Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ISLAMABAD1469
2009-07-02 09:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

BUNER BEGINS TO RECOVER FROM EFFECTS OF TALIBAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM PTER EAID MARR PK 
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P 020931Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3555
INFO RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 6502
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0601
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0837
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5201
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 1949
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 7551
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001469 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER EAID MARR PK
SUBJECT: BUNER BEGINS TO RECOVER FROM EFFECTS OF TALIBAN
TAKEOVER AND EXPULSION

REF: ISLAMABAD 1360

Classified by Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001469 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER EAID MARR PK SUBJECT: BUNER BEGINS TO RECOVER FROM EFFECTS OF TALIBAN TAKEOVER AND EXPULSION REF: ISLAMABAD 1360 Classified by Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Several assessment missions to the Buner district of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) by U.S. mission personnel and contractors and by United Nations (UN) personnel over the past two weeks have revealed that life there is gradually returning to normal, two months after the beginning of the Pakistani military operation in the district. Displaced residents are trickling back into the district. Essential services are generally operational in most of the district, though not in the areas where fighting was more recent. Damage to public buildings and residences in many parts of the district has been extensive, and restrictions in place will make it more difficult for internally displaced people (IDPs) to earn a living upon their return. The serious effects of the brief militant takeover and operation in Buner foreshadow the much more extensive and politically difficult work that will be required to put Swat back together once that operation has concluded. End Summary. Military Operations Mostly Over; Heavy Police Presence - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Frontier Corps (FC) commander General Tariq Khan told General Petraeus on June 28 that Buner was &90 percent cleared8 and that all but one point of entry into the district were under the control of the FC, including both passes between Buner and Swat. Since a spate of school burnings in western Buner during the first ten days of June (associated with the FC,s offensive in those areas),there have been few significant offensive moves by militants; judging by the current area of FC operations and supporting airstrikes, organized militant resistance appears to be confined to areas in the district,s northeast, near its border with eastern Shangla district and the Kala Dhaka tribal area of Mansehra district. However, curfews remain in place from 7 P.M. to 7 A.M. in most of the district, and access for civilians to many areas of Buner appears to vary from day to day as the Pakistani military continues to pursue operations against small groups of militants on the move. ¶3. (C) An assessment team sent out by the Embassy Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) to Buner on June 16 found a strong presence of FC, army and police an
d noted in particular that police morale was quite high and that Buner residents were showing their support for the police. U.S. mission personnel who accompanied FC elements on a non-food item (NFI) kit-distribution visit indicated similar levels of apparent public support for the FC. A UN Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment Mechanism (MCRAM) team in Buner June 25 was briefed that 662 police personnel were currently present in the district, including 150 &surge8 police officers; the latter included elite police forces. Displaced Residents Returning - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) As most of the residents displaced by the fighting in Buner had taken refuge with relatives, it is difficult to give a precise number of returnees - especially as there is no &de-registration8 process for internally displaced people (IDPs). However, of the estimated ten percent of Buner IDPs who were in official camps, 540 families departed for Buner over the past week, according to the NWFP,s Emergency Response Unit (ERU). The UN MCRAM team estimated that approximately 300 families were returning daily, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) calculates on the basis of MCRAM,s assessment and those of local officials that between 150,000 and 200,000 individuals out of the estimated 350,000 Buner IDPs have returned. ¶5. (SBU) This estimate takes into account a variety of partial returns, including many initial returnees (some witnessed by the NAS assessment group in mid-June) who returned only to harvest their crops and then departed once again. Pakistani military and police personnel in the district told the MCRAM team that they consistently observed convoys carrying household supplies moving into the district, but had seen many individuals re-exiting the district prior to the 7 P.M. evening curfew. The 25,000-rupee (312 USD) ISLAMABAD 00001469 002 OF 003 debit cards being issued by the Pakistani government to registered IDPs from the Malakand division (reftel) may paradoxically be slowing the return process to Buner, as incorrect rumors in the IDP community claim that IDPs who have returned will not receive these cards. Essential Services and Governance Being Slowly Restored - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) The MCRAM team found that electricity in the district was 60 percent restored, and contacts of Consulate Peshawar indicated that the only areas still lacking electricity were those northern and western portions (representing two of the district,s eight power sectors) where militants had held out until early to mid-June. In those areas where electricity had been restored, clean drinking water was generally available; damage to the water systems had not been extensive. Markets were open in much of the district, but not all merchants had returned ) particularly in the northern and western areas of the district. As of June 26, no banks were reportedly functioning (which means that IDPs who are issued 25,000-rupee debit cards are unable to use them inside the district). ¶7. (C) The office of the Buner District Coordination Officer (DCO) was fully staffed (as it had been since mid-June, according to the NAS team),and civil administration seemed to be in good working order; however, the judiciary was not yet functioning. (Note: The judiciary may take a while to resume operations in Buner, as in much of the rest of Malakand Division, while issues surrounding the implementation of the Nizam-i-Adl regulation are worked out ) septel.) Significant Infrastructure Damage Remains - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) While much of Buner district (particularly in the south) has been relatively undamaged by either the initial militant takeover or the military operation that followed, certain areas (particularly in the north and west) have sustained heavy damage. In most of these areas of militant control, civic buildings such as police stations and government schools have been destroyed by the militants. The NAS team, which visited four of the 20 police stations and posts in the district, found all four of them to be totally destroyed. In the western city of Jewar - one of the last towns held by militants ) a USAID assessment team found that militants had destroyed primary schools, a government college, the police station, and an FC fort in the city during the short period of active militant control. ¶9. (SBU) Even more damage was caused by the operation to expel the militants, but this damage has been fairly localized to a few areas of particularly heavy fighting. Daggar, the district,s headquarters and largest city, was secured by commandos in the Special Services Group (SSG) early in the operation and saw relatively little damage. Sultanwas, a village to the north where militants regrouped and made their new headquarters after the initial phase of the Buner operation had concluded, was by contrast virtually wiped out; according to the USAID assessment team, only 40 houses and two government schools remain standing; all of the other 497 houses, shops, mosques, mills, clinics, and communal halls were destroyed. (Note: Buner,s DCO is planning to establish a camp for Sultanwas returnees.) Ambela, on the border with Mardan district where the FC operation began, sustained similarly all-encompassing damage, though the settlement was smaller than Sultanwas to begin with. Other areas of heavy fighting, such as Karakar, still have not been assessed due to movement restrictions on the USAID and MCRAM teams. ¶10. (SBU) Roads along the primary axes of the government offensive have been heavily damaged, whether through movement of tanks, emplacement and detonation of improvised explosive devices, or artillery fire and airstrikes. Some of the periodic road closures in Buner have been explained to the public (and visiting assessment teams) as required for mine clearance operations by the military. Livelihood Recovery ISLAMABAD 00001469 003 OF 003 - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) The predominantly rural nature of Buner district makes the damaged infrastructure a somewhat less pressing issue than it might otherwise be; the wheat harvest has already passed, and planting season for some of the district,s off-season crops such as beans and corn will soon begin. According to Buner,s DCO, however, the local administration has banned the planting of corn this year as a counter-insurgency measure (presumably, militants could hide among corn plants). People dependent on such crops could therefore soon be in a bad position, particularly if they were among those who were unable to harvest their wheat crops due to the ongoing operations or those forced to sell their crops at half-price due to restrictions related to the curfew. OCHA reports that water shortages and inability to tend to agricultural land and animals resulted in a reduced tobacco crop and the death of approximately 30 percent of the total livestock in Buner district. ¶12. (SBU) The single industry present in Buner has also faced issues related to the exigencies of the operation and reconstruction. According to the MCRAM team, the local administration had ordered that the district,s three marble factories will remain temporarily closed due to the burden the factories place on the existing electricity supply and security concerns related to the explosive materials and blasting activities necessary to resume operations. OCHA noted that an estimated 50,000 individuals are dependent on the marble factories for their income. ¶13. (SBU) USAID and its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) are lining up a series of short-term initiatives to bridge the gap for returnees. In addition to its planned distribution of kits of food and non-food items, USAID is planning to distribute over 700 toolkits for electricians, plumbers, masons, and other tradesmen who can benefit from reconstruction activities. Other quick impact projects include seed and livestock provision for farmers in the district and a scheme to pay one hundred laborers over a three-month period to remove debris from the destroyed village of Sultanwas. Comment - - - - ¶14. (C) Ten weeks after militants seized control in Buner, eight weeks after the beginning of the Pakistani military operation there, and two weeks after most organized militant resistance was overcome, Buner seems to be slowly returning to normal. Significant challenges remain, but the short period of militant control and the militants, shallow roots in Buner,s society are important advantages in the government's favor. The scope and expense of the destruction in Buner, however, are only a fraction of the ravages that the much more heavily populated Swat has undergone during its previous military operations, its recent four months of militant domination and the new, six-week-old military operation still ongoing there. The government of Pakistan and international donors will have to quickly absorb the lessons of the reconstruction of Buner if they wish to appropriately deal with the much more difficult and complex problem that Swat,s reconstruction will pose. PATTERSON

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