHCR Islamabad the need to work
with the army and law enforcement in the interest of
humanitarian assistance. Others noted that law enforcement
was poorly equipped.

--------------
The Local Boys of the Taliban
--------------


8. (C) According to the NGOs, the police have returned to
Mingora, but elsewhere the army continues to be engaged in
missions to eliminate continued pockets of insurgency. NGOs
have heard that those Taliban returning to Swat are being
identified by local people and then picked up by the security
forces.


9. (C) NGOs agreed that almost every family was connected to
the Taliban one way or another. Often young boys, most from
poor families, joined the Taliban for the economic
opportunity or promises of glory. "They pay more in cash for
work than we do," said one NGO representative who had met
young, scared boys in a reeducation camp for the Taliban. An
Islamic NGO stressed the need to provide an alternative to
extremist madrassas because most people in the area want
their children to study the Koran, and the poor turn to
madrassas because they provide room and board. UNHCR
commented that the fact that local boys (militants) are
fighting against other local boys (lashkars and police) is
likely to produce family feuds and associated killings for
years to come. The discussion touched on the possible role
for reconciliation committees.

--------------
The Role of the Government and Politics
--------------


10. (C) One NGO commented that personnel in the Northwest
Frontier Province,s Emergency Relief Unit (ERU) and in the
Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) were "good,
smart, and willing to push," and said the provincial
government and DCOs did a good job of identifying needs.
Another found the army to be professional in its dealings
with civilians. However, provincial politics was seen to
play an unhelpful role. It was alleged that under the Awami
National Party(ANP)-led provincial authority, "IDP
registration is not happening in Lower Dir because it is a
PPP (Pakistan People's Party) stronghold." Similarly Swat
aid from the ANP was reportedly being blocked by the PPP.
One NGO distributing cash vouchers in Buner said political
jockeying made it difficult to work at the local level as
well; three local politicians had tried to draw the NGO to
their respective villages to distribute vouchers to their
specific lists of potential recipients.


11. (C) NGOs said people saw the federal government as not
responding directly to humanitarian needs although some
participants commented that the problem of a non-responsive
social services system predated the conflict. NGOs noted the
challenge of delivering relief through the district
government while transitioning to longer-term development.
They saw opportunities in the fact that the Government

ISLAMABAD 00002161 003 OF 003


doesn't want to fail the people in NWFP and in the fact that
the GOP and the humanitarian community share a common
objective of sustainable return.


12. (C) UNHCR views the GOP as "in denial" in its belief
that the emergency is over and that all attention can now be
directed to reconstruction. According to UNHCR, the
Government, which before saw the humanitarian community as
essential, now sees it as "too many eyes and ears" raising
issues about killings, registration and protection. ICRC
added that it currently faces access issues in Swat, not for
reasons of security but rather for political reasons, because
it "won't budge on the neutrality of humanitarian work."
ICRC decried the distinction being made by the Government
between good victims (those whose suffering is seen as
serving national duty and paying the price) and bad victims
(family members of Taliban).

--------------
To Brand or Not to Brand
--------------


13. (C) The NGOs realized the complexity of the issue of
branding and the reasons for wanting visibility of U.S.
assistance. All saw branding as a security risk, however,
and noted a low profile protects both NGO workers and
beneficiaries. One participant commented on the necessity of
additional local confidence-building if foreign funding of
assistance becomes evident. Another stressed the importance
of contextual risk analysis, and yet another commented that,
unlike after the earthquake, people may become dissatisfied
with the humanitarian community because "we are lined up with
the police and the army." ICRC added that absence of
branding makes all humanitarian assistance providers (except
ICRC) alike: all are strongly branded by being accompanied
by the military and the police.

--------------
Humanitarian Assistance Needs and Priorities
-------------- -


14. (SBU) The NGOs saw both short- and long-term assistance
priorities. Some stressed the importance of quick impact
projects to generate income and restore important
infrastructure that was either damaged in conflict or
historically poor. Highlighted needs included electricity
generation and water pumps outside of Mingora, seeds to
prevent further lost crops, and reconstruction of schools and
the government offices required to restore governance. One
participant pointed to the importance of investing long-term
in agriculture and tourism. Another mentioned vocational
training, such as in construction, to help rebuilding and
generate income. All noted that needs vary greatly from
village to village and among returnees, those who stayed
behind in the conflict areas, and the secondarily displaced.
NGOs saw opportunities and scope for development once people
acclimatize to the NGOs. UNHCR said the security breakdown
in Malakand Division, at a time when the attention had been
on FATA, should teach a lesson about the importance of
proactive attention to other sensitive areas across Pakistan.
PATTERSON

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