Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ISLAMABAD123
2009-01-21 04:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
DCM MEETING WITH FORMER PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR TO
how-toVZCZCXRO1034 OO RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #0123 0210426 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 210426Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1084 INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9676 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9454 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4304 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0902 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6632 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5507 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 000123
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PK PREF PREL PTER
SUBJECT: DCM MEETING WITH FORMER PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR TO
AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 000123
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PK PREF PREL PTER
SUBJECT: DCM MEETING WITH FORMER PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR TO
AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) Summary. During a January 12 meeting with DCM, Rustam
Shah Mohman, former Pakistan Ambassador to Afghanistan and
former Chief Secretary for the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP),expressed his long-held view that most of Pakistan's
problems in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
were due to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. He blamed
former President Musharraf for introducing the Pakistan Army
into FATA without prior consultations with the people and for
creating a gulf between the people of FATA and the rest of
Pakistan. DCM agreed with Rustam's view that developmental
and legal change must be introduced gradually in FATA but
disagreed that the current problems in FATA could be laid at
our door. Rustam's major interest, however, was to seek
clarification about USG policy towards negotiations with the
Taliban: DCM explained that the USG supports the Afghan
government's efforts to seek reconciliation with those
Taliban elements who are willing to lay down their arms and
recognize the Afghan government. End Summary.
2. (C) On January 12, the DCM, along with PolCouns and NAS
Senior Advisor, met with Rustam Shah Mohman, the former
Pakistan Ambassador to Afghanistan, former Chief Secretary
for the NWFP, and former federal Interior Secretary, to
discuss Pakistan and USG strategies in the NWFP and FATA.
Rustam, who is currently a consultant for the
Pakistan-Afghanistan peace jirga and resides in Peshawar,
repeated his long-held belief that the FATA and NWFP never
experienced problems with militants until the "U.S. War in
Afghanistan."
3. (C) Rustam argued that the deteriorating situation in the
FATA and NWFP can be traced back to two "big blunders" by
former President Pervez Musharraf. First, Musharraf did not
explain his policies on the FATA to the people, creating a
great disconnect between the FATA and the rest of the
country. Second, Musharraf, at the pressure of the USG, sent
the Pakistan Army into the region without any prior
consultation with the tribes of the FATA. Thus, the tribes
felt isolated from the rest of the country and then "invaded"
as the Army began to man posts within their areas.
4. (C) In Rustam's opinion, the way to solve the growing
militancy issue in Pakistan is to solve the problems in
Afghanistan. Then, in consultation with the tribes and with
the respect of the traditions of the FATA, development and
legal changes should be implemented gradually in an
"evolutionary, not revolutionary" manner.
5. (C) The DCM agreed that change needed to be evolutionary
but took exception to the idea that the militancy in FATA was
the result of U.S. actions in Afghanistan. He outlined the
USG strategy, which had begun in 2006, to concurrently
increase development required to improve dismal
socio-economic conditions in FATA and to build up the
capability of Pakistani security and law enforcement agencies
to combat militancy. This included recent efforts to assist
people displaced by military action and to provide jobs
through USAID's "Livelihoods".
6. (C) Additionally, he explained that the USG is working
with the GOP on bettering the health care and education
systems, along with trying to strengthen the economy of the
FATA and NWFP through the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
(ROZs). Another objective of the Mission is to continue to
encourage the GOP for political reforms in the FATA - which
include changes to the Frontier Crimes Regulation and the
extension of the Political Parties Act into the tribal areas
- to assist in fully bringing the area into the country.
7. (C) Getting to what appeared to be his major reasons for
seeking a meeting, Rustam asked if the USG had plans to bring
those taliban who lay down their arms into the government
structure. The DCM assured him that the Mission had made it
clear that we supported the Afghan government's efforts to
reach out to those taliban elements who were willing to lay
down their arms and recognize the government. So far,
however, we had not seen a positive response from Mullah Omar
and his Taliban associates.
PATTERSON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PK PREF PREL PTER
SUBJECT: DCM MEETING WITH FORMER PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR TO
AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) Summary. During a January 12 meeting with DCM, Rustam
Shah Mohman, former Pakistan Ambassador to Afghanistan and
former Chief Secretary for the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP),expressed his long-held view that most of Pakistan's
problems in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
were due to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. He blamed
former President Musharraf for introducing the Pakistan Army
into FATA without prior consultations with the people and for
creating a gulf between the people of FATA and the rest of
Pakistan. DCM agreed with Rustam's view that developmental
and legal change must be introduced gradually in FATA but
disagreed that the current problems in FATA could be laid at
our door. Rustam's major interest, however, was to seek
clarification about USG policy towards negotiations with the
Taliban: DCM explained that the USG supports the Afghan
government's efforts to seek reconciliation with those
Taliban elements who are willing to lay down their arms and
recognize the Afghan government. End Summary.
2. (C) On January 12, the DCM, along with PolCouns and NAS
Senior Advisor, met with Rustam Shah Mohman, the former
Pakistan Ambassador to Afghanistan, former Chief Secretary
for the NWFP, and former federal Interior Secretary, to
discuss Pakistan and USG strategies in the NWFP and FATA.
Rustam, who is currently a consultant for the
Pakistan-Afghanistan peace jirga and resides in Peshawar,
repeated his long-held belief that the FATA and NWFP never
experienced problems with militants until the "U.S. War in
Afghanistan."
3. (C) Rustam argued that the deteriorating situation in the
FATA and NWFP can be traced back to two "big blunders" by
former President Pervez Musharraf. First, Musharraf did not
explain his policies on the FATA to the people, creating a
great disconnect between the FATA and the rest of the
country. Second, Musharraf, at the pressure of the USG, sent
the Pakistan Army into the region without any prior
consultation with the tribes of the FATA. Thus, the tribes
felt isolated from the rest of the country and then "invaded"
as the Army began to man posts within their areas.
4. (C) In Rustam's opinion, the way to solve the growing
militancy issue in Pakistan is to solve the problems in
Afghanistan. Then, in consultation with the tribes and with
the respect of the traditions of the FATA, development and
legal changes should be implemented gradually in an
"evolutionary, not revolutionary" manner.
5. (C) The DCM agreed that change needed to be evolutionary
but took exception to the idea that the militancy in FATA was
the result of U.S. actions in Afghanistan. He outlined the
USG strategy, which had begun in 2006, to concurrently
increase development required to improve dismal
socio-economic conditions in FATA and to build up the
capability of Pakistani security and law enforcement agencies
to combat militancy. This included recent efforts to assist
people displaced by military action and to provide jobs
through USAID's "Livelihoods".
6. (C) Additionally, he explained that the USG is working
with the GOP on bettering the health care and education
systems, along with trying to strengthen the economy of the
FATA and NWFP through the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
(ROZs). Another objective of the Mission is to continue to
encourage the GOP for political reforms in the FATA - which
include changes to the Frontier Crimes Regulation and the
extension of the Political Parties Act into the tribal areas
- to assist in fully bringing the area into the country.
7. (C) Getting to what appeared to be his major reasons for
seeking a meeting, Rustam asked if the USG had plans to bring
those taliban who lay down their arms into the government
structure. The DCM assured him that the Mission had made it
clear that we supported the Afghan government's efforts to
reach out to those taliban elements who were willing to lay
down their arms and recognize the government. So far,
however, we had not seen a positive response from Mullah Omar
and his Taliban associates.
PATTERSON