NADEEM: IDP'S HOLDING AT 1.5 MILLION;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001098 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019 TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM EAID MARR PK SUBJECT: NADEEM: IDP'S HOLDING AT 1.5 MILLION; REHABILITATION ESTIMATE UNDERWAY Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: IDP Special Support Group leader Lt General Nadeem told Ambassador and PO Peshawar May 29 that the number of IDPs was holding at 1.5 million but could grow to two million when military operations begin in the Waziristans. IDPs were returning to Bajaur in FATA; Buner was now safe for returnees. He outlined a proposed incentive package for IDPs that included two months' food rations, non-food item kits, tools and tent, a medical exam and 25,000 PKR (USD 312) in cash; the GOP may request budgetary support to fund these packages at a donors' meeting in Islamabad scheduled for May ¶21. Nadeem had almost finished a preliminary needs assessment for rehabilitation and planned to submit it to the World Bank for a cost estimate this week. The weakest link in the GOP's IDP strategy, however, was the lack of capable civil servants to deliver government services when IDPs returned home. Nadeem and Ambassador agreed that perhaps a private-sector CEO, backed by technical experts and requisite bureaucrats, could lead civilian surge to provide these services. This effort was critical to countering militant propaganda about the GOP's inability to deliver quick justice, good governance, and social services. Post has already followed up on Nadeem's recommendation that we continue to press the GOP to let us rebuild police stations. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Ambassador and PO Peshawar called on IDP Special Support Group leader Lt General Nadeem on May 29 at his headquarters in Peshawar. Office of Defense Representative Pakistan Chief Rear Admiral LeFever, Polcouns, and UK Embassy Defense Representative Sherry also attended. IDP Count - - - - - ¶3. (C) Nadeem continues to plan on the basis of 1.5 million IDPs, although he expects that number could rise to 2 million within the next two to three months when military operations begin in the Waziristans. He suggested there could be up to a 20 percent distortion in the 1.5 million number because of double registration and registration of people from areas contiguous to but not directly affected by the conflict. The numbers could remain relatively stable, but actual IDPs would be different due to the changing areas of conflict and returns. (Note: UNHCR is reporting a higher figure.) Swat Valley - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Asked about civilians who had yet to flee the conflict area, Nadeem said that an overflight of Mingora yesterday showed that there were very few civilians left in the city. A government decision to fund disbursement of flour from the local mill had helped feed the remaining population. Nadeem sent ten trucks of Army-provided food supplies to the northern Swat Valley and planned to continue this as a convoy chain in the coming days, with the help of a local parliamentarian. He had allowed the ICRC to return to Lower Dir, Buner and Daggar, where they were delivering relief supplies. Buner was safe for returnees; there was still some fighting around Matta. Return Incentive Packages - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Nadeem reported that 230,000 IDPs had returned to Bajaur in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA),but they still needed humanitarian assistance. Nadeem was recommending that IDPs before returning home receive a medical exam, two months' food rations (from the World Food Program),non-food item kits (being provided by UNHCR),tools (USAID has propositioned tool kits in Bajaur),and 25,000 PKR (USD 312) cash. After a damage assessment, families would be able to receive 150,000 (USD 1875) PKR for totally destroyed homes or 100,000 PKR (USD 1250) for partially destroyed homes; the initial 25,000 PKR would be subtracted from these amounts. Nadeem expected that the federal government would appeal to donors for budgetary support to fund this assistance. ¶6. (C) The GOP has invited 58 donors to a meeting in ISLAMABAD 00001098 002 OF 002 Islamabad on May 21; following this, Nadeem expected that the UN would launch formally its latest consolidated appeal for IDPs. Nadeem will make a presentation at this conference and said he would outline a plan for a cluster-based (health, education, sanitation, etc) appeal for: (1) communities in conflict zones; (2) host families; and (3) IDPs living in camps. Nadeem had ordered an initial damage assessment that he expected to be finished May 19. He planned to pass that assessment to the World Bank to provide an initial ball-park estimate of the costs of reconstruction this week, and the World Bank will undertake a more detailed assessment. RAdm Lefever repeated the USG offer to assist with an aerial damage assessment. Nadeem was asking the World Bank to examine rehabilitation needs for health, education, sanitation, roads and bridges, power, and telecommunications. ¶7. (C) Ambassador offered assistance on strategic communications and reported that USAID had purchased 40,000 radios, which was all that was available in Pakistan; we had ordered additional radios from China but these would take 6-8 weeks to arrive. Nadeem said the NWFP government should control the IDP media cell; he wanted to establish a designated FM radio station and network but this would take 4-5 months to set up. They would need to de-conflict with existing Frontier Corps and commercial station networks. In the meantime, he planned to buy time from existing radio networks. Nadeem welcomed the assistance of a consultant to develop coordinated content; he recalled that during the earthquake USAID had contracted to a local FM station to do this job, and he suggested this ideally could be repeated today. Civilian Administration: The Weak Link - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) The biggest challenge, said Nadeem, was not organizing relief camps but re-establishing the government's ability to deliver services to populations who returned to affected areas. The militants successfully implemented a propaganda campaign based on citizen complaints about quick justice, good governance, and delivery of social services. If the government could not deliver on these three things, then the militants gradually would regain influence and the Army would have to intervene yet again. This was the weakest, yet most critical link, in the government's strategy. ¶9. (C) Nadeem explained that what was needed was a civilian surge of competent administrators who speak Pashtun. He had told the Prime Minister and NWFP Chief Minister that they must move immediately to choose a cadre of qualified personnel. He would raise this with President Zardari as well. (Note: Nadeem was supposed to brief Zardari today, but PM Gilani wanted to brief the President first.) Ambassador wondered if the GOP could identify a private-sector CEO who would be willing to donate a year to this effort; Nadeem thought this was an excellent idea if this person was supported by technical experts and had the buy-in from relative GOP departments. He suggested that the GOP tap recently retired military officers or civil servants from the area. (Note: The Ambassador raised the urgent need for competent civil administrators with President Asif Zardari later in the day but got little traction.) ¶10. (C) Asked if his 37th Division would perform hold operations until the civilians returned, Nadeem backtracked on earlier comments and suggested that the NWFP government had other ideas. Chief Minister Hoti had suggested reconstituting a now defunct support unit that had promoted development and employment during the 2005 earthquake. Nadeem and Ambassador agreed that the current crisis was too massive for this sort of approach. He suggested that the Embassy contact the NWFP Home Secretary to arrange assistance in strengthening/rebuilding police stations in the region. PATTERSON