U.S. COAST GUARD RECOMMENDS GOP INCREASE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001245

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019
TAGS: EWWT ECON ETRD KHLS IMO PREL PTER PK
SUBJECT: U.S. COAST GUARD RECOMMENDS GOP INCREASE
INDIVIDUAL SHIP SECURITY

REF: 09 STATE 004309

Classified By: Gerald M. Feierstein for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary. A U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) International
Port Security Program delegation visited Islamabad, Karachi
and Port Qasim April 19-23. They evaluated Pakistan's
compliance with the International Ship and Port Security
(ISPS) Code of the International Maritime Organization and
discussed enhanced security measures in Pakistan ports.
After meeting with officials from the federal Ministry of
Ports and Shipping, and conducting site visits at the Port of
Karachi and Port Qasim, the USCG recommended that Pakistan
require that individual ships entering Pakistani ports
improve their security posture. The USCG has not yet issued
its written report, but delegation members stated that they
would likely request that the USG impose conditions of entry
on vessels entering the U.S. from Pakistan if increased
security measures were not implemented. While port officials
were initially defensive about the USCG evaluation, Joint
Secretary Zaidi of Ports and Shipping ultimately responded
positively and said that additional measures were "possible."
End summary.

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Background
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2. (C) In January 2009, EconCouns informed the GOP Ministry
of Ports and Shipping that the USG questioned whether
Pakistan port security adequately addressed the terror threat
level against Pakistan and U.S. interests. Based on this
determination, the USG requested Pakistan to implement and
maintain heightened (ISPS Level 2) security measures in all
Pakistani port facilities. The USG also offered to send a
USCG delegation to assess the situation on the ground.


3. (C) Three levels of security exist in the ISPS Code:
Level 1 (normal),Level 2 (heightened) and Level 3
(exceptional). Each country defines its levels of security
depending on its particular circumstances, and what is
considered "normal" in one country may be "heightened" in
another country. After seeing the security measures at the
Port of Karachi and Port Qasim and getting a detailed read
out of their procedures, the USCG softened its original
position that the ports in Pakistan must always maintain
Level 2 security. Level 2 security, according to Pakistani
protocol, would effectively stop commerce in the ports as it
requires a draw down to skeleton staffing.

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Ministry Meetings
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4. (C) The USCG delegation met in Islamabad with GOP
Ministry of Ports and Shipping S.M. Hassan Zaidi, and briefed
him about the USCG International Port Security Program and
different types of training programs, exchanges, and other
assistance that might be available. The delegation then
visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and obtained formal
permission to tour the Port of Karachi and Port Qasim.

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Port of Karachi
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5. (C) In Karachi, the delegation met with Vice Admiral M.
Asad Qureshi, Director General of Ports and Shipping; Captain

M. Rashid Anwer, Director of ISPS for the Ministry of Ports
and Shipping, and a large group of security officers from the
Karachi International Container Terminal (KICT),the Pakistan
International Container Terminal (PICT),and the Port Qasim
Authority. The security officers described their
organizational structures and facilities and provided an
overview of their compliance with ISPS requirements.


6. (C) The delegation also visited the Karachi Port
Operation Tower, which gave the best overall view of the
facilities. The delegation noted that the land traffic
through the port facility was heavy with trucks and

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pedestrians, but also that the port entrance appeared to have
a full security check, including armed guards and heavy metal
swinging gates to bar unauthorized entry. The electronic
security cards issued by the Port biometrically tie to the
national identity cards issued by the GOP.


7. (C) The water side of the Karachi Port was fully
patroled by boats operated by the Navy, Coast Guard, the
Maritime Security Agency, and Customs. The Karachi Port
Facility Security Officer (PFSO) explained the various
checkpoints that each vessel must pass to enter the harbor,
and the delegation viewed the computer tracking systems in
place in the Port Tower. The USCG delegation noted that a
public harbor abutted the main entry and that several small
fishing boats were crossing through the area where ships
enter. The PFSO noted that even small fishing boats are
required to register and carry electronic Vessel Monitoring
System devices.


8. (C) The delegation also drove through the KICT and PICT
facilities. They noted that some of the perimeter security
appeared to be close to overhanging trees, but otherwise saw
a heavy security presence on foot and in vehicles.


9. (C) Entry into the Port from the land side was strictly
controlled and included a large number of armed foot patrols
and identification checks. However, the USCG expressed some
concern about the security of ships on the water side. The
USCG estimated that the Port's security was in the "Level 1
plus" range, and opined that the ships themselves needed to
elevate their security posture to enter the Port. The USCG
expressed the opinion that ships might not have sufficient
guards or lighting on board in a Level 1 environment to
prevent an incursion from the water side of the ship.

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Port Qasim
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10. (C) Port Qasim is located in a more remote area and its
land side security was much tighter than was possible in
urban Karachi. In Port Qasim, no outside transporters are
allowed to enter and the Port itself arranges for container
drop and delivery, minimizing the number of people at the
facility. The delegation met with the Port Qasim Authority
PFSO and other security officers, along representatives from
Progas Pakistan, DP World, and Fauji Oil Terminal, companies
operating from different berths in Port Qasim.


11. (C) Port Qasim officials noted that they were in the
process of obtaining four new patrol boats, and Progas was
acquiring an additional boat. The PFSO of Fauji Oil Terminal
emphasized that their terminal contained only a single point
of entry with armed guards, and that they had acquired two
new patrol boats, biometric identification controls, car
search devices, metal detectors, and a comprehensive closed
circuit television security system.


12. (C) The USCG noted that Port Qasim also was operating
at a "Level 1 plus," and expressed some concern that the
security on ships would not match that of the Port. The USCG
recommended that the GOP require ships to raise their
security level to match the level of port security upon entry
to the Port.

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Conclusions
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13. (C) The USCG gave the Ministry of Ports and Shipping
very high marks for their comprehensive training programs and
exercises and such initiatives as Port Qasim's centralized
bomb disposal unit. The USCG also noted that most of the
company and Ministry officials were retired military who
likely had significant experience in security matters.


14. (C) Comment: The USCG indicated that Pakistan's port
security was sufficient, but stated that the GOP should
require ships to raise their security level on entry into
ports. The USCG will likely ask the GOP to draw up a

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Declaration of Security for each ship entering a port, which
would include measures such as extra guards and enhanced
exterior lighting, with the cost to be borne by the ships.
The USCG stated that, because ports already have a heightened
level of security, ships entering the port without extra
security measures add vulnerability that needs to be
addressed. By implementing extra measures, ships can raise
their security level to match the level of port security and
better prevent security breaches. On entry into the U.S.,
each ship's Declaration of Security would be reviewed to
ensure that the ship had actually fulfilled its conditions
while in Pakistan. The USCG did not mention any particular
timetable. The alternative would be far more costly and
detrimental to Pakistani commerce, and would include the U.S.
issuing a Port Security Advisory for Pakistan, imposing
conditions of entry into the U.S. for any ship that lists
Pakistan as one of its last five ports of call.

PATTERSON