CONSUL GENERAL'S FAREWELL CALL ON SECRETARY FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 001371 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM HK SUBJECT: CONSUL GENERAL'S FAREWELL CALL ON SECRETARY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AND MAINLAND AFFAIRS STEPHEN LAM REF: (A) HONG KONG 1315 (B) HONG KONG 1140 (C) HONG KONG 605 Classified By: Consul General Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On July 23, Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Stephen Lam assured the Consul General the Hong Kong government will proceed with consultations on political reforms for 2012 by the end of this year. Lam told the CG the reform package, greater Pearl River Delta integration, and relations with Taiwan were the main foci of his Bureau's work in the coming year. In response to the CG's comment about the lack of contact between the USG and the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO),Lam noted that much of CGLO's work in Hong Kong was direct outreach to Hong Kong people in which even the Hong Kong government played no role. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Consul General paid a farewell call on Secretary Stephen Lam Sui-long at the Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau (CMAB) July 23. Lam was joined by Administrative Assistant Joyce Ho, who did the major drafting for the government's 2007 consultation paper on constitutional reform. The Consul General took the opportunity to praise the excellent cooperation between CMAB and the Consulate, noting we were in contact over a range of matters including political reform, human rights, and Taiwan. Lam reciprocated the CG's high estimation of the relationship, and welcomed the chance to explain "the real situation in Hong Kong" to the Consulate and the range of high-level visitors who have come during the CG's tenure. -------------- Constitutional Reform: 2012 and No Further -------------- ¶3. (C) The Consul General reiterated to Lam that the United States attaches great importance to Chief Executive (CE) Tsang's pledge to begin consultations on political reform for 2012 by the end of the year no matter the state of the economy. Lam reiterated that this was still the plan. In response to a question from the CG, Lam indicated the CE would make "some reference" to the consultation in his annual Policy Address (usually mid-October),but that the formal consultation would follow later. While stressing that nothing concrete was decided about the content, Lam ventured that the first part of the consultation process would revisit �00A;ideas discussed by the advisory Commission on Strategic Development during the 2007 "green paper" consultations on constitutional reform. ¶4. (C) Lam told the CG the current administration was only authorized to deal with reforms for 2012, a limitation he said came from the central government in parallel with the December 2007 National People's Congress Standing Committee decision which set Hong Kong's "timetable" for universal suffrage. That said, Lam allowed that political parties and others might raise ideas regarding 2017 and 2020 (the years, respectively, in which direct elections for the CE and Legislative Council (LegCo) are anticipated). CMAB would faithfully record these ideas for review by future administrations. (Comment: The administration line has always been that they would look at 2012 only, leaving future reforms to their successors. Lam's remarks are the first time the Hong Kong government has made the claim to us they received specific instructions from the central government limiting them to working on 2012. End comment.) ¶5. (C) Lam concluded by hoping that the reforms, along with Hong Kong's system of political appointments to the policy bureaux, would eventually allow an elected CE to build a political coalition which would include the majority party in LegCo. He told the CG he felt the Hong Kong political scene was "on track" to reach this goal. -------------- Building Ties with the PRD and Taiwan -------------- ¶6. (C) Lam told the CG that CMAB was also active on Pearl River Delta (PRD) integration issues. The successive Closer Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA) were "a start," Lam explained, but Hong Kong "needs to go further." In particular, now that Guangdong is industrialized, the time is ripe for Hong Kong to push for greater access and cooperation in the service sector. Noting the growing economic links between Hong Kong and the PRD, the Consul General asked Lam if it would be increasingly difficult to maintain "one country, two systems." Not really, said Lam. While there may be more "green channels" in the future, Lam was adamant HONG KONG 00001371 002 OF 002 that the Hong Kong government would maintain its authority to "check, hold and inspect" at the border. ¶7. (C) Lam offered a personal insight into why Taichung rather than Taipei was the initial partner in Hong Kong's new cross-Strait outreach. Lam served in the Hong Kong representative office in Canada at the same time that current Taichung Mayor Jason Hu was serving as Taiwan representative, and the two got to know each other "at social functions." Lam told the Consul General his June 5-6 visit to Taiwan (ref B) was his first ever. Hong Kong's next step was appointing personnel to the Economic Committee, which with its counterpart in Taiwan would steer ties between the two sides. All of these initiatives, Lam told the CG, occurred with the "support and understanding" of Beijing. Evincing a clear enthusiasm for the future development of Hong Kong-Taiwan relations, Lam suggested this framework would grow to cover more than just economic and commercial matters. The CG welcomed these warming ties, as well as the growing ties between the Mainland and Taiwan. He hoped the breakthrough on Taiwan participation in the World Health Assembly would be followed by other chances for Taiwan to participate in international bodies in which statehood is not required for membership. -------------- CGLO Does Its Own Thing -------------- ¶8. (C) The Consul General noted that he was unable to open a dialogue with the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO) in Hong Kong. Even when CGLO delegations visit the United States, they declined to meet with Consulate General or State Department personnel. Lam took this opening to downplay reports from earlier this year that the CGLO had been involved in push for a greater role for Hong Kong delegates to the National People's Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC) in Hong Kong (ref C). "We regard these people as Hong Kong people," Lam declared, "and if they are talented, we make use of them." However, Lam noted the Hong Kong government left logistical support for NPC and CPPCC delegates to CGLO specifically because the Hong Kong government wants to maintain a distance, in accordance with "one country, two systems." While the Hong Kong government coordinates with CGLO on issues like Taiwan policy and Sichuan reconstruction, Lam told the CG that CGLO also does a lot of direct outreach to Hong Kong people in which the Hong Kong government plays no role. "They don't bother us, and we don't bother them. We meet on stage a lot to cut ribbons," Lam joked. Lam also noted that CGLO has contacts with local groups which might be viewed by foreigners as "political". Lam professed to be uncertain how or if CGLO had contacts with the foreign community. DONOVAN