CAN CHINA REBALANCE ON ONLY ONE LEG? HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 002124 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EEB/IFD/OMA, TREASURY FOR CUSHMAN, MALLOY E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2034 TAGS: EFIN ECON HK CH SUBJECT: CAN CHINA REBALANCE ON ONLY ONE LEG? HONG KONG ECONOMISTS MIXED MINDS Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher J. Marut ¶1. (U) This is a joint Consulate General Hong Kong/Embassy Beijing cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: Even the most pessimistic Hong Kong-based China economists are mostly sanguine about the near-term prospects for Chinese economic growth. Although the Chinese stimulus package is creating asset market bubbles and setting the stage for a significant increase in non-performing loans, it is also driving growth in China and the region and no one expects the merry-go-round to stop before mid-2010 at the earliest. In the medium and long-term, Hong Kong experts had widely divergent views of China's economic future, with some arguing that Chinese infrastructure investment is ultimately aimed at facilitating continued export-driven growth, while others claim to see rebalancing slowly getting underway. Renminbi (RMB) appreciation is likewise ill-advised or necessary, depending on whom you choose to believe. Economic observers agree that recent steps toward RMB internationalization are laying the foundation for eventual liberalization, but are unlikely to be meaningful for many years. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Comment: As might be expected in Hong Kong,s free-wheeling intellectual environment, opinions on China's future varied widely. But our contacts all agreed that the goals of social stability and economic growth continue to drive Chinese policy and that economic policy changes were unlikely before mid-2010 at the earliest. Our interlocutors, views suggest that Chinese policymakers are more likely to muddle through crises than to embrace new policies. Urbanization and demographic trends are likely to support the natural evolution of additional Chinese domestic consumption and the Chinese authorities may even take some steps to legitimize that as an economic goal. But rebalancing the Chinese economy requires structural and cultural shifts that will take years. End Comment. ¶3. (C) Embassy Beijing Economic Minister Counselor and Internal Economic Unit Chief joined Consulate General Hong Kong Economic Unit Chief for a series of meetings with Hong Kong-based China watchers November 6-7. Discussions touched on the prospects for continued Chinese stimulus, China's rapid monetary expansion, asset bubbles and concerns about non-performing loans, expectations for Renminbi (RMB) internationalization, and rebalancing the Chinese economy. Officers met with Asianomics Managing Director Jim Walker, Credit Suisse Regional Economist Tao Dong, Royal Bank of Scotland Chief China Economist Ben Simpfendorfer, JP Morgan China Economist Grace Ng, HSBC Regional Currency Strategist Richard Yetsenga, and Goldman Sachs Managing Director Roy Ramos. Don't Stop the Music ==================== ¶4. (C) Hong Kong-based economists agreed that Chinese policy-makers were unlikely to stop stimulus measures any time soon. Though the effects of the stimulus have plateau'd China will continue to pursue additional measures at least through the middle of 2010, according to Credit Suisse's TAO Dong. HSBC's Yetsenga agreed, noting that policymakers were focused on boosting domestic demand and minimizing unemployment. ¶5. (C) Monetary stimulus is clearly driving Chinese economic growth. Chinese banks' loans were over RMB 8 trillion (US$1.17 trillion) in the first three quarters of 2009 and are expected to exceed RMB 10 trillion (US$1.47 trillion) by the end of the year. Economists agree that 2010 loan growth should be slightly less, but still far more than previous years, perhaps in the range of RMB 7-8 trillion (US$1.03-1.17 trillion). Goldman Sachs' Ramos insisted there was no way to expand the banking system so quickly without risking massive non-performing loans (NPLs). But in the near-term those NPLs would not matter for the banks, and they might not matter in the longer term either, he said. Most of the loans were to SOEs and local and regional government-backed asset management companies which carry implicit government guarantees. NPLs were unlikely to be problems over the next several years, and might never be an issue as long as China's economy continues to grow. China's need for additional infrastructure made investments in roads, railways and airports attractive, even if the loans were never repaid. Asianomics Jim Walker disagreed, worrying that infrastructure investment ultimately was aimed at facilitating exports and HONG KONG 00002124 002 OF 003 would not help re-orient the economy towards increased domestic demand. The Hubba Bubba Economic Policy =============================== ¶6. (C) Asset price bubbles were a natural result of the Chinese monetary stimulus, said Simpfendorfer. Walker agreed, noting that Chinese monetary expansion had been successful because in China's state controlled financial system, SOE banks could be instructed to lend to SOE companies, rather than stashing funds away to boost capital adequacy ratios as in the West. Tao noted that easy money with few sound investment opportunities was leading to record land prices. Up to 70 percent of recent Chinese land sales had been to SOEs, many of which only recently stood-up a real estate business, he said. Land and stock speculation was now more profitable than SOE core businesses. But do these asset bubbles matter? In the near-term at least, our interlocutors agreed that the Chinese government was not worried. Given the Chinese government's emphasis on social stability, as long as the economy is growing and unemployment was manageable, asset bubbles, NPLs and structural inefficiencies were all secondary concerns, said Yetsenga. ¶7. (C) The biggest question facing the Chinese, said Walker, is what would happen when the stimulus package ran out? Chinese policy-makers were unwisely using their massive fiscal and monetary stimulus to prop up the domestic economy until U.S. demand recovers, at which point they hope to resume their successful export-oriented development strategy, he predicted. Domestic demand-oriented production would be unable to develop as long as the RMB was pegged to the falling dollar. If U.S. demand for Chinese exports did not recover, he said, China would have to keep raising the stimulus stakes to maintain politically acceptable economic growth levels. Though the stimulus was big, it was not directed towards high quality investments. Infrastructure investment ultimately was aimed at facilitating exports, insisted Walker, and in the long term would not help re-orient the economy towards increased domestic demand. ¶8. (C) JP Morgan's Ng disagreed, saying Chinese leaders were aware that there would not be a significant recovery in external demand from the West in the near term. She predicted that 2010 Chinese export figures would show an increase from 2009, but only because the collapse of exports over the past year sets the base very low. Chinese traders were increasingly looking to Southeast Asia and other markets in an effort to diversify exports. But it would be politically difficult for China to allow the RMB to strengthen until export figures showed some improvement, she said. Tao agreed, and argued that the Chinese should not allow the RMB to appreciate until the global economy had recovered. The rest of the world needed the Chinese economy to continue to grow in order to sell commodities and machinery. If the RMB began to appreciate again, he said, hot money inflows would force the Chinese to tighten, removing the one remaining engine of global growth. HSBC's Yetsenga agreed that RMB appreciation would be destabilizing. The weak RMB hurt commodity exporters, but as China was their market of last resort, they had no choice but to bear it. RMB Internationalization and Recycling Dollars ============================================= = ¶9. (C) China's desire to reduce pressure on the RMB was part of their reason for promoting limited use of their currency outside China, said Yetsenga, but internationalization would be difficult. Hong Kong was designated for pilot RMB bonds issuances and trade settlement schemes, but was a very small market with just RMB 53 billion (US$7.77b) in Chinese currency deposits. Other Asian currency markets were even less suitable, he said, noting that other markets were not prepared to offer RMB-denominated products. Ramos agreed, noting that small RMB bonds had been very popular in Hong Kong thus far, but were limited due to the small amount of RMB in circulation. RMB trade settlement was also an interesting scheme, but was really only useful for companies with significant operations in the Mainland, he said. Tao added that China's massive U.S. dollar reserves made financial policymakers uneasy and had encouraged them to look for ways to recycle their U.S. dollars. But none of their options looked particularly appealing. He predicted that the Chinese would increase the pace of approval for Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) to facilitate HONG KONG 00002124 003 OF 003 overseas investment and encourage Chinese corporates to look abroad for additional buying opportunities. Hard to Rebalance on Only One Leg ================================= ¶10. (C) Chinese leaders wanted to rebalance the economy, said Ramos, but it would take a long time to turn the Chinese economy away from reliance on investment and exports. Ng agreed that the policymakers were searching for ways to support domestic demand, but predicted that it would take many years. China needed a social safety net, health reforms, and rural development programs before they could substantially increase domestic consumption, she said. Little of the current stimulus had gone into domestic consumption, said Yetsenga. He attributed that in part to cultural norms that encouraged savings as well as precautionary behavior. Ramos added that pension and health reform could not occur without rational markets, which in turn required capital convertibility. Only Tao was more optimistic, noting that the Land Reform plan launched in 2008 could help to spark rural development. He added that the one-child generation now coming of age had the lowest savings rate of any Chinese generation and he predicted that increasing urbanization, expected to be a major theme of the 12th Five Year Plan, would contribute to additional consumption in the future. MARUT