DA'WA EFFORTS TO GIVE AWAY BABIL GOVERNORSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000033 CORRECTED COPY E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ SUBJECT: DA'WA EFFORTS TO GIVE AWAY BABIL GOVERNORSHIP REF: A) HILLAH 30, B) BAGHDAD 1036 CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth M. hillas, PRT Leader, Babil PRT, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) In a 20 April meeting with the PRT, Da'wa provincial chairman and PC member Abu Ahmed Al-Basri confirmed media reports that the national Da'wa leadership had promised the Babil Governorship to ISCI and that local Da'wa officials had reneged. He said that he had received eleventh hour instructions from Baghdad late last week to allow ISCI to gain the Governorship, but that ISCI had sought to have Salim Saleh Mahdi Al'-Muslmawi reelected, or alternatively another ISCI candidate, Ali Issa, both of whom were unacceptable to the Da'wa-led coalition in the PC. Al-Basri did not specify what Da'wa had hoped to get back from ISCI on the national level in return, but he made clear that there was a larger deal. ¶2. (C) Faced with a revolt by Da'wa PC members and coalition partners, Al-Basri refused to follow the instructions that he said came from PM Al-Maliki's office, offering his resignation to underscore his point. Adding tension to ISCI Da'wa relations, in the last ISCI-Da'wa negotiating session in Al-Hillah, Al-Basri reportedly called Al-Muslimawi a "failure" and Ali Issa a "thief." ¶3. (C) Reflecting on the reasons for Baghdad's efforts to give away Da'wa's electoral gains, Al Basri said there is great nervousness within the national Da'wa office over the survivability of the Al-Maliki Government. He said ISCI was prepared to "sell out Iraq" to advance its own political goals, referencing ISCI support for Kurdish demands with regad to Kirkuk. He implied that Da'wa efforts to co-opt Sadrist moderates -- for which he has been a strong proponent -- were taking on more momentum as Da'wa's relations with ISCI worsened. He agreed that it was vital that Da'wa efforts to co-opt Sadrst moderates not give extremists any breathing space, and he gave assurances that aggressive ISF targetting of Special Groups in Babil should not diminish but rather needed to show results. ¶4. (C) Comment: This is the first confimation we have received that the Prime Minister's office had agreed to give up the Babil Governorship to ISCI, although we knew that Baghdad was encouraging a political accommodation of some sort (reftels). In this environment, the likelihood of changes in Babil's ISF leadership could take on new impetus, if Da'wa draws the conclusion that ISCI/Badr are prepared to use violence or the threat of violence to initimdate Da'wa or force political concessions in Babil. Regarding Special Groups, Al-Basri understands that while the PRT and USG have supported bringing Sadrists into the political process and for strengthening Sadrist moderates, there is a red line when it comes to any weakening of ISF efforts to vigorously pursue Special Groups, which he acknowldged are behind most of the recent IED attacks in central and southern Babil. HILLAS