PAKISTAN'S OPTIONS ON FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001562

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2019
TAGS: KNNP PREL PTER PGOV MNUC PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN'S OPTIONS ON FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF
TREATY

REF: 7/13/2009 DALTON -
MCCLELLAN/SCHULTZ/OEHLBERT/SCHEINMAN EMAIL

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: In late June, Embassy Energy Attach was
given a pre-publication draft of a paper (ref) written by
Kurshid Khan, an officer formerly with the Arms Control and
Disarmament Affairs Section of Pakistan's Strategic Plans
Division (SPD). The paper details Pakistan's views and
options on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Khan
is rumored to be in the running to replace AIR Commodore
Khalid Banuri as SPD Director for Arms Control and
Disarmament Affairs, and, therefore, could play a significant
policy-making role on FMCT in the future. He concludes that
an FMCT in any guise is likely to have more effect on
Pakistan than any of the other states with nuclear weapons
and that "in its envisaged form, FMCT does not serve the
strategic interest of Pakistan." End Summary.


2. (C) In late June, Embassy Energy Attach was given in
confidence a pre-publication draft of a paper written by
Kurshid Khan, an officer formerly with the Arms Control and
Disarmament Affairs Section of Pakistan's Strategic Plans
Division (SPD). Khan details Pakistan's views and options on
the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) under discussion at
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The paper is
intended to be published by the South Asian Strategic
Stability Institute, an Islamabad-based NGO dedicated to
nuclear and strategic issues; SPD has held up publication for
unknown reasons. The paper, titled "Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty: An Overview from Pakistan's Standpoint," describes
the history of FMCT negotiations, the current status, and
emerging trends, and discusses implications and negotiating
options for Pakistan.


3. (C) Khan begins by noting that Pakistan has consistently
supported the Shannon Mandate since 1993, seeking a
"non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices while taking into account existing fissile
material stocks." However, the paper continues, Pakistan has
sought to delay negotiations "because it was interested in
acquiring sufficient stockpiles of fissile material to
achieve relative strategic parity with India and to have a
strong deterrent capability." Some have suggested an interim
moratorium while negotiations are underway, but Khan states
that Pakistan cannot accept even a temporary moratorium
because it could "perpetually freeze the asymmetric strategic
advantages" held by India and would not be subject to
verification.

Critical Issues
--------------


4. (C) One of the key issues for Pakistan is whether to
include existing stocks in the treaty, or simply freeze
future production. Khan admits to being of two minds on this
issue. On the one hand, Pakistan is interested in declaring
and reducing existing stocks "because it fears that a cutoff
treaty could lock it into a position of disadvantage relative
to India." On the other, "Pakistan would not like to declare
its existing stocks, too." In his analysis, Pakistan's
"alternate route to build new Plutonium production reactors"
needs time to mature. Pakistan should maintain flexibility
given changes in India's strategic posture, he argues, namely
an increase in India's fissile material production capability
due to the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation initiative,
development of a second strike capability, and construction
of an anti-ballistic missile system.


5. (C) A second issue important to Pakistan is the extent to
which the treaty will include verification mechanisms.
"Pakistan is of the view that a verifiable FMCT will be able
to control the spread of nuclear materials, enhance the
proportion of weapon usable material under international

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safeguards, strengthen nuclear export control and reduce the
discrimination in the present NPT regime, thus it will serve
Pakistan's interest better without being subjected to any
discriminatory treatment," Khan asserts. He argues that a
treaty lacking a verification regime and reliant on national
technical means "would be discriminatory and against the
national interests of many developing states, and Pakistan
would be no exception." Moreover, a verification regime
"will be necessary to guarantee successful implementation" of
the treaty, and a "mere normative, soft law treaty would not
serve the purpose of nonproliferation and disarmament." Khan
acknowledges, however, that negotiating verification will be
"very tricky and would take considerable time."


6. (C) While much of the paper is devoted to analysis of the
issues noted above, Khan repeatedly raises concerns that the
long impasse on FMCT negotiations, coupled with renewed U.S.
interest in negotiating a verifiable treaty, may lead the
nuclear weapon states to move negotiations outside the CD.
He hypothesizes that "under the garb of the global war on
terror" and in light of international media attention to
terrorist threats to Pakistan's nuclear weapons, the P-5 plus
India and Israel could opt to pursue an alternate negotiating
route. In such a scenario, he worries, "the UN Security
Council may provide an alternate forum where Pakistan and
possibly Iran may be stretched to their limits. UNSC
Resolution 1540 has already set a precedent to target a few
nuclear proliferation concerned countries." "The bottom line
for Pakistan," he suggests, "should be that the U.S. should
not be provided an excuse to destroy the principal and
relatively effective multilateral negotiating forum where
countries like Pakistan and the non-nuclear weapon states
have a say in international disarmament treaty-making."

GOP Options
--------------


7. (C) Considering the recent progress in negotiations, Khan
opines, "Pakistan should consider taking the pragmatic course
and drop its demand for inclusion of existing stocks in the
treaty at an appropriate stage," and let the negotiations
proceed. He argues that during the negotiations, Pakistan
should raise its security concerns and seek to address them
in the treaty text. He suggests that Pakistan seek insertion
of language that would "reserve the right to develop fissile
material to maintain its 'minimum credible nuclear
deterrence' capability if a serious asymmetry in conventional
military balance is observed due to India's ambitious
anti-ballistic missile defense program." Similarly, Pakistan
might reserve the right to respond if India expands its
nuclear weapons program, he asserts.


8. (C) Despite his willingness to allow negotiations to
proceed, he suggests that Pakistan's security interests are
unlikely to be addressed. "From 2010 onwards, Pakistan may
have to protect its supreme national security interests in
the CD and other forums single-handedly. Pakistan would need
to maintain 'credible nuclear deterrence,' with the lowest
possible number of nuclear weapons, consistent with its
national security needs. But what it requires for minimum
credible deterrence vis-a-vis India is not easy to quantify
in concrete terms. Pakistan may be compelled to take an
undesirable step of blocking consensus as a last ditch
effort," he writes. He acknowledges that Pakistan may not be
able to withstand the pressure to join consensus, and in such
a case Pakistan must use the time between signing and entry
into force, which he estimates at five years, to close the
gap with India on fissile material stocks. He concludes
that an FMCT in any guise is likely to have more effect on
Pakistan than any of the other states with nuclear weapons
and that "in its envisaged form, it does not serve the
strategic interest of Pakistan."

Comment: Why Khan's Views Matter
--------------


9. (C) Although he has rotated out of SPD to another

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assignment, Khan is rumored to be in the running to replace
Air Commodore Khalid Banuri as SPD Director for Arms Control
and Disarmament Affairs, and, therefore, could play a
significant policy-making role on FMCT in the future. As an
institution, SPD tends to be less ideological, though still
conservative, on multilateral arms control and
nonproliferation arrangements, opposing measures that would
impede Pakistan's strategic program. Khan's assessment of
Pakistan's FMCT options, and, in particular, his assertion
that Pakistan should resist language that would constrain its
ability to maintain relative strategic parity with India, is
a fair reflection of this institutional bias. Given
Pakistan's unique circumstances, as FMCT negotiations proceed
it seems likely that Pakistan will be forced to move past
traditional Non-Aligned Movement positions and, instead,
mount a pragmatic defense of its nuclear deterrence
requirements as determined by SPD. End Comment.
PATTERSON