CONSEQUENCES OF A ZARDARI-NAWAZ SHOWDOWN

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OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0141/01 0221413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221413Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1120
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9681
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9466
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4317
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0914
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6636
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5513
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PK 
SUBJECT: CONSEQUENCES OF A ZARDARI-NAWAZ SHOWDOWN 
 
REF: LAHORE 9 
 
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 

>PPP Is Solidifying its Coalition

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3. (C) After a series of meetings by Ambassador, A/DCM, PO

Lahore, and Poloffs with President Zardari, Punjab Chief

Minister, Shahbaz Sharif, PML-N's National Assembly Leader of

the Opposition Chaudhry Nisar, PML-N spokesperson Ahsan

Iqbal, Minister of Interior Rehman Malik, PPP's Leader of the

House Senator Raza Rabbani, Speaker of the National Assembly

Fehmida Mirza, Nawaz's personal attorney Akram Sheikh, PML-Q

President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)

Punjab president Liaquat Baloch, PML-Q stalwart Moonis Elahi,

MQM in-country party leader Farooq Sattar, PPP presidential

spokesperson Farhatullah Babar, and other political leaders

over the past two weeks, it is clear that the political right

and left are consolidating their respective positions and are

about to clash.



4. (C) MQM leader Farooq Sattar confirmed MQM is finishing

negotiations over ministries in preparation to join the

Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government in the center. This

will give PM Gilani another 25 votes in the National Assembly

to shore up what is now technically a minority government and

provide some protection against a possible no-confidence vote

from the opposition.



..in Preparation to Attack Nawaz Sharif

--------------



5. (C) Once strengthened in the National Assembly by the

additional MQM votes, we expect PPP President Zardari to have

the Supreme Court disqualify Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N)

opposition leaders Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif from

holding public office. The Lahore High Court in June

separately declared both ineligible. The case challenging

Nawaz's eligibility is based on his prior convictions for

corruption and hijacking; the case against Shahbaz, based on

a technical violation of election law, was referred to the

Supreme Court via an election tribunal (although he has been

allowed to continue as Chief Minister pending a final

decision). The Sharifs refused to appeal because they do not

recognize the legitimacy of the Supreme Court without former



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Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. However, the PPP government

appealed on behalf of the Sharifs, and the case which had

been pending for months could wrap up as early as January 23

(septel).



6. (C) The Supreme Court ruling may be based on a

technicality that the PPP government has no grounds to

represent the Sharifs. Zardari has repeatedly told

Ambassador that he wanted to hold this pending decision over

Nawaz's head and was inclined to move against Nawaz. PML-N

party officials have stepped up anti-Zardari rhetoric in

recent weeks and continues to fund an increasingly nasty

press campaign against the PPP (mostly through the Jang media

group). The proverbial last straw for both Zardari and Nawaz

was a case which challenged an Education Board decision to

raise the exam scores of the current Supreme Court Justice's

daughter so she could enter medical school. Nawaz has used

the case to criticize Zardari and keep the issue of the

deposed judiciary alive; Zardari considered this assault as

an unnecessary provocation.



Civil Unrest Likely

--------------



7. (C) The consequences could unfold in several ways.

Nawaz, who now holds no public office and has been relatively

muted in criticizing Zardari, would have little reason not to

give Opposition Leader Chaudhry Nisar orders to heighten

parliamentary criticism and rhetoric against Zardari. With

an 83 percent approval rating in the latest IRI poll, Nawaz

is far and away the most popular politician in the country

and his disqualification will be seen by many as

anti-democratic. Shahbaz Sharif currently is Chief Minister

of Punjab. Unlike the PPP government in Islamabad, Shahbaz's

job approval ratings are high, and his departure would be

seen locally as an assault against good governance and

personally motivated by Zardari.



8. (C) In the Punjab, Shahbaz rules in a coalition with the

PPP, which has been threatening for months to withdraw its

support. PPP Governor Salman Taseer and Shahbaz have been

exchanging pot shots for months in preparation for a

showdown. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q) and the

Chaudhrys from Gujrat hold enough votes to team up with

either the PPP or Shahbaz to form a new government in Punjab.

Zardari wants the PML-Q at the national level as well, but

he recently rejected the idea of bringing Chaudhry Pevaiz

Elahi back as Chief Minister of Punjab in exchange for PML-Q

joining the coalition in Islamabad. Without this benefit,

PML-Q has little incentive to support the PPP in Punjab,

although hatred of Nawaz will probably ensure that PML-Q

continues to quietly support Zardari in Islamabad. The

Chaudhrys and the Sharifs have not been able to settle the

issue of who would lead a theoretical PML-N/PML-Q government

in Punjab.



Weighing Consequences

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9. (C) In expectation of being disqualified, Nawaz already

was planning to team up with the street power of JI to

support another lawyers' protest, now scheduled for March 9,

across the country. That protest could turn ugly; we expect

the Punjab street also to turn out in large numbers to

protest the disqualification of Nawaz, particularly if

coupled with the removal of Shahbaz as Chief Minister.

Pressed by high interest rates and energy shortages, we also

expect the textile manufacturers in Faisalabad (Punjab) to

lay off up to 30,000 workers within the next month. Smaller

textile layoffs are also expected in Lahore and Multan. Nawaz

will not miss the opportunity to exploit discontent from

newly unemployed workers in an increasingly tough economy.



10. (C) The lawyers' march is likely to take place at the

same time as Senate elections on/about March 9, according to

Deputy Election Commissioner Dilshad. This is an indirect

election in which half of the Senate's 100 members will be

chosen by provincial party assembly members (see septel for a

full explanation of the Senate vote). We expect the PPP to

increase its membership in the Senate, but the process could

be disrupted by an imbroglio in the Punjab.



11. (C) If Shahbaz is removed as Chief Minister, it would

instigate complex political maneuvering over a new provincial



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election in which all three parties would vie for control.

Shahbaz could withdraw his party from the government in order

to prevent a potential PPP victory in the provincial

assembly. While there are scenarios that would leave PPP

Governor Taseer in control of a technocratic government, PO

Lahore does not believe that Taseer has the administrative

ability or the political skill to hold a PML-N dominated

province together.



The Army?

--------------



12. (C) The big question, as always in Pakistan, is how the

Army will react. There are growing rumors that low-level

Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) officers have restarted a

quiet campaign to replace the PPP government with some sort

of technocratic government on the Bangladesh model where the

civilians would rule as a facade for the military. As yet,

these are rumors that rely on the sad but historically valid

Pakistani assumption that the Army is always poised to oust

inept civilian governments. Chief of Army Staff (COAS)

General Kayani has made it clear to Ambassador that he is

frustrated with Zardari's weak government but has no

intention of replacing him and he has repeatedly reiterated

his intention to support the civilian government. In fact,

we believe that the relationship between Kayani and Zardari,

while hardly warm, has improved. In the end, Kayani's

dislike for Nawaz outweighs his distrust for Zardari. Post

does not believe there is any evidence to indicate the Army

wants to inherit the economic and security challenges facing

the Zardari government.



13. (C) Post contacts in JI who lunched with Saudi Prince

and Intelligence Chief Muqrin during his visit to Islamabad

reported that Muqrin urged Zardari not to go after Nawaz.

Fearing a backlash in the parliament, PM Gilani and many PPP

rank and file also oppose efforts to remove PML-N from power

in the Punjab. Interior Minister Malik first tried to

dissuade Zardari from going after Nawaz, but he now is

increasingly convinced that the PPP has no other choice.



14. (C) Zardari has dismissed concerns about widespread

unrest in reaction to an attack on the Sharifs, but he has

asked Ambassador several times whether the USG would support

his efforts to disqualify the Sharifs and remove the PML-N

from power in the Punjab. To date, Ambassador has declined

to get involved in this internal political quagmire.

Pakistan's pro-PPP political left will have to struggle with

what, on principle, would be Zardari's anti-democratic move

against Nawaz.



15. (C) Comment: The salient points of this drama for

Washington are: (1) Regardless of the turmoil, the PPP

government appears to be strengthening, not weakening, its

federal coalition in the short-term; (2) There could be

significant public upheaval just as the proposed

Donors'/Friends meet for a tentative ministerial in March in

Tokyo; (3) Public unrest in Punjab will sap an already

over-burdened law enforcement system and could possibly

require Army assistance to keep public order; and, (4)

Washington's reaction to Nawaz's disqualification will frame

whether the U.S. is again seen locally as backing a

pro-American but currently besieged leader (Zardari) over the

most popular politician in Pakistan (Nawaz). We could

possibly dissuade Zardari from going down this road, but

ultimately the PPP and Nawaz are going to fight it out with

or without our support. End Comment.



PATTERSON