EDITOR OF "PRISONER OF THE STATE" ON THE FUTURE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 001118 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM CH HK SUBJECT: EDITOR OF "PRISONER OF THE STATE" ON THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN CHINA REF: HONG KONG 1022 Classified By: Consul General Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Bao Pu (son of the late Zhao Ziyang's secretary Bao Tong; strictly protect throughout) believes Beijing leadership have read Zhao's recently-published memoirs, and chosen to do nothing. Bao believes that the revelations in the memoirs, Charter 08, and the increasing legalization of China are all compressing the political space of the Communist Party. That said, he feels some actual "push" will be required to cause major change. He sees intellectuals as the best catalyst for change, but also recognizes that they may be distracted by more mundane livelihood concerns. Though well-connected through family, Bao's remarks strike us as reflective more of his observation and even his hopes than as recounting specific conversations with Beijing insiders. End summary and comment. -------------- A Watchful Eye... -------------- ¶2. (C) We met recently with Bao Pu, who edited the English version of Zhao Ziyang's memoirs "Prisoner of the State." Bao told us he had been under surveillance by Mainland operatives in Hong Kong in the two weeks prior to the release of the Zhao memoirs, his first such experience here. That said, he doubts his shadows knew why they were tailing him beyond that something big was going to happen. He suspects one of two things led to his being watched. Theory one is that Bao knows Princeton scholar Perry Link got an advance copy of "Prisoner of the State." If Link discussed it with Chinese contacts, that may in turn have led to Bao's being tailed. Theory two is a (guarded) conversation Bao had some weeks ago with Radio Free Asia Mandarin Service, which might have been monitored. In any case, the surveillance ran intensively for two weeks up to May 20, after which it disappeared. Since the English edition of the Zhao memoirs was on sale in Hong Kong May 19, Bao believes whoever ordered the surveillance suddenly knew what the big news was and, having acquired the book, stopped following him. He has not detected surveillance since, although he told us that the overall high level of public attention was such that he "had to quit" his day job at a Shanghai-owned investment company. -------------- ...But Inaction Otherwise -------------- ¶3. (C) Bao believes the Beijing leadership has already read the Zhao memoirs, and decided to do nothing in the hopes that the issue will fade away. In part, he contends they can't do anything, since an alternative version of the history covered would require them to work around the large number of facts in Zhao's account. Bao claimed there was a precedent for Hu Jintao in this regard. During the 1989 Tibet crisis, at which time Hu was Tibet Party Secretary, Bao claims Tibet security officials tried for days to raise Hu on the phone. Absent instructions, security officials took action on their own which, once he saw they had been "successful", Hu came out and publicly endorsed. Bao sees this history being repeated now, with provincial-level security officials told to maintain stability without any particular guidelines, leading each to set its own arbitrary standards and policies. ¶4. (C) Looking at China's politics writ large, Bao believes that the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) political "room to maneuver" is shrinking. Bao feels the Zhao memoirs may be rejected, but they are difficult to dispute. A second force is Charter '08 (a call for wide-reaching reform by prominent Mainland dissident scholars and activist lawyers),which Bao termed a small but significant step. Third is the growing number of laws in China, which the CCP will find increasingly difficult to circumvent. Interestingly, however, Bao does not see the legal community as a major force for social change, which he sees coming from China's intellectuals. -------------- A Teetering Rock in Need of a Push -------------- ¶5. (C) In addition to the political forces hemming in the CCP, Bao also sees demographics shifting in favor of change. The generation of people aged 45-60, who came up immediately after the Cultural Revolution, only know life in the Party. Bao feels the next generation, who have a broader life experience, will undoubtedly be more amenable to reform. In addition, Bao sees China's intellectuals as the key bellwether for change: the more they criticize, the greater HONG KONG 00001118 002 OF 002 the strength of the reform movement. By the same token, if intellectuals focus more on their own lives (buying a house, etc.),the momentum will slow. Despite these changes to the correlation of forces antithetical to the interests of the Communist Party, Bao still feels a push will need to come from somewhere. ¶6. (C) Among the current leadership in Beijing, he sees Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom he describes as very pragmatic, as the most inclined to reform. Bao thinks Politburo members Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao could potentially also be reformers, but dismisses Premier Wen Jiabao as a bureaucrat. -------------- Outside Pressure Matters -------------- ¶7. (C) In looking at forces which could cause change in China, Bao stressed that international pressure on human rights remains important. He is certain people on the Mainland are aware of Hong Kong's activities in commemoration of June 4 (reftel). Hong Kong's candlelight vigil shows that Beijing has not gotten the upper hand here, Bao said, although he was uncertain whether such a demonstration would lead Beijing to further slow the pace of Hong Kong's political development in response. DONOVAN