PESHAWAR: KILLING OF ANTI-BAITULLAH MILITANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001385 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PINR PK PREL SUBJECT: PESHAWAR: KILLING OF ANTI-BAITULLAH MILITANT COMPLICATES GOP,S WAZIRISTAN CAMPAIGN REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1358 ¶B. PESHAWAR 113 Classified By: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate Peshawar, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The June 23 assassination of Mehsud militant commander Qari Zainuddin, presumably sponsored by rival Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),removes a key element of the Pakistani government's planned campaign in South Waziristan Agency (SWA). Qari Zainuddin, who opposed Baitullah but not the jihad in Afghanistan, had been backed by the Pakistani government as an alternate leader to Baitullah and had been increasingly active in the press and in settled areas east of SWA over the past month. Unless his designated successor establishes authority quickly, Zainuddin's death will leave no immediate alternative to Baitullah for Mehsud tribesmen whose allegiance might have wavered with growing military pressure. End summary. Baitullah Mehsud Rival Assassinated -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to initial press reports confirmed by Consulate contacts, anti-Baitullah militant leader Qari Zainuddin Mehsud was assassinated on the morning of June 23. An armed man who may have been one of Zainuddin's bodyguards, entered a room in Zainuddin's compound in Dera Ismail Khan after dawn prayers and opened fire. Zainuddin and one aide were killed; several others were wounded. Later in the morning, Misbahuddin Mehsud, Zainuddin's brother and spokesman, was named in the press as Zainuddin's successor as leader of the militant group; however, a consulate contact who talks to the group says that the group has not yet ratified his selection. Qari Zainuddin as Alternate Mehsud Leader -------------- ¶3. (C) Qari Zainuddin, in his mid-twenties, was the first cousin of Abdullah Mehsud, a one-legged former Guantanamo Bay detainee who was one of the most prominent Mehsud militants fighting against coalition forces in Afghanistan prior to his death in July 2007 in a Pakistani commando raid in Baluchistan. Zainuddin, who reportedly had spent time as a member of the TTP, had focused his efforts over the past several months on gaining support among Mehsud tribesmen living in those areas where the government exercises some level of control, particularly the Dera Ismail Khan and Tank districts and Frontier Region Tank. (Note: Many Mehsud families own property in DI Khan and Tank and use it as a winter home.) As of June 14, Zainuddin had claimed to have 3,000 followers. Residents of Tank reported that Zainuddin's militia was offering arms, ammunition, and bonuses of 5-8,000 rupees to new recruits. Our contacts uniformly believed that the Pakistani government was footing the bill. ¶4. (SBU) From the beginning of June, Zainuddin had repeatedly met with the Pakistani press in order to raise his profile as the primary Mehsud challenger to Baitullah, and on June 22 he had announced an amnesty for all Mehsuds who abandoned Baitullah. However, Zainuddin had made it clear that his anti-Baitullah rhetoric should not be construed as anti-jihadi. He repeatedly called Baitullah an agent of India, Israel, and the United States whose aim was to distract Pakistanis from the true goal of jihad in Afghanistan, and he had publicly pledged to send his forces into Afghanistan to fight coalition forces once Baitullah has been defeated. Setback for Government,s SWA Strategy -------------- ¶5. (C) The death of Qari Zainuddin is a setback for the Pakistani government's plans for its upcoming SWA campaign. The most significant effects will be felt in the "intimidation game." Zainuddin's death tips the scales in favor of Baitullah Mehsud. Though primarily important in the areas of the Mehsud diaspora, Zainuddin,s challenge had had an effect even in the Mehsud areas of SWA, where Baitullah,s ISLAMABAD 00001385 002 OF 002 rule and the fear he inspired was absolute. Over past weeks, Zainuddin had both publicly and privately indicated that Mehsud maliks should be dealing with him rather than with Baitullah. According to Pakistani press, this had unnerved some maliks so much that they had taken refuge in "medical treatment" in Islamabad rather than risk offending either warlord by picking sides. ¶6. (C) A more concrete effect of Zainuddin's assassination is the potential increase in the vulnerability of the Pakistani military,s rear areas. Along with an allied militia led by Turkestan Bhittani, whose Bhittani tribe dominates access into and out of SWA along the Wana-Tank road, Zainuddin,s group had made TTP activities in the settled areas east of SWA more difficult. With Pakistani government support, the allied groups had engaged in assassinations of TTP-affiliated Mehsuds and occasional armed clashes in those districts from mid-May (ref B),resulting in the deaths of at least 30 suspected TTP members. Qari Zainuddin's assassination may intensify militant-on-militant violence, which has the potential to spill over and impact civilians, particularly in public places such as mosques and markets. The Pakistani army's logistics lines also run through these areas, and insecurity there will increase difficulties in resupply and coordination. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The Pakistani government's backing for Qari Zainuddin against Baitullah Mehsud in the run-up to the beginning of its campaign in SWA had been the latest example of its divide-and-rule strategy for dealing with militants, and it displays both the positives and the weaknesses of the strategy. The promotion of Zainuddin's group over the past weeks had increased the pressure on Mehsud leaders who support Baitullah ) whether that support was willing or coerced. Zainuddin's death, however, breaks the stride of this anti-Baitullah momentum, and precedent suggests that it will be difficult to recover. Twice before, in the Bara tehsil of Khyber agency and in Mohmand agency, the TTP has assassinated rival militant leaders backed by the Pakistani government; in both cases, those leaders' groups melted away, paving the way for a period of TTP dominance of those areas. ¶8. (C) The assassination of nearly 300 Waziristan elders over the past four years with no direct consequences against the attackers has been cited by multiple contacts as a key problem for the government in getting community leaders off of the fence in support of the government. Mehsud elders, as well as others, will certainly be watching the government response to Qari Zainuddin's killing closely as they assess who is most likely to be the "winner" in the contest between the government and Baitullah Mehsud. End comment. PATTERSON