MOTIVATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING EXPEDITED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001770 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2019 TAGS: PREF PHUM EAID PREL PGOV PK SUBJECT: MOTIVATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING EXPEDITED RETURNS: YAR HUSSAIN, A CASE STUDY Classified By: Gerald M. Feierstein, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Below is an e-mail account providing a timeline of events for the expedited return of displaced persons from Yar Hussain camp, Swabi, in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. It is followed by a review, from an NGO perspective, of some of the likely considerations and motivations of the GOP in expediting return home of the displaced and also includes some NGO concerns about the implications of these expedited returns. A/S Schwartz requested that this Yar Hussain account be circulated internally as it was provided by a professional, dispassionate and trustworthy NGO interlocutor with very good access, and the essential elements of the account have been conveyed to us by others -- solely, however, with regard to returns from displaced person camps (where only ten to fifteen percent of the Pakistan's displaced population is/was sheltered). We cannot verify the account with absolute certainty but we consider it credible. End summary. -------------- Timeline of Return from Yar Hussain Camp -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Below is a timeline of the events leading to the departure of displaced persons from Yar Hussain Camp as provided by informed NGO sources. -- As of July 11th, the population of Yar Hussain camp (Chota Lahore) was approximately 32,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) composed of both Buneris and Swatis. -- On July 11th, an announcement was made by the (government) camp administrator that beginning on the 13th, the government would begin facilitating travel back to the points of origin. The announcement indicated that prior to departure returnees would receive rations (oil, sugar, flour, rice and pulses) which would last an initial 25 days and an ATM card with an initial 25,000 rupees (approximately 300 USD) per family with an additional 175,000 rupees (2,2000 USD) to be provided a short time after return. The IDPs were also informed that they would be able to sell their tents, and buyers would be facilitated to purchase the tents for approximately 3,000 rupees (40 USD). -- On July 12th, convoys of buses began arriving at the camp, and most left full. On the 13th, without an announcement, electricity was shut off in the camp, and the water distribution tankers did not arrive for their usual twice daily runs. Many of the IDPs retained a small store of drinking water in their tents and were able to use a nearby irrigation channel (of unclean water) for other water supply needs. Without electricity the tube wells were no longer functioning, nor were the electric fans which had been the primary respite from the heat. -- On July 13th, the camp administrator stopped the World Food Program (WFP) distribution of food rations to the IDPs in the camp. A small riot ensued injuring two and forcing the camp administrator to recant and resume distribution of food on the 14th. -- As of July 18th, the population of Yar Hussain Camp had decreased to approximately 16,000 and by the 22nd had reached 4,000. -- On July 23rd, the camp population had decreased to 1,700 IDPs primarily from areas in Swat which had been deemed unsafe for return. These IDPs were to be relocated over the following few days from Yar Hussain camp to Jalala camp in Mardan. -------------- Contextual Framing: Governmental Motivations -------------- ¶3. (C) NGO discussions with officials at various levels of government and the military have indicated that elements contributing to the government-perceived urgency of the ISLAMABAD 00001770 002 OF 003 situation and to the approach taken to rapidly resettle IDPs include: -- The IDP population displaced by this conflict have been of mixed sympathies. Their idle time in the camps has been seen as a risk to continued unrest, and it is perceived that upon their return, the push to reestablish lives and livelihoods will limit the opportunities for anti-governnment elements to continue to cultivate unrest. -- The "dislocation" (displacement) has been scrutinized significantly by the press in Pakistan, and there is a sense that a prolonged displacement may lead to broader criticism of failings of the government and military. Access to families by the media will be diminished when they are back in their often geographically difficult to access points of origin. -- The upcoming monsoon season is perceived to be a real threat to the health situation of IDPs especially those in camps, many of which are in flood plains. The mountainous areas of Swat and Buner will be impacted less by the rains than will be the low-lying areas temporarily inhabited by the displaced. -- The month of Ramadan will begin in the middle of August. As many of the IDPs are sure to fast, lack of food and water in the scorching summer heat could prove to be a significant health risk to many of the IDPs and increase the risk of unrest. -- Humanitarian organizations working with the displaced in camps and in host communities have been able to engage with communities who have for some time been the recipient of anti-government and anti-international community messaging (from the taliban). Exposure to and support from humanitarian organizations have changed many of the perspectives of the IDPs. With a return home of the displaced population, there is an expectation (as well as a government push) that these organizations will follow the IDPs back, continue support, and continue providing a vehicle for the IDPs' engagement with the rest of the country and the international community. -- Given conflict-stretched military resources, the military may try to harness returning IDPs into lashkars (militias) which can be of use in efforts to continue obstructing the activities of anti-government elements. This is an approach which has met with some success in Lower Dir. -- There has been limited financial support by the international community (except for the United States) to the IDP emergency, and there is an expectation that early recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, given their longer time frame and development orientation, may facilitate provision of larger tranches of funding, a larger portion of which might go to governmental agencies than is the case in an emergency setting. -- With the focus of operations moving to Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),there has been some discussion by GOP officials of the need to free up international resources to provide support for additional potential displacement as the conflict evolves (although quite possibly without direct humanitarian access). -------------- NGO Questions and Concerns -------------- ¶4. (C) GOP policy as it has been relayed to NGOs is to close a number of camps within weeks. The remaining displaced will be consolidated in selected camps and supported in their return upon the resumption of GOP military control of their respective areas of origin. NGOs continue to have the following concerns and continue to raise the following questions with the authorities: -- Will those IDPs who have returned and found that the ISLAMABAD 00001770 003 OF 003 security situation, lack of services and/or lack of economic opportunities have made return an untenable option be permitted to re-register as IDPs and have access to basic services in areas such as Swabi, Mardan and Peshawar? -- This crisis has severely depleted the coping capacity of host communities, many to such an extent that they have also begun to use assistance such as those facilities provided in the camps to survive. As these facilities and the organizations supporting them follow the IDPs back to their homes, how will the continuity of services/assistance be ensured to those who have been newly marginalized by their prolonged hospitality? -- Many of the IDPs not in camps have been living in schools and community centers. As the school year nears its beginning, what will/can be arranged to ensure that those IDPs currently sheltering in schools and not able to return to their homes continue to receive support? If there is a disruption in schooling because the schools are occupied, how will alternative school locations be identified, and how can it be ensured that this school disruption doesn't place an undue strain on relations between displaced and the host communities? -- Those displaced persons who choose to stay in established camps are likely to be the most vulnerable, facing few prospects upon their return. What services will they be able to access, for how long, and what additional provisions can be made to facilitate their reintegration? FEIERSTEIN