Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HONGKONG1078
2009-06-12 10:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Hong Kong
Cable title:  

MACAU CHIEF EXECUTIVE RACE -- NO CONTEST

Tags:  PGOV CH MC 
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VZCZCXRO7455
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHHK #1078 1631012
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121012Z JUN 09
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7837
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 001078 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2024
TAGS: PGOV CH MC
SUBJECT: MACAU CHIEF EXECUTIVE RACE -- NO CONTEST

REF: HONG KONG 983

Classified By: DPO Christopher Marut for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 001078 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2024 TAGS: PGOV CH MC SUBJECT: MACAU CHIEF EXECUTIVE RACE -- NO CONTEST REF: HONG KONG 983 Classified By: DPO Christopher Marut for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) With Prosecutor General Ho Chio-meng's decision not to enter the race, former Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture Fernando Chui Sai-on is almost certain to be Macau's next Chief Executive (CE). The June 11 deadline for any senior Macau official to resign his or her position in order to stand for CE passed without another serious candidate declaring interest, thus ceding the field to Chui. Prospects for any of the other, largely unknown, declared candidates even getting the fifty nominations required to appear on the ballot are almost nil (reftel). Chui's campaign reports he has already secured the minimum fifty nominations, but Chui can be expected to seek as many of the remaining 250 nominations as possible to demonstrate the strength and breadth of his support. Assuming the process proceeds as expected, Chui will be "elected" July 26, approved by Beijing thereafter, and take office December 20. ¶2. (C) Macau Inter-University Institute (IIUM) scholar Eric Sautede sees social harmony trumping even corruption in Beijing's calculus. Thus, having Ho Chio-meng, who prosecuted Macau's biggest official corruption case to date, run for CE would serve only to highlight the corruption fault line in Macau society. The point of having any other candidate, he argues further, is to offer an alternative, and other than on corruption, there aren't really any issues which would show contrast between Chui and another contender. University of Macau Professor Eilo Yu believes Beijing is now trying to smooth Chui's path into power by reaching out to those who oppose Chui. Yu also thinks the (largely tame and pro-government) Macau media will protect Chui in their coverage. Even with such "united front" efforts, however, Yu sees little chance for Chui to have much of a honeymoon period once elected. Even Beijing may be laying down markers, as Yu thinks the recent crackdown on corrupt Shenzhen officials by Mainland authorities are meant in part as a warning to Macau. ¶3. (C) Comment: No one ever expected the Macau CE race would be a real contest; the only question was which candidate would have Beijing's nod. Chui may now be the heir apparent, but his march to the throne may not be a pleasant stroll. As reported reftel, a vocal, if still quite small and largely powerless, sector of society has now mobilized to express its opposition to corruption and the historically cozy relationship between government and a few powerful "patriotic" business clans like the Chui family. Chui is saying the right things about opposing corruption and supporting "one country, two systems," but to avoid being seen as merely a well-connected princeling, he will need to deliver clean and effective governance along with economic prosperity. Moreover, the opposition now finding its voice in Macau's cyberspace may yet become a force, or at least a factor, in the September Legislative Assembly elections. End comment. DONOVAN

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