LOOKING AHEAD: SUPPORT FOR MILITARY/HUMANITARIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 001184 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM MARR MOPS PREF PK SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD: SUPPORT FOR MILITARY/HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS REF: PESHAWAR 110 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Bolstered by ongoing popular and political support, the Pakistani security forces appear determined to win against militants. We expect a Waziristan campaign as early as late June. Meanwhile, Pakistan's military faces an entrenched enemy in Mingora, Swat, and the security situation in Bajaur and Mohmand, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, may be fraying. It is unclear if the military has the capacity to fight on more than one front at the same time. Coping with a growing IDP population is something the Mission believes the UN and other international agencies can handle in the short-term; the UN, however, needs to appoint a senior level humanitarian coordinator. ¶2. (C) Longer-term, the real challenge will be helping Pakistan hold and develop areas cleared of militancy. We and the international community need to help the national and NWFP provincial government manage an organized return of IDPs to their communities, and this will require: (1) restoring basic infrastructure destroyed by combat (water, electricity, roads); (2) restoring a civil service and civilian law enforcement presence (in many cases, this means starting from scratch to develop/train manpower and build/fix police stations); (3) rebuilding for the longer-term (schools, health care and courtrooms/jails); and (4) implementing a return plan publicized through a structured strategic communications campaign. We need both bilateral U.S. programs and coordinated donor assistance. Above all, for assistance programs throughout Pakistan, we need the UN and/or the World Bank. We are exploring whether the Friends of Pakistan can play a helpful role in planning the way forward. End Summary. Military Overview -------------- ¶3. (C) Bolstered by ongoing popular and political support, the Pakistani Army continues to engage militants in Malakand Division. By Pakistani standards, this campaign has to date been more effective than previous attempts to oust militants in Swat. Rather than just controlling the main roads and temporarily occupying cities, as has been the case in the past, the Army began operations from the mountain heights and progressively moved down through the Peochar Valley to destroy enemy strongholds and interdict avenues of escape from Mingora and surrounding locales. Rather than shell indiscriminately and cause large scale collateral damage, the Army has put boots on the ground and conducted more careful artillery and aerial bombardment. Military actions have been accompanied by a nascent attempt at a strategic communications/hearts and minds campaign through daily TV briefs and delivery of government-supplied Army food and relief supplies to the stranded civilian population. ¶4. (C) The Army leadership reports to Post that it currently has 23 infantry brigades committed to duty on the western border with Afghanistan. Eight brigades are conducting combat operations in Malakand. There are also five to six Special Services Group (SSG) brigades in the fight. Forces have been moved from two of the Army corps on the eastern border to the western theater. In addition, three wings of the Frontier Corps are supporting Army operations in Malakand. Hampering the effort are command and control challenges and the lack of counter-insurgency training. Just as important, the operational rates of rotary wing aircraft currently committed to the western theater operations are deteriorating. Of particular concern to Chief of Army Staff Kayani is the available number of Mi17 helicopters. General Kayani claims to have only five Mi17 aircraft currently operational in the fight. The Pakistan Air Force is flying F-16 sorties over Swat, but has been judicious in targeting missions to avoid civilian casualties. (Comment: Progress in responding to Kayani's desperation on helicopter lift is extremely significant and the most positive indicator of U.S. commitment to support the Pakistani military possible. End Comment) ¶5. (C) Kayani reported May 28 that over 90 soldiers had ISLAMABAD 00001184 002 OF 004 been killed and 279 were injured during recent operations; varying reports put the number of militants killed at over 1,000; there are no credible reports on civilian casualties. Given the urban nature of Mingora and the need for continued house-to-house fighting, however, we believe success in Swat will inevitably result in more civilian deaths. ¶6. (C) As of May 29, the Army appears to have cleared about 70 percent of Mingora. Stiff resistance remains, but it is impossible to know how many militants are still there. Pakistani forces are taking a deliberate approach, in part in order to avoid collateral damage. There has been progress and the Army does seem to have the upper hand in its bid to clear Mingora, but its own approach and the ability of even a fairly small number of holed up militants to delay and obstruct the government's forces make optimistic predictions of the town being cleared in a manner of days doubtful. It is in the taliban's interest to tie up as many Pakistani forces for as long as possible while they create problems elsewhere. ¶7. (C) The long awaited retaliation from Baitullah Mehsud has begun. The GOP has increased significantly its security procedures in Islamabad and Rawalpindi after the May 27 suicide bombing/attack on ISI/police buildings in Lahore and the May 28 suicide bombings in Peshawar. In addition, the security situation in Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies, Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is showing signs of deterioration, and the Frontier Corps (FC) is getting very limited air support for its operations. The FC also is engaged in operations in Orakzai Agency, and militants have been attacking Army/FC posts in South Waziristan. Waziristan Action -------------- ¶8. (C) Thus, Kayani's careful campaign plan of beginning operations in Bajaur and moving deliberately southwest through FATA to the Wazirstans has been upset. With Baitullah Mehsud using his Waziristan base of operations to launch attacks throughout FATA and into the settled areas of Pakistan, Kayani has little choice now but to move as quickly as possible to the Waziristans. Based on observations of troop movements and other preparation, we now expect a Waziristan campaign as early as late June. If the Army cannot begin operations by July, Kayani most likely will wait until after Ramadan, which begins in late August. ¶9. (C) There are indications that Mehsud is preparing for major conflict in the Waziristans. He has ordered some of the population of South Waziristan to flee (approximately 40,000 have left so far) and is calling militants back from other areas of FATA and Afghanistan. That could be good news for both U.S. forces in Afghanistan and for the Pakistani Army as his forces vacate some areas; however, a stronger and more fortified militant presence in the Waziristans will make it harder for an already taxed Pakistani Army and FC to succeed in combat operations there. ¶10. (C) It simply is too soon to make a prediction on the likelihood the Pakistanis will defeat Mehsud, but historically, the Pakistanis have not been able to handle more than one combat area at a time. Beyond Mehsud, it is unclear if the Army/FC will take on the Haqqanis, Commander Nazir or Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. For al-Qaida elements, the Waziristans represent a key safe haven, so the Pakistanis will face a long, entrenched fight if it is their intention to take on these extremist elements. How to Hold -------------- ¶11. (C) Particularly given the prospect of multiple military engagements, the question of how Pakistan will hold areas cleared of militants is becoming acute. Currently, Kayani has told us he will deploy Lt. General Nadeem's 37th division of the 1st Corp to hold Swat. IGFC Major General Khan plans to use a combination of FC forces and local lashkars to hold areas of Bajaur and Mohmand (assuming he retains control of Buner and Dir). Local law enforcement capacity in both FATA (where there are no formal police ISLAMABAD 00001184 003 OF 004 forces) and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) is minimal and insufficient in the face of better armed, equipped and organized militants. Even in areas of NWFP that appear increasingly cleared of militants, including Buner, the lack of electrical power and water will make it nearly impossible to restore immediately civilian governance. ¶12. (C) With the support of Lt. General Nadeem, we are encouraging the GOP and the NWFP government to expand and accelerate planning to bring back civil administrators and police. PM Gilani announced May 28 that the GOP had planned a post-military operation strategy for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Malakand Division, but details remain vague and resources are notably lacking. The NWFP announced plans to hire recently retired Army officers to bolster police forces; again, it is unclear how this proposal will be resourced or implemented. Growing IDP Population -------------- ¶13. (C) Meanwhile, the IDP population continues to grow, with current estimates ranging as high as 3 million. The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) expects to complete database entry of IDP registrations within days, and many expect the IDP numbers to drop 20-30 percent due to duplicate registration and attempts by non-IDPs to access IDP benefits, particularly the 25,000 rupee stipend promised by the government. There is no uniformity across IDP camps, especially those more directly managed by the NWFP government, but given support from UNHCR, WFP, ICRC, other relief agencies and NGOs, post believes that the overwhelming majority of camp residents are receiving adequate food, medical care and shelter. As the summer progresses, heat, health and sanitation issues will be the primary challenges. ¶14. (C) The larger problem, however, is the growing number of IDPs who are choosing to stay with family and friends -- now 85 percent of registered IDPs are outside the camps, and others may not be registered at all. WFP and UNHCR are increasing the number of hubs providing food and non-food items to IDPs. The pending Waziristan campaign is expected to increase IDP numbers by as much as 720,000 (80 percent of the area's 900,000 population). Losing Hearts and Minds -------------- ¶15. (C) Unlike the national outpouring of support for victims of the 2005 earthquake, the Pakistani response to the IDP situation is tainted by ethnic and political overtones. The muted international response has not helped the situation. The local media is now running spots lauding the martyrdom of soldiers, rewards for the arrest of wanted militants, and stories about the brutality of the taliban. Within the Pashtun community, however, the sense that the rest of Pakistan has written them off is growing. The lack of GOP response to growing militancy in Swat led the Awami National Party/NWFP government to strike a deal with the taliban in the first place. ¶16. (C) Years of neglect in terms of budgetary/security support of NWFP by Islamabad has been exacerbated recently. The NWFP government has had to cancel its entire development budget to increase meager police salaries. Despite the transfer of 1 billion rupees to the NWFP government in May, Prime Minister Gilani's promised initial cash stipend of 25,000 rupees per family for IDPs has yet to materialize. The government's recent decision to provide this stipend prior to IDP's return home has hardened IDPs' decision to delay return until receipt of this support and has also resulted in massive attempts at fraudulent registration. ¶17. (C) PM Gilani has stated that IDPs are Pakistanis who can travel anywhere they choose. Nevertheless, the government is trying to prevent IDPs from establishing camps in major cities, including Islamabad and Karachi, and GOP officials have made clear to the UN that there will no IDP camps in Punjab. Lt. Gen. Nadeem has also made clear that only IDPs from certain areas and currently in certain areas will receive the 25,000 rupee benefit. Sindh Province ISLAMABAD 00001184 004 OF 004 officially said that IDPs (read Pashtuns) were not welcome in a province where recent migrations have threatened to make Sindhis a minority in their own area. Punjab has offered help to IDPs but made it clear that IDPs from the Waziristans are not welcome in Punjab. Concerns are particularly high about IDP outflows from Waziristan given the strong militant presence in the area and government officials have made clear that they will attempt to prevent this IDP community from leaving NWFP. Winning Hearts and Minds -------------- ¶18. (C) There are real short-term IDP humanitarian needs that must be met to maintain popular Pakistani support for current military operations. The reality is that UN and other international agencies can do this; they would be able to do it better if the UN increases its staff and appoints a senior humanitarian coordinator. ¶19. (C) The real challenges, however, lie further ahead. We and the international community need to help the national and NWFP provincial government manage an organized return of IDPs to their communities, and this will require: (1) restoring basic infrastructure destroyed by combat (water, electricity, roads, government buildings); (2) restoring a civil service and civilian law enforcement presence (in many cases, this means starting from scratch to develop/train manpower and re-equip the police forces); (3) rebuilding for the longer-term (schools, health care and police stations/courtrooms/jails); and (4) implementing a return plan publicized through a structured strategic communications campaign. For this we need both bilateral U.S. programs and coordinated donor assistance. We have been discussing with key members of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan whether there may be a role for the group in advising and supporting Pakistani efforts to develop a strategic plan for restoring basic civil administration and services to the region. Above all, for assistance programs throughout Pakistan, we need good, long-term donor coordination from the UN and/or the World Bank. PATTERSON