AQ KHAN DEFENDS PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001607 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019 TAGS: KNNP PREL PTER PGOV MNUC PK SUBJECT: AQ KHAN DEFENDS PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS REF: A. ISLAMABAD 267 ¶B. ISLAMABAD 284 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In his periodic column in the July 15 edition of Pakistan daily "The News," A.Q. Khan further tested the boundaries of his "gag order" with an expansive defense of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. This article, like previous ones, seeks to burnish his credentials as the "father" of the program, but offers greater detail on the funding of the program and the support it received over time from a variety of Pakistani leaders. Even though it betrays no national secrets, the article is a violation of the terms of Khan's release from house arrest as described to Embassy by GOP officials (reftels),under which he is to refrain from public comment on the nuclear issue. Post believes that raising Khan's latest indiscretion with Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who previously provided assurances to Ambassador that Khan would be kept under wraps, is the best course of action at this time. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) In his periodic column in the July 15 edition of Pakistan daily "The News," A.Q. Khan published an expansive defense of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program against recent domestic criticisms. Like previous articles on nuclear issues, including one written on the 11th anniversary of Pakistan's May 1998 nuclear tests, Khan reminds readers of his central role in the founding of the program. The primary difference between this article and previous ones, however, is the level of detail he gives on some aspects of the program, including level of funding and support over time from various Pakistani leaders, including civilian Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. ¶3. (SBU) Khan begins his defense of Pakistan's nuclear weapons by recalling the atrocities committed by India, including the massacres of Muslims at Bhopal in 1947. Against the background of Indian aggression, Khan claims he returned from his lucrative work in Europe "to turn Pakistan into a nuclear power for deterrent purposes." He dismisses current detractors of Pakistan's nuclear program as bureaucrats "with very little scientific, strategic or educational knowledge on the subject," and as "CIA-paid agents." ¶4. (SBU) Khan then turns to recent criticisms that Pakistan's weapons do not act as a deterrent, Pakistan does ;not need them, and they are too expensive. Khan recalls Margaret Thatcher's argument that nuclear weapons had brought peace to Europe. Deterrence, he suggests, kept India from following through on former home minister Advani's threat to occupy Kashmir. "Other than Gen. Musharraf's misadventure in Kargil," he concludes, "there have been no major skirmishes since (the 1998 nuclear tests)." ¶5. (SBU) Comparatively, Khan argues, Pakistan's nuclear weapons program has been relatively inexpensive compared to conventional weapons. He claims that the annual budget in the early years was just $20-25 million, totaling about $300 million over the first 15 years. This included production of sufficient number of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, he states. This annual cost, he argues, was less than half that of a modern fighter aircraft, and far less than other large defense procurements. Several prominent leaders, including former Chief of Army Staff Gen. Aslam Beg, "knew how much we were spending," he claims. ¶6. (SBU) Khan further suggests that the nuclear program was a scientific boon to Pakistan. Specific gains resulting from the program include acquisition of advanced technologies, creation of a scientific culture, employment of 10,000 highly-trained scientists and engineers, and production of many conventional arms. Given these benefits, Khan concludes, it should be left to the public to decide whether the nuclear program was worth the effort and expense. Pakistan's leadership believed the program worth the investment, Khan insinuates, citing support over time from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Gen. Zia ul Haq, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Gen. Aslam Beg, among others. ¶7. (C) Comment: The English language "The News" is known for ISLAMABAD 00001607 002 OF 002 its tabloid-style exposes and has a very limited circulation. It and its parent Jang Group takes a usually critical view of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Even though it betrays no national secrets, the article is a violation of the terms of Khan's release from house arrest as described to Embassy by GOP officials, under which he is to refrain from public comment on the nuclear issue. In the past, Embassy has conveyed concerns about Khan to Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, which had been in charge of Khan's affairs before responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Interior at the time of Khan's "release." With the GOP on the defensive about nuclear security as a result of recent media coverage, however, raising Khan with SPD now could cause further harm to ongoing nonproliferation cooperation. Instead, Post believes that highlighting Khan's latest indiscretion to Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who previously provided assurances to Ambassador that Khan would be kept under wraps, may yield a more constructive response at this time. Ambassador will follow up with him. End comment. PATTERSON