MOTIVATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING EXPEDITED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001770

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2019
TAGS: PREF PHUM EAID PREL PGOV PK
SUBJECT: MOTIVATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING EXPEDITED
RETURNS: YAR HUSSAIN, A CASE STUDY

Classified By: Gerald M. Feierstein, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary: Below is an e-mail account providing a
timeline of events for the expedited return of displaced
persons from Yar Hussain camp, Swabi, in the Northwest
Frontier Province of Pakistan. It is followed by a review,
from an NGO perspective, of some of the likely considerations
and motivations of the GOP in expediting return home of the
displaced and also includes some NGO concerns about the
implications of these expedited returns. A/S Schwartz
requested that this Yar Hussain account be circulated
internally as it was provided by a professional,
dispassionate and trustworthy NGO interlocutor with very good
access, and the essential elements of the account have been
conveyed to us by others -- solely, however, with regard to
returns from displaced person camps (where only ten to
fifteen percent of the Pakistan's displaced population is/was
sheltered). We cannot verify the account with absolute
certainty but we consider it credible. End summary.

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Timeline of Return from Yar Hussain Camp
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2. (SBU) Below is a timeline of the events leading to the
departure of displaced persons from Yar Hussain Camp as
provided by informed NGO sources.

-- As of July 11th, the population of Yar Hussain camp (Chota
Lahore) was approximately 32,000 internally displaced persons
(IDPs) composed of both Buneris and Swatis.

-- On July 11th, an announcement was made by the (government)
camp administrator that beginning on the 13th, the government
would begin facilitating travel back to the points of origin.
The announcement indicated that prior to departure returnees
would receive rations (oil, sugar, flour, rice and pulses)
which would last an initial 25 days and an ATM card with an
initial 25,000 rupees (approximately 300 USD) per family with
an additional 175,000 rupees (2,2000 USD) to be provided a
short time after return. The IDPs were also informed that
they would be able to sell their tents, and buyers would be
facilitated to purchase the tents for approximately 3,000
rupees (40 USD).

-- On July 12th, convoys of buses began arriving at the camp,
and most left full. On the 13th, without an announcement,
electricity was shut off in the camp, and the water
distribution tankers did not arrive for their usual twice
daily runs. Many of the IDPs retained a small store of
drinking water in their tents and were able to use a nearby
irrigation channel (of unclean water) for other water supply
needs. Without electricity the tube wells were no longer
functioning, nor were the electric fans which had been the
primary respite from the heat.

-- On July 13th, the camp administrator stopped the World
Food Program (WFP) distribution of food rations to the IDPs
in the camp. A small riot ensued injuring two and forcing
the camp administrator to recant and resume distribution of
food on the 14th.

-- As of July 18th, the population of Yar Hussain Camp had
decreased to approximately 16,000 and by the 22nd had reached
4,000.

-- On July 23rd, the camp population had decreased to 1,700
IDPs primarily from areas in Swat which had been deemed
unsafe for return. These IDPs were to be relocated over the
following few days from Yar Hussain camp to Jalala camp in
Mardan.

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Contextual Framing: Governmental Motivations
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3. (C) NGO discussions with officials at various levels of
government and the military have indicated that elements
contributing to the government-perceived urgency of the

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situation and to the approach taken to rapidly resettle IDPs
include:

-- The IDP population displaced by this conflict have been of
mixed sympathies. Their idle time in the camps has been seen
as a risk to continued unrest, and it is perceived that upon
their return, the push to reestablish lives and livelihoods
will limit the opportunities for anti-governnment elements to
continue to cultivate unrest.

-- The "dislocation" (displacement) has been scrutinized
significantly by the press in Pakistan, and there is a sense
that a prolonged displacement may lead to broader criticism
of failings of the government and military. Access to
families by the media will be diminished when they are back
in their often geographically difficult to access points of
origin.

-- The upcoming monsoon season is perceived to be a real
threat to the health situation of IDPs especially those in
camps, many of which are in flood plains. The mountainous
areas of Swat and Buner will be impacted less by the rains
than will be the low-lying areas temporarily inhabited by the
displaced.

-- The month of Ramadan will begin in the middle of August.
As many of the IDPs are sure to fast, lack of food and water
in the scorching summer heat could prove to be a significant
health risk to many of the IDPs and increase the risk of
unrest.

-- Humanitarian organizations working with the displaced in
camps and in host communities have been able to engage with
communities who have for some time been the recipient of
anti-government and anti-international community messaging
(from the taliban). Exposure to and support from
humanitarian organizations have changed many of the
perspectives of the IDPs. With a return home of the
displaced population, there is an expectation (as well as a
government push) that these organizations will follow the
IDPs back, continue support, and continue providing a vehicle
for the IDPs' engagement with the rest of the country and the
international community.

-- Given conflict-stretched military resources, the military
may try to harness returning IDPs into lashkars (militias)
which can be of use in efforts to continue obstructing the
activities of anti-government elements. This is an approach
which has met with some success in Lower Dir.

-- There has been limited financial support by the
international community (except for the United States) to the
IDP emergency, and there is an expectation that early
recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, given their
longer time frame and development orientation, may facilitate
provision of larger tranches of funding, a larger portion of
which might go to governmental agencies than is the case in
an emergency setting.

-- With the focus of operations moving to Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),there has been some
discussion by GOP officials of the need to free up
international resources to provide support for additional
potential displacement as the conflict evolves (although
quite possibly without direct humanitarian access).

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NGO Questions and Concerns
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4. (C) GOP policy as it has been relayed to NGOs is to close
a number of camps within weeks. The remaining displaced will
be consolidated in selected camps and supported in their
return upon the resumption of GOP military control of their
respective areas of origin. NGOs continue to have the
following concerns and continue to raise the following
questions with the authorities:

-- Will those IDPs who have returned and found that the

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security situation, lack of services and/or lack of economic
opportunities have made return an untenable option be
permitted to re-register as IDPs and have access to basic
services in areas such as Swabi, Mardan and Peshawar?

-- This crisis has severely depleted the coping capacity of
host communities, many to such an extent that they have also
begun to use assistance such as those facilities provided in
the camps to survive. As these facilities and the
organizations supporting them follow the IDPs back to their
homes, how will the continuity of services/assistance be
ensured to those who have been newly marginalized by their
prolonged hospitality?

-- Many of the IDPs not in camps have been living in schools
and community centers. As the school year nears its
beginning, what will/can be arranged to ensure that those
IDPs currently sheltering in schools and not able to return
to their homes continue to receive support? If there is a
disruption in schooling because the schools are occupied, how
will alternative school locations be identified, and how can
it be ensured that this school disruption doesn't place an
undue strain on relations between displaced and the host
communities?

-- Those displaced persons who choose to stay in established
camps are likely to be the most vulnerable, facing few
prospects upon their return. What services will they be able
to access, for how long, and what additional provisions can
be made to facilitate their reintegration?


FEIERSTEIN