BABIL DA'WA LEADER ON BAGHDAD'S EFFORTS TO GIVE GOVERNO

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000032

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: BABIL DA'WA LEADER ON BAGHDAD'S EFFORTS TO GIVE GOVERNO

REF: A) Hillah 0030, B) Baghdad036

CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth M. hillas, PRT Leader, Babil PRT, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) In a 20 April meeting with the PRT, Da'wa provincial
chairman and PC member Abu Ahmed Al-Basri confirmed media
reports that the national Da'wa leadership had promised the
Babil Governorship to ISCI and that local Da'wa officials had
reneged. He said that he had received eleveNnth hour
instructions from Baghdad late last week to allow ISCI to gain
the Governorship, but that ISCI had sought to have Salim Saleh
Mahdi Al'-Muslmawi reelected, or alternatively another ISCI
candidate, Ali Issa, both of whom were unacceptable to the
Da'wa-led coalition on the PC. Al-Basri did not specify what
Da'wa had hoped to get back from ISCI on the national level in
return, but he made clear that there was a larger deal.

2. (C) Faced with a revolt by Da'wa PC members and coalition
partners, Al-Basri refused to follow the instructions that he
said came from PM Al-Maliki's office, offering his resignation
to underscore his point. Adding tension to ISCI Da'wa relations,
in the last ISCI-Da'wa negotiating session in Al-Hillah Al-Basri
reportedly called Al-Muslimawi a "failure" and Ali Issa a
"thief."

3. (C) Reflecting on the reasons for Baghdad's efforts to give
away Da'wa's electoral gains, Al Basri said there is great
nervousness within the national Da'wa office over the
survivability of the Al-Maliki Government. He said ISCI was
prepared to "sell out Iraq" to advance its own political goals,
referencing ISCI support for Kurdish demands with regad to
Kirkuk. He implied that Da'wa efforts to co-opt Sadrist
moderates -- for which he has been a strong proponent -- were
taking on more momentum as Da'wa's relations with ISCI worsened.
He agreed it was vital that Da'wa efforts to co-opt Sadrst
moderates not give extremists any breathing space, and he gave
assurances that aggressive ISF targetting of Special Groups in
Babil should not diminish but rather needs to show results.

4. (C) Comment: This is the first confimation we have received
that the Prime Minister's office had agreed to give up the Babil
Governorship to ISCI, although we knew that Baghdad was
encouraging a political accommodation of some sort (reftels). In
this environment, the likelihood of changes in Babil's ISF
leadership could take on new impetus, if Da'wa draws the
conclusion that ISCI/Badr are prepared to use violence or the
threat of violence to initimdate Da'wa or force political
concessions in Babil. Regarding Special Groups, Al-Basri
understands that while the PRT and USG have supported bringing
Sadrists into the political process and for strengthening
Sadrist moderates, there is a red line when it comes to any
weakening of ISF efforts to vigorously pursue Special Groups,
which he acknowldged are behind most of the recent IED attacks
in central and southern Babil.

HILLAS