Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HONGKONG1877
2009-10-06 06:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Hong Kong
Cable title:  

HONG KONG ANALYSTS SEE LITTLE SUBSTANCE IN FOURTH

Tags:  PGOV CH HK 
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VZCZCXYZ0657
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHK #1877/01 2790617
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060617Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8684
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 001877 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV CH HK
SUBJECT: HONG KONG ANALYSTS SEE LITTLE SUBSTANCE IN FOURTH
PLENUM

REF: (A) BEIJING 2731 (B) BEIJING 2533

Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher J. Marut for reasons 1
.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 001877 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV CH HK SUBJECT: HONG KONG ANALYSTS SEE LITTLE SUBSTANCE IN FOURTH PLENUM REF: (A) BEIJING 2731 (B) BEIJING 2533 Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher J. Marut for reasons 1 .4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Analysts in Hong Kong see no significant developments emerging from the Fourth Plenum in late September. Although Xi Jinping was not appointed to the vice-chairmanship of the Central Military Committee (CMC), they believe it is too early to conclude that he will not succeed President Hu Jintao in 2013. While most of the Plenum focused on anti-corruption measures such as asset disclosure, the analysts do not anticipate meaningful intraparty reforms will be implemented in the foreseeable future. Except for those who specifically watch Mainland politics, the Plenum meant little to Hong Kong residents. End summary. ¶2. (C) We met with Hong Kong-based China watchers to discuss their perspectives on the results of the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee: City University political science professor Joseph Cheng, Hong Kong Baptist University Department of Government and International Studies chairman Professor Jean-Pierre Cabestan, and veteran local China-watchers Frank Ching and Johnny Lau. All four believed that the Plenum achieved nothing substantial. They noted "Party construction" issues, such as asset disclosure rules for members, have been under discussion for years, but the poor state of the economy and atmosphere of social unrest in China have made them all the more relevant. -------------- No Xi in CMC -------------- ¶3. (C) None of the four ascribed great importance to the fact that Xi Jinping's much-anticipated appointment as vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) had not occurred. None regarded Hu's appointment at the same point in his career as a binding precedent. Cabestan cautioned against jumping to the conclusion that Xi would not succeed Hu Jintao simply because he was not appointed and suggested that the decision to promote Xi in due course may have been made but not publicized. Lau believed that there were no hard-and-fast "rules of the game" for succession. Ching insisted that it was "better not to make predictions," although he added that, had Xi been appointed to the CMC, everyone would have assumed him to be confirmed as Hu Jintao,s successor. The analysts argued Xi could easily be appointed next year or assume a position on the CMC after taking over as president and party boss. Alternatively, Cheng speculated that prominent provincial Party secretaries such as Wang Yang Guangdong or Yu Zhengsheng in Shanghai could be candidates for presidential succession. The analysts agree that, in any case, the situation remains fluid. -------------- Intraparty Democracy and Anti-Corruption: All Talk, No Action -------------- ¶4. (C) Although Hu called for intraparty democracy in his report to the 17th Party Congress, the analysts see little movement on the issue and believe Hu,s sincerity is now widely doubted in China. While Party-wide elections were not on the horizon, Lau believed that the fifth-generation leadership would need to build a broader support base among party members and even the general public than was needed in the past. In the end, he said, the choice of the next leader would represent a greater compromise than was the case in the past. At this time, no potential fifth-generation leader, including Xi, enjoys adequate support to be tipped as a favorite. ¶5. (C) Similarly, despite much discussion, no breakthrough on anti-corruption measures was made during the Plenum. Lau noted that Premier Wen Jiabao has met stiff resistance in trying to implement asset disclosure rules. There was no way to enforce asset disclosure in the current political climate, Lau added, citing a recent survey in which only three percent of Party members favored strengthening anti-corruption measures. Lau also believed the proposed regulations would leave plenty of room for corrupt officials to maneuver, given that only the immediate family members of Party members would have to report income and assets. -------------- In Hong Kong, Crickets Chirp -------------- ¶6. (C) Despite a widespread perception that the Mainland has taken a more active interest in Hong Kong since 2003, analysts believe the reverse is not true. Both Ching and Lau see Mainland politics having little impact on the everyday lives of residents here, and the Plenum did not attract much attention in Hong Kong outside academic and media circles. At the same time, the analysts saw nothing in particular emerging from the policy discussions at the Plenum that would impact on Hong Kong. MARUT

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