IDP STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001080 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2019 TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM EAID PGOV PTER PK SUBJECT: IDP STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PLAN REF: ISLAMABAD 1063 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary and action request: The GOP,s strategic communications plan for combating extremism remains nascent, under-resourced, and uncoordinated among civilian and military players. While the government realizes the importance to its military campaign of winning the hearts and minds battle and getting the story right on help for internally displaced persons (IDPs),it lacks the capacity to either create or effectively disseminate messages. However, the IDP crisis is a critical opportunity for us to provide the GOP with quiet yet effective communications assistance. Post requests that SCA/PPD immediately release to Post $1 million in funding to support media-related projects for IDPs in Pakistan. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Pakistanis have been trying to remove the public perception they are fighting on America,s behalf; consequently, they want to &do it themselves8 and have been reluctant to have too big a USG footprint in their fight against the Taliban. In addition, the GOP was slow coming to grips with the negative effects of the Pakistani military actions against the extremists, deliberately not laying the political groundwork and failing to explain to the public why it was important and how the GOP would assist those affected by the fight. ¶3. (C) Now as the military actions escalate toward a critical juncture, a crisis caused by the displacement of over a million civilians threatens to sway public opinion away from support for the battle. The GOP did not plan for the resulting IDP crisis, and they remain behind the eight ball in the public relations battle. They understand they will lose if they cannot show they are taking care of the IDPs. There is still plenty of time for that to happen. ¶4. (C) It was obvious from the start that neither the GOP nor the PakMil did all they could to lay the political groundwork for the negative effects of the battles. They initially and intentionally left national politicians asking questions, and they failed to reach out to the public until the last minute via an 11:00 PM speech by the Prime Minister to let them know why this fight was so important and worth their sacrifice. It was obvious when the POL Counselor and the PAO met with the new Minister of Information and Broadcasting before the fighting began that there was only a limited plan for communications outreach to the people of Pakistan about the value of the fight, and less, if any, for reaching out to potential IDPs. The capacity to implement any communications plan is a particular weakness of this GOP, and the GOP remains behind the eight ball in the public affairs fight. ¶5. (C) In a subsequent meeting the PAO, ODRP PAO and the MIST commander had with the Pakistani Military Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) office, the Director of ISPR, General Abbas, admitted that the center of gravity in this military action is the people,s willingness to carry on the fight. He also admitted they know the GOP will lose if they cannot show they are taking care of the IDPs. While ISPR had a mechanism to inform the general public of the war campaign, the GOP was slow off the mark to pull the civilian side into their briefings. They did that almost a week after the fighting began, after the IDP situation had come to a head. We are still waiting for them to effectively reach out to the IDPs as they stream out of their homes and into camps, or find other accommodations. ¶6. (C) Discussions are underway with Chairman of the Special Support Group, Lt. Gen. Nadeem regarding communications support, including radios. However, the GOP has rarely been effective communicating with its public, and we believe, given the importance of this task at this time, it is imperative that the GOP has professional assistance in developing, producing, and placing messaging to communicate to the IDPs and keep them in this fight. ¶7. (C) To do this, we propose to use the $1 million in PD funding set aside with SCA/PPD to establish a media cell that ISLAMABAD 00001080 002 OF 002 can produce and place daily media and information packages that would then be placed on commercial, Pakistani Military and government radio stations (including an FM station being stood up with USAID funding by the FATA Secretariat) in the affected areas. The funding would also support outreach to moderate religious leaders and for SMS messaging to the IDPs. The funds would be used to stand up the media cell, cover its costs for the duration of the crisis, and pay for placement of the information packages where necessary. ¶8. (C) Post proposes the following projects for $1 million in funding: -- Establish a media cell in the Peshawar headquarters of LtGen Nadeem,s Special Support Group. -- Fund a consultant(s) to be embedded in that media cell to draft daily messages for IDPs in coordination with UN and other relief agencies, the Pakistani military, and Pakistani national and provincial governments. -- Assist LtGen Nadeem in conducting a survey to determine which IDP camps are out of range of existing commercial FM and/or Pakistan military (ISPR) radio range. Provide repeater towers where necessary to expand coverage to cover all IDP camps. -- Establish SMS messaging to disseminate IDP information through a local private company. -- Working with local moderate Muslim groups, develop messaging content for IDPs through alternative voices to the Taliban. ¶9. (C) We will supplement these PPD-funded projects with the following actions: -- In response to LtGen Nadeem,s request, post is purchasing radios to distribute to camp residents. (Funded by USAID) -- Reprogram currently purchased USAID (health) radio spots to disseminate messages to IDPs. (Funded by USAID) -- Assist ISPR to stand up its Radio 96 Swat station and increase its coverage to include the IDP camps. (Funded by DOD) -- Through the Military Information Support Team (MIST), provide IDP content for Frontier Corps radio broadcasts. (Funded by DOD) -- Through the FATA Secretariat, create a 1,000 watt FM station in Mardan dedicated to IDP issues. Until that station stands up, contract with another FM radio station in the same area to carry IDP messages. (Funded by USAID) ¶10. (C) Even as the U.S. responds to GOP military assistance requests (ref Islamabad 1063) and provides physical assistance to relieve the plight of IDPs, we also need to provide the GOP quiet yet effective assistance in communicating with the IDP community. The President will announce this week $100 million in USG support for IDPs. We believe we must assist the GOP in their effort to communicate with the IDPs and request immediate access to the $1 million in PD funds being held by SCA/PPD to provide professional public affairs assistance in this effort. Request SCA/PPD advise Post of the status of this request. PATTERSON