Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HONGKONG1877
2009-10-06 06:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Hong Kong
Cable title:  

HONG KONG ANALYSTS SEE LITTLE SUBSTANCE IN FOURTH

Tags:  PGOV CH HK 
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VZCZCXYZ0657
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHK #1877/01 2790617
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060617Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8684
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 001877 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV CH HK
SUBJECT: HONG KONG ANALYSTS SEE LITTLE SUBSTANCE IN FOURTH
PLENUM

REF: (A) BEIJING 2731 (B) BEIJING 2533

Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher J. Marut for reasons 1
.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 001877

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV CH HK
SUBJECT: HONG KONG ANALYSTS SEE LITTLE SUBSTANCE IN FOURTH
PLENUM

REF: (A) BEIJING 2731 (B) BEIJING 2533

Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher J. Marut for reasons 1
.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Analysts in Hong Kong see no significant
developments emerging from the Fourth Plenum in late
September. Although Xi Jinping was not appointed to the
vice-chairmanship of the Central Military Committee (CMC),
they believe it is too early to conclude that he will not
succeed President Hu Jintao in 2013. While most of the
Plenum focused on anti-corruption measures such as asset
disclosure, the analysts do not anticipate meaningful
intraparty reforms will be implemented in the foreseeable
future. Except for those who specifically watch Mainland
politics, the Plenum meant little to Hong Kong residents.
End summary.


2. (C) We met with Hong Kong-based China watchers to discuss
their perspectives on the results of the Fourth Plenum of the
17th Central Committee: City University political science
professor Joseph Cheng, Hong Kong Baptist University
Department of Government and International Studies chairman
Professor Jean-Pierre Cabestan, and veteran local
China-watchers Frank Ching and Johnny Lau. All four believed
that the Plenum achieved nothing substantial. They noted
"Party construction" issues, such as asset disclosure rules
for members, have been under discussion for years, but the
poor state of the economy and atmosphere of social unrest in
China have made them all the more relevant.

--------------
No Xi in CMC
--------------


3. (C) None of the four ascribed great importance to the fact
that Xi Jinping's much-anticipated appointment as
vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) had
not occurred. None regarded Hu's appointment at the same
point in his career as a binding precedent. Cabestan
cautioned against jumping to the conclusion that Xi would not
succeed Hu Jintao simply because he was not appointed and
suggested that the decision to promote Xi in due course may
have been made but not publicized. Lau believed that there
were no hard-and-fast "rules of the game" for succession.
Ching insisted that it was "better not to make predictions,"
although he added that, had Xi been appointed to the CMC,
everyone would have assumed him to be confirmed as Hu
Jintao,s successor. The analysts argued Xi could easily be
appointed next year or assume a position on the CMC after
taking over as president and party boss. Alternatively,
Cheng speculated that prominent provincial Party secretaries
such as Wang Yang Guangdong or Yu Zhengsheng in Shanghai
could be candidates for presidential succession. The
analysts agree that, in any case, the situation remains fluid.

--------------
Intraparty Democracy and Anti-Corruption:
All Talk, No Action
--------------


4. (C) Although Hu called for intraparty democracy in his
report to the 17th Party Congress, the analysts see little
movement on the issue and believe Hu,s sincerity is now
widely doubted in China. While Party-wide elections were not
on the horizon, Lau believed that the fifth-generation
leadership would need to build a broader support base among
party members and even the general public than was needed in
the past. In the end, he said, the choice of the next leader
would represent a greater compromise than was the case in the
past. At this time, no potential fifth-generation leader,
including Xi, enjoys adequate support to be tipped as a
favorite.


5. (C) Similarly, despite much discussion, no breakthrough on
anti-corruption measures was made during the Plenum. Lau
noted that Premier Wen Jiabao has met stiff resistance in
trying to implement asset disclosure rules. There was no way
to enforce asset disclosure in the current political climate,
Lau added, citing a recent survey in which only three percent
of Party members favored strengthening anti-corruption
measures. Lau also believed the proposed regulations would
leave plenty of room for corrupt officials to maneuver, given
that only the immediate family members of Party members would
have to report income and assets.

--------------
In Hong Kong, Crickets Chirp
--------------


6. (C) Despite a widespread perception that the Mainland has
taken a more active interest in Hong Kong since 2003,
analysts believe the reverse is not true. Both Ching and Lau
see Mainland politics having little impact on the everyday
lives of residents here, and the Plenum did not attract much
attention in Hong Kong outside academic and media circles.
At the same time, the analysts saw nothing in particular
emerging from the policy discussions at the Plenum that would
impact on Hong Kong.
MARUT

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