HONG KONG'S ANSON CHAN: OUT OF OFFICE BUT STILL IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 000165 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM HK CH SUBJECT: HONG KONG'S ANSON CHAN: OUT OF OFFICE BUT STILL IN THE FIGHT REF: (A) HONG KONG 114 (B) HONG KONG 53 Classified By: Consul General Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4b and d ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: In a January 16 meeting with the Consul General, former Chief Secretary Anson Chan told us she believes Chief Executive (CE) Donald Tsang, with or without Beijing's "connivance", will try to drag out the consultation process over democratic reforms in Hong Kong, then force his preferred solution on the public when the deadline comes. Chan feels CE Tsang has lost the will to govern. She also fears the Secretary for Justice has retreated from his office's traditional role as an advocate for human rights. Looking forward, she sees the government attempting to revise its failed 2005 reform package, and ultimately to establish a system of "managed democracy" that includes a filtering process for CE candidates and a continuation of the Legislative Council's functional constituencies under some "one man, two votes" system. ¶2. (C) Summary and comment continued: Since retiring, Chan has focused on outreach, through her Citizens' Commission on Constitutional Development, promoting "two systems" among students, and a planned international speaking tour. Chan remains a formidable interlocutor. Politically, however, she lacks a strong platform, and her outreach to students may in the long term prove her most important contribution to the development of Hong Kong's civic and political culture. End summary and comment. -------------- Universal Suffrage -------------- ¶3. (C) During a January 16 meeting with the Consul General, former Chief Secretary for Administration and Legislative Councilor Anson Chan began by scorning Chief Executive (CE) Donald Tsang's January 15 announcement that he would delay consultations on electoral reforms for 2012 until the end of the year as "totally expected" and "carefully orchestrated". As reported ref A, Chan believes the Chief Executive's intention from the start -- with or without Beijing's "connivance" -- was to drag out the process of consultation on electoral reforms, then rush something through at the last minute. Although she believes the government will go through the motions of the consultation, the bottom line is already set: a "managed democracy". That result will be made to look like an expression of the popular will, she maintained. ¶4. (C) Chan warned that, given the bad economy ("we have not seen the worst"),growing income disparities, and the ineptness of the government, the Hong Kong public's growing unhappiness will be vented in the democracy debate. Thus, this delay will have the effect of making the consultation more, rather than less, contentious. She also dismissed the government's argument that it could only examine reforms for 2012 so as not to tie the next administration's hands as "a whole lot of rubbish." Every government makes policy which will have an impact for years into the future, she said. The Basic Law (Hong Kong's political charter) is quite clear that the destination is elections by universal suffrage. Chan insisted that there must therefore be a full roadmap to that goal in order to discuss the intervening steps. ¶5. (C) Ultimately, Chan expects the establishment of some filtering mechanism to form a slate of Beijing-approved candidates for the 2017 CE election. She also expects the government to attempt to retain the Legislative Council's (LegCo) functional constituencies (FC) through some form of "one man, two votes" system. Chan disputes such a system could ever be compliant with the standard for universal suffrage elections set by Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Even if people could vote for FC candidates, she argues, the system is only free and fair if each citizen also has the right to stand for those seats, rather than having candidates nominated by a narrow FC constituency. -------------- Why She Retired, Returned, and Retired Again -------------- ¶6. (C) Asked by the CG about her departure from government, Chan explained that she had resigned as Chief Secretary for Administration in April 2001 after a year spent failing to convince then-CE Tung Chee-hwa his plan (since implemented) to make all policy secretaries political appointees was wrong. She told the Consul General she continues to believe granting the power to appoint all of the policy secretaries to an unelected Chief Executive concentrates too much power HONG KONG 00000165 002 OF 003 in one person's hands. (Note: Prior to CE Tung's introduction of the "political accountability system in July 2002, all policy secretaries were drawn from the ranks of Hong Kong's professional civil service. The Tsang administration received approval from LegCo in December 2007 to expand the political appointments to include an Undersecretary and a "political assistant" for each policy secretary. End note.) ¶7. (C) Chan returned to politics when former Secretary for Security Regina Ip announced she would stand in the December 2007 by-election for the Hong Kong Island seat vacated by the death of Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) leader Ma Lik. She told the Consul General she feared no one else could beat Ip, and she felt Ip's election would send a very bad signal to both the Hong Kong government and Beijing. (Note: Ip had resigned in June 2003 after the failure of Hong Kong's Article 23 national security legislation, for which she was the leading government advocate. She went on to earn a Masters' degree at Stanford, and returned to Hong Kong as a self-professed democrat. Meanwhile, Chan had left her post-retirement retreat from public life by joining a December 2005 protest march against CE Tsang's proposed package of electoral reforms. She then formed her "Core Group" in 2006 with a number of noted scholars and activists to advocate for Hong Kong's democratic development. End note.) ¶8. (C) Chan won the election and joined LegCo as a democrat, albeit not a member of any party in the pan-democratic camp. Once in LegCo, however, Chan told the Consul General she resented being "given the runaround" by civil servants, since she knew perfectly well the things she was asking about could have been done. For this reason, she chose not to stand for re-election in September 2008. (Note: Chan did actively campaign for a range of pan-democratic candidates in the election, in particular the Civic Party ticket of Audrey Eu and Tanya Chan on Hong Kong Island. Ip won a seat herself in ¶2008. End note.) -------------- A Three-part Plan -------------- ¶9. (C) Asked by the Consul General about her current activities, Chan mentioned the Citizen's Commission on Constitutional Development (CCCD),her outreach to students, and plans for an international speaking tour. Chan described the CCCD as seeking a rational debate on constitutional reform, which would get the people of Hong Kong involved in the process. ¶10. (C) Chan intends her outreach to students to form a counterweight to efforts by CE Tsang and Secretary for Home Affairs (and former DAB member and left-wing activist) Tsang Tak-sing's emphasis on "patriotic education". Chan believes that "patriotic education" has focused too much on simple patriotism and loyalty, at the expense of educating students about "one country, two systems", the doctrine by which Hong Kong maintains its distinct political and legal culture. She has plans to speak at a hundred schools, to students ranging in age from high school to university. She told the Consul General her first such event was a "few days ago", and she had tried to "separate facts and myths." Asked by the Consul General to explain, she mentioned in particular her belief that one need not love the Communist Party to love China. She also mentioned telling students that economic stability could not be separated from democracy. Chan stressed that her approach is to give the students background they can use to make an informed decision, but then let them draw their own conclusions. She told the Consul General that the people who came to Hong Kong from the Mainland know the value of freedom, while children born in Hong Kong take it for granted, a point she has made a focus in her remarks to students. ¶11. (C) Regarding her international speaking tour, Chan mentioned a number of invitations to speak at Canadian universities. She also told the Consul General she recently had dinner with visiting former Secretary of State George Schultz and former Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, both of whom encouraged her to come speak in the United States. She intends to advocate for Hong Kong, which she told the Consul General means talking about Hong Kong's particular role as a financial center and its status as a rule-of-law society. Chan believes the Mainland is in a very fragile state right now, and Shanghai is no where near ready to play the same role that Hong Kong can. -------------- HONG KONG 00000165 003 OF 003 Chan on the Mainland, the Decline of the Legal Sector, Democracy, and the Press -------------- ¶12. (C) Chan professed to understand the nervousness of China's leadership, whom she feels "don't know where the spark will come from." She understands the enormity of the challenges they face, and even concedes they may not at present be ready for democracy. That said, she stressed there is no risk of "riots" in Hong Kong resulting from democratization, although she expects a healthy turnout for the annual July 1 democracy march. ¶13. (C) Regarding the Mainland's approach to Hong Kong, she sees the problem not as Beijing's interference; she dismissed Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Director Liao Hui as "not a strong advocate." She instead sees three more local problems. First, Chan believes CE Tsang has not lost Beijing's confidence, but confidence in himself, and no longer has the will to lead. Second, she sees the Central Government Liaison Office as the source of any PRC interference. Third, she believes Hong Kong's traditional leftists are also obstacles to democratic development. ¶14. (C) Chan also bemoaned the fact that Secretary for Justice Wong Yan-lung had not been a more forceful advocate for human rights, and asserted that he was not attending meetings in LegCo regarding legal issues. Chan argues that if the Secretary for Justice is not an independent advocate for "two systems", others will not be willing to speak out. The judiciary remains independent, in Chan's view, but she feels the quality of judges may have declined since the handover. She welcomes the continued participation of expatriate judges, telling the Consul General she thinks they are less vulnerable to local pressures. Chan also feels the powerful Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) may be becoming more politicized, saying she herself had been on the receiving end. ¶15. (C) Chan told the Consul General she had expected LegCo member Margaret Ng's resolution calling for CE Tsang to make clear the government intended to end functional constituencies (FC) to fail. The goal was to keep the pressure on the government. She believes that some businessmen, whose interests are nominally represented by the FCs, have come round to the idea that they must be phased out, and she is reaching out to the business sector on democracy issues. That said, she expects that the government's next proposal will be a slight revision of its 2005 reform proposal. (Note: in accordance with the National People's Congress Standing Committee's decisions on Hong Kong's democratic development, FCs will continue to fill half the seats in LegCo in 2012. End note.) Chan encouraged the Consul General to speak out in support of democratic development in Hong Kong. ¶16. (C) Chan regrets the lack of a truly independent Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong. She believes reporters are young, inexperienced and vulnerable to self-censorship. Pro-democracy Apple Daily is willing to take a stand, but Chan notes the paper carries certain political baggage with it. DONOVAN