UNHCR GUTERRES IN ISLAMABAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001064

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PREF PTER PHUM EAID UN PK
SUBJECT: UNHCR GUTERRES IN ISLAMABAD

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During separate May 15 briefings for
Ambassador and the donor community, UN High Commissioner for
Refugees Antonio Guterres said he was satisfied the GOP now
understood the severity and complexity of the IDP challenge
and believed the UN response was proceeding better than
expected. Government response capacity was low, however, and
the resource needs were enormous. It was critical to help
the GOP cope for both humanitarian and political
geo-strategic reasons; if the GOP did not get this right, it
would have a destabilizing effect with global impact and
implications. The next challenge is preparing for return and
rehabilitation, but we must also plan for a protracted
displacement.


2. (U) UNHCR and the GOP on May 15 signed an agreement
formalizing the GOP's extension of Afghan refugee status
until 2012 and initiating the Refugee Affected and Hosting
Area (RAHA) initiative. Guterres suggested that RAHA, which
will provide development assistance to both Afghan refugees
and their Pakistani hosts, could be adapted or extended to
IDP affected and hosting areas. The UN will informally
present to donors a consolidated appeal on May 18; UNHCR
estimates that its component of the appeal will be USD 80
million. This USD 80 million represents the unfunded portion
of the USD 105 million necessary only for UNHCR-implemented
programs to support 250,000 families through the end of 2009.
He estimated the IDP population would grow to two million;
further displacement would depend on Pakistani military
operations and strategy. Guterres worried that there was
insufficient global support to fund both emergency and
rehabilitation needs; he plans a media campaign to raise
awareness and elicit additional support. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) In a May 15 meeting with Ambassador, Guterres first
commemorated the successful hostage release of UNHCR
representative John Solecki. Guterres said he came to
Pakistan for three reasons: (1) to express solidarity with
the GOP, a partner that has been hosting millions of Afghan
refugees for more than 30 years; (2) to convince the GOP to
end its denial and confusion about the need to help
internally displaced persons (IDPs),a goal that is now moot
because the GOP is serious and aware of the complexities of
the IDP challenge; and (3) to raise global awareness about
the scope and nature of the Pakistan IDP problem. Guterres
visited IDPs in Swabi on May 14 and planned May 16 to visit
Peshawar.


4. (C) Guterres said that while his job was humanitarian aid,
but he realized that there were overarching political,
geo-strategic reasons to help the GOP respond to its IDP
crisis. The first two weeks displaced people recover and
take stock. Thereafter they start measuring the assistance
that they are receiving; if it is inadequate, they will
become angry and frustrated. If the global community cannot
support the GOP in dealing with IDPs, this crisis will have a
devastating and destabilizing effect with global impact.


5. (C) Guterres said that the two big questions are capacity
to respond to the crisis and availability of sufficient
resources for the immediate response, for medium-term
assistance of displaced populations and the local community
which supports them, and for mobilizing national capacity to
permit return and rehabilitation. Guterres said he was
reasonably satisfied the pieces of the assistance puzzle were
fitting together, and the response so far was better than he
had expected. Having met May 15 with the leaders of the
National Assembly and Senate and with the Minister of
Finance, Guterres said he was convinced that Pakistan's
leaders now recognized the enormity of the task at hand.
However, government capacity is limited. The resources
committed to date are insufficient to the challenge, and
Guterres was not sure that adequate resources would be made
available.


6. (C) Guterres said that the UN would informally present to
donors its consolidated Pakistan appeal on May 18. UNHCR
estimates that its component of the appeal will be USD 80
million. This USD 80 million represents the unfunded portion
of the USD 105 million necessary only for UNHCR-implemented

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programs to support 250,000 families (1.5 million persons)
through the end of 2009. To date, UNHCR, which provides camp
management, protection and non-food items, has received USD
25 million to support this effort. With the number of IDPs
now above 1.5 million, the World Food Program (WFP),also
part of the UN appeal, is currently funded only to provide
food to the IDPs for the next two months.


7. (C) The next challenge is to look ahead towards
reconstruction in a way that transforms the situation on the
ground and eliminates the environment that bred extremism.
IDP return and rehabilitation will present an opportunity to
rebuild a society to be more moderate, open, and based in
rule of law, but doing so will require much more dialogue and
planning with the GOP. Working with IOM, UN Habitat, and
NGOs like World Vision, UNHCR will assist rehabilitation by
providing shelter, sanitation and building materials.
Guterres emphasized UNHCR's focus on local procurement
whenever possible.


8. (C) After protracted negotiations, UNHCR and the GOP on
May 15 signed an agreement formalizing the GOP's decision to
extend the stay of Afghan refugees in Pakistan until 2012 and
initiating RAHA, a five-year, USD 140 million project in
which UNHCR and its UN partners will fund development
projects in 21 refugee affected and refugee hosting districts
in Pakistan. Guterres said that RAHA presented an important
rebuilding opportunity. He added that this idea of
community-based development that benefited both Afghan
refugees and the local Pakistani population would be a good
model for IDP affected hosting areas as well. He hoped that
RAHA could be adapted and expanded to include IDP hosting and
affected areas but said he had made the decision to sign the
agreement as it was currently agreed rather than risk another
long delay to re-negotiate it to include them.


9. (C) Ambassador noted that the GOP's civilian capacity was
extraordinarily weak. The UN agencies' performance had
improved, but its response to the Bajaur IDP situation had
been uncharacteristically poor. She urged that OCHA send a
permanent high-level representative to Pakistan to support
the excellent work being done by Manuel Bressler, who also
needs staff assistance. She also believed that Jean Arnault
could assist with donor coordination, an issue of growing
importance as we begin rehabilitation work and implement
projects from the Donors' Conference. Guterres said he had
tried and failed to have the UN appoint for Pakistan a
senior-level humanitarian coordinator in a position separate
from that of the UN Resident Representative. The compromise
solution was Rashid Khalikov, Director of OCHA's New York
Office, who did need to spend more time in Pakistan. He will
arrive in Islamabad on May 16 for a two-week stay. In the
meantime, UNHCR and the World Food Program were working well
together on the ground.


10. (C) Asked about UNHCR's willingness to work with the
Pakistani military, Guterres said that UNHCR could not work
in "militarized" camps, (i.e. ones in which camp
administration was military). Currently, with only 10-15
percent of IDPs in camps, UNHCR had camp management under
control and did not see a role for the Army. Police, not the
Army, should provide camp security. Guterres praised the
Army, however, for that day actively supporting civilian
evacuation from Swat with vehicles and logistical support.
He also was quick to say that UNHCR "was the first to be
relieved" at the appointment of Lt. General Nadeem to lead
the Government's relief effort. He said that UNHCR would
work cooperatively for the good of the IDPs and common sense
would prevail. It was important to realize the difference
between a national disaster and a conflict environment in
determining appropriate relief responsibilities. Ambassador
noted there were no police available in the region, so the
Army would have to provide security.



11. (C) Looking ahead, Guterres said over 100,000 IDPs were
registered on May 15 alone. Whether the population grew
further and when IDPs could return home would depend on
military operations and strategy. Asked about Lt. General
Nadeem's optimistic prediction of imminent large-scale return
home by IDPs, Guterres said that some people would want to go

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back initially, but it will be important not to rush people
back. We need to plan for a return scenario, he said, but
also to plan a community development approach to permit IDP
integration during a relatively protracted displacement. We
cannot fail to plan for the possibility of growing and
ongoing displacement, he said. It is simple to organize
transportation and a return package, but more complex to
ensure that conditions are such that IDPs can settle back
home and not have to leave again. The Ambassador agreed,
noting that the Pakistani military had plans to move into the
Waziristans, but we doubted the military could meet its
proposed timetable for beginning this operation in the next
few weeks.


PATTERSON