HONG KONG SCHOLARS LUKEWARM ON PRC ELECTION REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 002146 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM CH HK SUBJECT: HONG KONG SCHOLARS LUKEWARM ON PRC ELECTION REFORM Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Hong Kong based China experts were unimpressed with proposed amendments to the PRC electoral law that would increase the number of rural deputies in the NPC. They see the government using democratic reforms at the rural level to maintain an air of concern for rural residents without risking any actual political change. While the experts do not see rural voters gaining any political ground from the reforms, they believed village democracy may inculcate a tradition of democratic participation over the long term, which in turn may lead to calls for greater reform. End summary. ¶2. (C) During the October legislative session of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, deputies debated draft amendments to the PRC's electoral law that would equalize NPC representation for rural and urban areas. We discussed the changes, and the status of village-level democracy, with a range of local experts, including: media commentator and Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) academic Willy Wo-lap Lam; City University of Hong Kong (City U) Professor Joseph Yu-shek Cheng; Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) Professor David Zweig; and University of Hong Kong (HKU) postdoctoral fellow Dr. Wang Shiru, who is researching PRC village election reform and rural democratic participation. -------------- - Background: Village Election Reform in the PRC -------------- - ¶3. (C) First introduced in the mid-1980s, village election reform -- which allowed direct election of village heads and governing (as opposed to Party) committees -- ground to a halt in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. Direct village elections resumed in the late 1990's, and some areas conducted pilot election projects to choose leaders at the township level. Reform came to urban centers in early 2000 with the direct election of Community Resident Committee (shequ jumin weiyuanhui) leaders in selected areas. While electoral reforms were introducing the nominally democratic selection of officials at local levels (although in practice often closely controlled by the Party),rural residents were denied a proportional voice at the national level. Each rural deputy in the NPC represents a population four times larger than that of an urban deputy (960,000 vs. 240,000). The election amendments, if approved, would require rural and urban areas to adopt similar ratios of representatives in the election of deputies to the People's Congress. -------------- High Politics, Low Substance -------------- ¶4. (C) Hong Kong scholars were unimpressed by the proposed amendments, which they dismissed as political gestures lacking actual substance. With 800 million rural residents, HKUST's Zweig believed that the central government had to appear sympathetic to rural concerns, if only to avoid the argument that a rural political party be formed. HKU'S Wang told us Beijing allowed village elections to develop with relative autonomy precisely because village and township committees have no real authority and thus did not pose a threat to the central government's control. ¶5. (C) Because rural democratization has not proven to be a vehicle for substantive political reform, the once-enthusiastic supporters of reform inside and outside of China have moved on. CUHK's Lam argued that, since "rural election reforms no longer had the party leaders' attention, academics and government figures now concentrate on better governance and intraparty democracy." From the other side, the experts believed most international NGOs and grant-giving bodies had lost interest in projects related to rural democratization. ¶6. (C) Even with a more equitable allocation of NPC deputies, scholars believed that urban residents would still have more influence with Beijing. City U's Cheng explained that many rural deputies were actually carpetbaggers from the urban or educated population, with little real knowledge or concern for rural issues. The central government's incentives for educated urbanites to do a "hardship tour" in rural villages as a route to promotion within the central system both ensures a supply of such outsiders and mitigates against such deputies rocking the boat. -------------- Forming Democratic Habits HONG KONG 00002146 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶7. (C) While dismissing the immediate impact of rural-level democracy, HKU's Wang suggested there were indirect "political consequences" to be had from village election reform, such as the institutionalization of political participation among rural residents. While election reforms did not directly result in more responsive village government, villagers' long-term exposure to "political rights" inculcated a sense of "right to resistance," which Wang defined as an awareness of one's right to express injustice and/or grievances through participation in the governing process. -------------- -- Urban Election Reform is the Key to Real Change -------------- -- ¶8. (C) The scholars were unanimous that real movement towards democratic reform in the PRC would not take place without elections at the urban level. This group was disappointed that the urban election reforms which began in early 2000 fizzled out soon after they began. City U's Cheng blamed local and district officials, who feared losing power and therefore interfered and often challenged the elected residents' committee's decisions. CUHK's Lam highlighted a different problem, arguing that the elected officials were often not the most qualified people, but rather the wealthiest, who had the resources to "buy votes" and viewed public office as a vehicle to increase their wealth and influence. According to Lam, the central government was "unhappy" with the people such elections produced and decided to "quietly discourage" further reforms. MARUT