Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HONGKONG383
2009-03-03 09:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Hong Kong
Cable title:  

HONG KONG DEMOCRATS READY TO DEAL ON REFORM, BUT

Tags:  PGOV PHUM HK CH 
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VZCZCXRO7650
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHHK #0383/01 0620918
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030918Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7008
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 000383 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM HK CH
SUBJECT: HONG KONG DEMOCRATS READY TO DEAL ON REFORM, BUT
FEEL BEIJING IS WAITING THEM OUT

REF: (A) HONG KONG 335 (B) 08 HONG KONG 1630

Classified By: Consul General Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 000383 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM HK CH SUBJECT: HONG KONG DEMOCRATS READY TO DEAL ON REFORM, BUT FEEL BEIJING IS WAITING THEM OUT REF: (A) HONG KONG 335 (B) 08 HONG KONG 1630 Classified By: Consul General Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Hong Kong's Democratic Party (DPHK) told the Consul General they are ready to reach a compromise deal on reforms for 2012. During a lunch February 27, they noted certain core DPHK positions, such as the eventual elimination of the Legislative Council's functional constituencies, were not open to compromise. To them, however, the big problem is getting Beijing to talk (and here, they regard Chief Executive Tsang only as a messenger between them and the central leadership). Absent a "kowtow" from the democrats, such as ending their support for democratic causes in China, the DPHK believes Beijing is playing a waiting game, allowing the generation which came up through 1980s democratic activism against the British and protested against the Tiananmen Square events to retire. Ho believes Beijing is missing the chance to send a positive signal to Taiwan by allowing democratic development in Hong Kong. The DPHK has told us before that they could accept a modified version of the package voted down in 2005 (ref B). Beijing's unwillingness to reach out to the DPHK and other pragmatic democrats to reach a workable compromise on democratic reform continues to be an opportunity missed. End Summary and Comment. ¶2. (C) The Consul General hosted Democratic Party (DPHK) Chairman and legislator Albert Ho Chun-yan, Vice Chairman and former legislator Sin Chung-kai, and senior DPHK legislator Fred Li Wah-ming for lunch at the residence February 27. Ho and Sin won re-election this past fall, with a new vice chairmanship won by Emily Lau Wai-hing following the merger of her "the Frontier" political movement with the DPHK. Ho is concurrently Secretary of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic and Democratic Movement in China ("the Alliance") and head of the China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group. Sin served as Information Technology functional constituency representative until stepping down in 2008 (at which time the pan-democratic camp lost his seat). A moderate with close ties to the establishment, Sin excused himself early from our lunch to attend another function with Chief Secretary Henry Tang. Li is the last representative in t
he Legislative Council (LegCo) of "the Meeting Point", a democratic movement founded in 1983 which joined with Martin Lee's United Democrats (1991) in 1994 to form the DPHK. -------------- Why Wait to Talk? -------------- ¶3. (C) Asked by the Consul General for their views of the government's decision to delay consultations on reforms for the 2012 elections (ref A and previous),Ho noted that the government did not need a consultation process to begin discussions, if only behind closed doors, with the pan-democrats. By the same token, the length of a consultation period is irrelevant if the other side is not willing to negotiate. Although it stands by its position of calling for elections for the Chief Executive and LegCo by universal suffrage in 2012, the DPHK claims it has made clear to the government and Beijing that it is ready to reach a compromise. ¶4. (C) Two key points of contention remain. First, Ho insists the DPHK will not compromise on the elimination of LegCo's functional constituencies (FCs - seats assigned to small electorates representing key economic and social sectors; the DPHK currently holds the Education FC seat). Asked by the Consul General, Ho conceded it was theoretically possible to have FC seats by some "one person, two votes" system which opened the FC electorates to all voters, but noted the logistical difficulties of having each of thirty FC legislators elected by the whole electorate. Li likened such a model to "thirty separate Chief Executive elections." Second, Ho rejects the government's contention that it will only consider arrangements for 2012 now because this administration cannot bind its successors. The roadmap of political development of the first ten years of the SAR was mapped out in the Basic Law, Ho reminded the Consul General, so there is no reason the government cannot consider 2017 and 2020 now. (Note: There will be one other LegCo election in 2016 which occurs prior to the projected elections by universal suffrage of the Chief Executive in 2017 and for LegCo in 2020. End note.) -------------- The Buck Stops in Beijing -------------- HONG KONG 00000383 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The DPHK told us (as other pan-democrats have) that the real interlocutor on these issues is Beijing. In this respect, they see Chief Executive (CE) Donald Tsang's role as merely a messenger. As proof, Ho cited a conversation in which the CE suggested that the pan-democrats "behave better" so that he could report a "peaceful gesture" to Beijing. Ho interprets this to mean Beijing wants a "kowtow", such as a withdrawal from the Alliance, which DPHK finds unacceptable. ¶6. (C) Ho and Li told the Consul General Beijing believes it has time on its side. The economic dependence of Hong Kong on the Mainland is growing. At the same time, the activist generation, which entered politics by pushing the British for democratic reforms in the 1980s and which witnessed the Tiananmen Square events, is getting ready to retire. Li noted he had served in LegCo for twenty years already, and that he and Ho would be gone in ten years at the most. For these reasons, there is nothing pushing Beijing to negotiate now. -------------- A Signal to Taiwan -------------- ¶7. (C) Ho ventured that the Mainland was missing an opportunity to further improve the atmosphere in cross-Strait relations by its reluctance to make progress on democracy in Hong Kong. The Consul General noted, and Ho agreed, that Hong Kong would likely serve only as a negative example for Taiwan. While Taiwan would not embrace "one country, two systems" under any circumstances, lack of democratic progress in Hong Kong gave ammunition to opponents of improved cross-Strait ties. DONOVAN

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