JANUARY 1 DEMOCRACY MARCH: THE LAST WALTZ?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 002377 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM HK CH SUBJECT: JANUARY 1 DEMOCRACY MARCH: THE LAST WALTZ? REF: HONG KONG 2264 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4( b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The January 1 march for universal suffrage may be the last united appearance by the pan-democrats for several months. Meant by the Democratic Party to move public attention away from the League of Social Democrats' (LSD) and the Civic Party's plan to use resignations from the Legislative Council as a referendum on universal suffrage, the march itself will not attract the kind of numbers that would push Beijing to negotiate. After the march, the LSD and the Civics will begin planning their referendum campaign, pushing against public opinion polls and editorial opinion that show even the pro-democracy camp does not support them. Observers believe Beijing will be unswayed by even a five-seat win, and will not in any case negotiate until after the votes are tallied. End summary. -------------- The Short March -------------- ¶2. (C) Pan-democrats and their allies will march from Chater Garden (near the Legislative Council in Central) to the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO - Beijing's official representative office to the people of Hong Kong) on the afternoon of January 1. Unlike the annual July 1 catch-all democracy march, numbers are expected to be small. Factors that will dampen turnout include weather, the holiday, and the fact that the general public's enthusiasm for the debate has been lowered by the wrangle among the pan-democrats over the resignation plan (reftel). Factors that may boost turnout include outrage among democracy advocates over the conviction of Charter '08 activist Liu Xiaobo and allegations that Mainland police crossed the border to drag pro-Liu demonstrators to the Shenzhen side during a recent scuffle at the Lo Wu border crossing point. Activists for a range of other causes, such as Lehman minibonds investors and protesters against plans to run a Hong Kong-Mainland rail link through a New Territories village may also boost numbers, albeit with some loss to the unity of the march's message. ¶3. (C) March organizer Richard Tsoi Yiu-cheong picked 10,000 participants as a target (by comparison, the 2009 July 1 march saw about 50,000 people take part.) Tsoi contended the numbers were respectable given (a) it was a march to the CGLO (Hong Kong people are traditionally more reluctant to confront Beijing directly) and (b) this march was meant to be 'an event' rather than 'the event' in terms of constitutional reform. Chinese University (CUHK) Professor and democracy advocate Ma Ngok contended 10,000 was optimistic, and said less than 5,000 would suggest weakness. Democratic Party (DPHK) strategist Law Chi-kwong was more pessimistic, suggesting 4,000 participants was a reasonable prediction, and that breaking 10,000 was unlikely. Central Policy Unit (the Hong Kong government's in-house think-tank) member Shiu Sin-por told us in early December the march would need at least 50,000 participants to be significant and 100,000 to grab Beijing's attention. ¶4. (C) The DPHK hope the march will be the first step towards moving public debate over political reform away from its current sole focus on the resignation plan (and the DPHK's failure to support the LSD and Civics) and back on to the substance of democratic development. In pursuit of that goal, the DPHK is hoping to collaborate with a network of scholars and prominent pro-democracy advocates on an alternative proposal (or at least a set of principles) on constitutional reform (septel). All of the pan-democratic parties will participate, but this may be the last time they appear together as a bloc prior to the conclusion of the by-elections. -------------- No Turning Back -------------- ¶5. (C) Following the march, the radical League of Social Democrats (LSD) and the Civic Party will begin concrete planning for their resignation-as-referendum plan. The plan calls for three LSD and two Civic Party legislators to resign their seats to force a by-election the parties hope to use as a de facto referendum on universal suffrage. Mechanically, this would involve resignations in mid-January in advance of elections expected to occur in April or May. Civic Party legislator Ronny Tong Ka-wah (who has publicly broken ranks with the party over the resignation plan) expects the government would schedule the election around Easter to HONG KONG 00002377 002 OF 002 dampen turnout. Civic Party strategist Professor Joseph Cheng Yu-shek told us separately the Civics think it vital to conclude the elections before mid-May so as not to conflict with the World Cup. Notwithstanding either factor, experts predict a low turnout (the DPHK's Law suggested 40 percent), which is expected to hurt the pan-democrats. ¶6. (C) Public opinion polls suggest the public does not support the resignation plan, and satisfaction with LegCo as an institution is at 18 percent -- less than half of the support for 'unpopular' Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen. Opinion leaders including the Ming Pao and South China Morning Post editorial pages, columnists like Frank Ching and Chris Yeung, and the majority of pro-democracy scholars are all publicly against the plan. However, observers believe there is no chance the Civic Party will not go through with the resignations. The DPHK's Law suggested the DPHK's decision that, while individual members could canvas for the elections, the party as an institution would not, represented the last face-saving opportunity for the Civics to back down (albeit by blaming the DPHK's lack of support). ¶7. (C) The DPHK's Law told us he thought the Civics and the LSD could expect to win at most three of the five seats, (which would be the minimum needed to maintain their "blocking minority"). He tipped the LSD's Leung "Long Hair" Kwok-hung (New Territories East) and Albert Chan Wai-yip (New Territories West) as vulnerable. Should the pro-Beijing camp choose to run popular former Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) legislator Chan Yuen-han against Civic Party Vice Chair Alan Leong Kah-kit in Kowloon East, Law thought Leong might lose as well. Supporters of the Civics have also called on party leader Audrey Eu Yuet-mee, who consistently polls as Hong Kong's most popular legislator, to replace her understudy, freshman legislator Tanya Chan Suk-chong, in the race on Hong Kong Island. ¶8. (C) For the opposition, observers expected Beijing, through the CGLO, would orchestrate a race with the five strongest candidates available. In addition to the FTU's Chan, credible contenders include former legislator Choy So-yuk and party chair Horace Cheung Kwok-kwan from the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, and former Liberal Party legislator James Tien Pei-chun. ¶9. (C) Many have argued that even the best-case scenario -- that all five resignees are returned by majorities on the order of sixty percent -- will merely re-establish the status quo. No one seems to believe the results will have any effect on Beijing. CUHK's Ma and others have suggested Beijing in fact is holding off on any negotiations on the reform package pending results of the by-elections. MARUT