INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN PAKISTAN: TRANSITION TO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 001654 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM EAID PGOV PTER PK SUBJECT: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN PAKISTAN: TRANSITION TO RETURN ¶1. (SBU) Summary: With the exception of expected further displacement from Waziristan, the current internal displacement from conflict-affected areas in Pakistan appears close to an end. The government has signed on to principles of safe, voluntary, informed and dignified return and began on July 11 to facilitate the return home of the displaced to Malakand through a phased return plan based on area of origin. Return to Buner, much of it spontaneous, is proceeding apace, and life in Buner is returning to normal although trading centers and main roads are more secure than more remote villages. Humanitarian attention is turning to early recovery. Vast areas of Swat, particularly to the north of Mingora, remain insecure, however, and while returns to Swat have begun, most Swatis and humanitarian assistance community representatives believe that conditions are not yet sufficiently secure to support a return to civilian life. As the military moves to close in on Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan, displacement into D.I. Khan and Tank has not yet peaked. Current displacement from South Waziristan is estimated at over 60,000. Registration and humanitarian assistance for this displacement will be through the GOP and a local NGO, as the GOP will permit neither international humanitarian presence nor the establishment of camps. End summary. -------------- Displacement Overview -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Displacement in Pakistan first began in August 2008 when nearly 100,000 people left Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies and the Lower Dir District. This first displacement had reached approximately 556,000 when one of the world's fastest, largest displacements began in late April and early May, 2009 from Lower Dir, Buner and Swat as a result of military operations against the growing taliban presence in Northwest Frontier Province. Estimates of the total number of displaced peaked at around 3 million (468,000 families), registered in a fast-track manner in immediate response to the humanitarian crisis. A later verification process by the National Registration and Database Authority weeded out duplications, split family registrations, fraudulent registrations, those previously without national identity cards, and other anomalies and resulted in an initial figure of less than 2 million verified, registered, displaced (289,000 families). The current total overall number of verified displaced individuals, as of July 14, is approximately 2.289 million, with another 10,000 to 20,000 registrations remaining to be verified and a grievance process underway for those appealing the decision on their cases. As of July 14, approximately 2.073 million verified, registered, displaced individuals are staying with host families, in schools and in spontaneous camps, and another 216,173 are in 21 official camps. ¶3. (SBU) The Pakistani government at the federal and provincial levels and the humanitarian community worked together in May, June and July to ensure that all IDPs had access to food, shelter, medicines, water, sanitation and protection. Despite difficulties and challenges, no IDP was left hungry, and there were no disease epidemics among the IDPs. This enormous and successful humanitarian assistance operation was possible only because thousands of families across NWFP opened their homes to receive hundreds of thousands of families who were in search of shelter and sustenance. Less than 15 percent of all registered IDPs resided in official camps; the rest availed themselves of the generosity of fellow Pakistanis. The humanitarian assistance operation would also not have been a success without the disproportionately large funding role played by the United States. In FY 2008 and in FY 2009, the USG has provided more than USD 171 million in assistance to conflict-affected populations in Pakistan. ¶4. (SBU) In mid-May, the Government of Pakistan committed to provide a PKR 25,000 (USD 310) debit card to each displaced family. Initial response to this commitment was a flood of attempted new IDP registrations. After a brief ISLAMABAD 00001654 002 OF 004 government-imposed break in registrations and a thorough verification process, however, the government began distributing these cards. As of July 15, debit cards had been distributed to almost exactly half of the 289,000 verified, registered displaced families. -------------- Restricting Displaced Access to Benefits -------------- ¶5. (SBU) On June 16, the NWFP authorities issued a notification identifying as "Conflict Zones" specific union councils in Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Buner, Swat and Shangla "where there is an army operation or imminent fear of an operation." According to the notification, only people "displaced in consequence of such fear" from these areas "will be deemed IDPs." By July 6, the authorities had further reduced the areas from which IDPs could be newly registered to just 27 villages in the Charmang Valley of Bajaur, 25 villages in the Union council of Kabal in Swat, and 9 villages in the Union Council of Shamozai also in Swat. ¶6. (SBU) The humanitarian assistance community has expressed serious concern that this restriction in areas considered conflict-affected will result in the denial of benefits to those who may have left home out of understandable and genuine fear due to military operations in a neighboring union council. A map of the Conflict Zones identified on June 16 shows areas in southern Buner not identified as conflict-affected, and even a non-confict area within Buner entirely surrounded by Conflict Zones. There is also some concern that a cash-strapped government has limited the areas considered conflict-affected to limit its liability for payment of PKR 25,000 debit cards. ¶7. (SBU) As of July 17, both spontaneous and facilitated, voluntary IDP return was ongoing, while the situation in the camps was tense as many displaced families not only remained uncertain of the security conditions in their home areas but also waited, often ill-advisedly, for the government distribution of the debit cards. In Jalozai camp, for example, only 9,500 of the 22,000 families at the camp have verified registrations and thus are entitled to the cards. ¶8. (SBU) A riot broke out in Yar Hussein Camp when the Camp Administrator informed IDPs, particularly those with unverified registrations, that they would receive their next World Food Program distribution in their home areas. Following this event, the UN has made and conveyed a policy decision that all IDPs in camps (whether or not their registration has been verified) will continue to receive food and all other humanitarian assistance normally provided in the camps. -------------- Continued Needs of IDPs and Hosting Areas -------------- ¶9. (SBU) As return progresses, support will continue to be necessary for the small proportion of people who will remain displaced perhaps because home areas are still or newly affected by ongoing military operations, or because with the arrival of winter they cannot return to live in damaged or destroyed homes, or because they have not received the government's PKR 25,000 debit card or perhaps because conditions in camps or hosting arrangements are economically, socially, or politically more attractive than those in places of origin. In addition, host communities, which have allowed IDPs to occupy nearly 4,000 school buildings (now empty during the school holidays),will require school buildings in approximately six weeks when more than 700,000 children of the host communities will need to go back to school. As a result, alternative accommodation will need to be provided to nearly 180,000 IDPs if they have not returned home. It remains to be seen the extent to which humanitarian assistance and movement of humanitarian assistance personnel will be constrained by security concerns following the attempted kidnapping and July 16 shooting death of UNHCR ISLAMABAD 00001654 003.2 OF 004 personnel at Kacha Gari camp on the outskirts of Peshawar. -------------- Returns -------------- ¶10. (SBU) On July 11, 2009, the Government of NWFP and the humanitarian community came to an agreement on the core principles, guidelines and standards that would govern the return process. The core of the resulting return policy framework, signed by the Provincial Relief Commissioner, on behalf of the Chief Secretary, and the head of UNHCR's Peshawar office, on behalf of the humanitarian community, is that the return of the IDPs should be voluntary, informed, dignified, safe and sustainable. On July 13, the NWFP authorities began implementation of a phased, facilitated return plan, with phases based on the area of origin of the displaced. Return has run smoothly in its first few days. UNHCR has found the NWFP authorities to be cooperative, and there is no/no issue of forced return. The UN has requested, however, that the NWFP government provide notification of which Union Councils are safe for return and civilian life, just as the government previously formally notified which Union Councils were classified as conflict-affected areas. The UN is very clear that it is not within its mandate to determine whether areas are safe for return and that such a determination is rather a governmental responsibility. The UN is looking similarly for determinations in relation to the Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies of FATA. ¶11. (SBU) UNHCR has agreed to assist and facilitate transportation. It is providing resources to the NWFP Emergency Response Unit (ERU) to rent trucks and buses and is also assisting in documenting return in order to ensure protection. UNHCR intends to have independent NGO monitors in the locations of return to monitor conditions, and it will assist with early recovery. It is considering establishing linkages between IDP return and assistance that can be through the UN-GOP agreed program for refugee assisting and hosting areas (RAHA). IDPs are permitted to take all their donated non-food items as well as their tent with them when they return. UNHCR will provide non-food items to all those who have not received them and will supplement the non-food items kits of those who may need an additional or replacement item. ¶12. (SBU) On July 17, the spokesman of the NWFP Emergency Response Unit reported that the provincial authorities had thus far facilitated the return of 8,957 families. The plan for facilitating return to Buner (where much spontaneous, voluntary return has already occurred) has five phases based on areas of return. It targets 11,221 families of the 31,062 IDP families of Buner origin and is scheduled to take 19 days. The phased return to Swat is also phased based on areas of return but begins first with those IDPs in official camps and then moves on to those with host families and in schools and spontaneous camps. The return of Swat IDPs just from camps is scheduled in three phases over the period July 13 ) 20, and each phase brings IDPs to homes further north than the previous phase. General Nadeem told the Ambassador on July 16 that 23 percent of all IDPs had thus far returned to their home areas. While 70 percent of those displaced from Buner have returned, only 2 percent of those displaced from Swat have done so. ¶13. (SBU) According to the Prime Minister's original announcement that facilitated return would begin July 13, total repatriation was to take five to six weeks, although few in the humanitarian community believe this to be a reasonable time frame where Swat is concerned. International Committee of the Red Cross delegation head Pascal Cuttat has told the Embassy that other than certain areas in Mingora, nothing in Swat is safe, particularly in areas north of Mingora, and that there is a substantial militant presence in vast areas. Surveys in the IDP camps have found that while virtually everyone in the camps wants to return home, more than half say it is too early and unsafe. A USAID/OFDA assessment team found destruction to be ISLAMABAD 00001654 004 OF 004 limited in the areas it surveyed in southern Swat but found destruction and insecurity to be more extensive in Mingora and areas to its north. Return appeared to be robust and organized with many time-consuming checkpoints to ensure security. ¶14. (SBU) Both ICRC and the UN agencies believe that the return process to Swat will not be as easy or as fast as the government says. In Buner, where the DCO estimates that return is already at 80 percent, the capital Daggar is seen by all as safe, although NGO staff members of Buner origin still express concern about safety in villages far off the main road. The humanitarian assistance community is already staging to provide early recovery assistance in Buner. With USAID/OFDA funding, UNHabitat is ready to assist with debris-clearing and utility restoration in the virtually flattened town of Sultanwas. The UN has one food and non-food hub, and WFP is installing more; WHO is providing support to the health infrastructure. USAID/OFDA is initiating a range of grants providing support for housing repair, livelihood restoration, and health services to returned populations. There will be a need to make a true estimate of needs and to provide access to quick disbursing schemes (including cash for work) to help repair damaged homes, replant fields, restock herds, re-open business, or meet basic needs until sustainable jobs can be obtained. ¶15. (SBU) While perhaps 70 percent of those displaced from Bajaur have returned home, Bajaur is generating fresh displacement from conflict-affected areas in the Charmang Valley. -------------- South Waziristan -------------- ¶16. (SBU) South Waziristan represents a humanitarian crisis that has not yet occurred. All major roads from the East are blocked, and a military operation with humanitarian ramifications is expected shortly. The government estimates that 60,000 people have been displaced. Humanitarian assistance has been prepositioned in Bakkar. The GOP has determined that there will be no camps or international humanitarian presence in D.I. Khan or in Tank, the areas receiving the displaced. Under agreement with UNHCR, the Ministry of Social Welfare and a local NGO are undertaking registration with verification by NADRA. The NGO representative estimated that 5000 displaced families from South Waziristan were in D.I. Khan and more than 1600 in Tank; family size is estimated at ten for this area. USAID and the UN are also working through the same NGO to provide assistance to those displaced from Waziristan, and the UN has prepositioned food and non-food assistance in Bakkar in Punjab. Access for even an NGO staffed with people from the area is highly complicated due to fundamental distrust of the population of those outside the tribe and complex tribal structures. The UN is preparing for a worst case scenario of 150,000 displaced with the assumption that the conflict will be limited to South Waziristan and not include North Waziristan. An estimated 15,000 people have displaced to Afghanistan, but it is not clear whether these people are Afghans or Pakistanis. PATTERSON