ISLAMABAD EAC MEETING 06/06/09

S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 001258 NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2014 TAGS: ASEC PTER PREL AMGT CACS PK SUBJECT: ISLAMABAD EAC MEETING 06/06/09 REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1044 ¶B. ISLAMABAD 0776 ¶C. ISLAMABAD 0766 To: SECSTATE WASHDC - PRIORITY Action: DS From: AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD (ISLAMABAD 1258 - PRIORITY) TAGS: ASEC PTER PREL AMGT CACS PK Captions: NOFORN Subject: ISLAMABAD EAC MEETING 06/06/09 Ref: A. ISLAMABAD 1044 B. ISLAMABAD 0776 C. ISLAMABAD 0766 _____________________________________________ ____________________ Classified By: DCM Gerald M. Feierstein; Reason 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (SBU) The DCM chaired an EAC meeting on 06 June 2009 to discuss the steady rise in terrorist threat reporting in the aftermath of the PAKMIL operations in Swat and review the personnel security measures currently in place to lessen vulnerability in our heightened threat climate. All sections/agencies were represented. ¶2. (S/NF) RSO and GRPO reviewed the current state of terrorist threat reporting and host country countermeasures to deter a terrorist attack in Islamabad. There is a growing body of intelligence to indicate Baitullah Mehsud and the Tehrik-e Taliban are desperately seeking to target urban areas in retaliation for PAKMIL operations in Swat. Likely targets in the Islamabad area include Pakistani government buildings, Inter-service Intelligence (ISI) facilities, police installations, Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) buildings and large public markets located in the F/6 and F/7 areas of the city. Separate reporting suggests Pakistani Taliban militants ordered suicide attack cells in Islamabad/Rawalpindi to target unspecified five-star hotels, government buildings, military and police installations, as well as unspecified diplomatic areas. ¶3. (C) Pakistani security forces have implemented extraordinary security measures in Islamabad and Rawalpindi in the wake of the 5/27 attack in Lahore that targeted the Rescue-15 and ISI compounds. The newly-appointed Inspector General Police (IGP) for Islamabad implemented a multi-tiered system of police checkpoints, to include many random, "rolling" checks to interdict terrorist movements. According to the IGP, a number of terrorists in the final stages of planning have been detained over the course of the last two weeks and intelligence gained from interrogation has led to further arrests. The IGP believes the threat is real and the terrorists determined, but the flexible security plan for the capital is paying dividends. Despite the heightened security plan for the capital, a suicide bomber attempted to penetrate the Rescue-15 center in Islamabad's G/8 sector on 6/6, killing two policemen and injuring six after detonating an IED after being confronted at the facility checkpoint. The action of the police mitigated further casualties. ¶4. (S/NF) The DCM led a discussion on the serious threat of terrorist attack in Islamabad (and throughout Pakistan) and the Mission security policies in place to lessen the vulnerability of Mission personnel while we continue to carry out vital foreign policy objectives in Pakistan. The EAC discussed the seriousness and long term significance of targeted terrorist reporting in Islamabad and the Mission response. While our footprint within Islamabad will shrink upon the opening of the TDY lodging facility on the Embassy compound at the end of June, there is still a significant number of employees living outside the compound that must traverse the city on a daily basis. Upon review of Embassy personnel security guidance, the EAC was unanimous in belief that these measures continue to provide the greatest chance of lessening our vulnerability to targeted attacks and mitigate the potential for being a victim of collateral damage. Current security policies are geared to keeping Embassy personnel out of the high risk situations while allowing some freedom to conduct essential personal business outside the Enclave. ¶5. (C) In discussing Embassy personnel's perceptions of the security climate, EAC members noted that access to terrorist reporting differs based on office/agency, job, physical location, etc. While significant terrorist threats are discussed at each Country Team, the crush of business often precludes many employees from focusing on the immediate threat climate. The EAC reemphasized the need to keep all employees briefed and focused on the serious threat conditions we face in Pakistan - the reason we operate in a restricted personal security environment. Section/Agency heads will refocus their efforts to keep respective sections up to date on terrorist threat reporting. RSO will continue to reinforce the real danger from terrorism in both the new-arrival and monthly refresher briefings. ¶6. (SBU) The EAC recommended that the Pakistan Travel Warning be revised to further highlight the significant terrorist threat facing Pakistan. Non-essential travel is not recommended and security measures consistent with those followed by official Americans are provided. CONS is clearing the recommended update. DCM closed the meeting after reminding all EAC members on the "No Double Standard" issues the USG operates under, for both official/non-offical Americans and also internal to the Embassy. Section/agency heads cannot impose restrictions more stringent than those followed by the general population. The EAC remains the one forum to discuss security implications associated with terrorist threat and appropriate Embassy response. The EAC unanimously concurred that current security guidance is appropriate and no further restrictions will be implemented at this time. PATTERSON _____________________________________________ ____________________