AFGHANISTAN: SIMILAR EXPECTATIONS OF KARZAI, PRT

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000441 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2019 TAGS: AF FI MOPS PREL SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: SIMILAR EXPECTATIONS OF KARZAI, PRT REDESIGN IN PROGRESS REF: STATE 118297 Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Scott Brandon, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with MFA officials responsible for Afghanistan policy, poloff delivered reftel points regarding USG expectations of the new Karzai government and solicited information on the redesign of the Swedish-Finnish PRT. The interlocutors noted a lack of USG emphasis on follow-on elections and economic development while signaling an interest in hosting a visit from USG officials once a new Afghanistan strategy has been decided in Washington. The Swedish-Finnish PRT redesign is likely to receive political-level approval before mid-2010 but is not likely to result in a civilian-led PRT. Finland is likely to remove its four civilians from Mazar-e-Sharif while maintaining the current level of military forces. When NATO solicits views from non-ally ISAF troop contributors, the GOF would appreciate more time to provide its input. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On November 18 poloff delivered reftel points to MFA Afghanistan desk officer Niko Heimola. While affirming that Finland broadly shared the same view of what was required of the Karzai government, Heimola noted that our points did not appear to mention setting the conditions for future parliamentary elections or place much emphasis on growth/development. Poloff responded that preventing corruption would be essential to both of these goals. Regarding the need for the international community to support Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts, Heimola confirmed that the frequent suggestions of Defense Minister Hakamies that Finnish MP and EU Sudan/Darfur mediator Pekka Haavisto would be a good candidate to serve as a mediator in Afghanistan had not been discussed in the GOF. NOTE: This confirms what we had previously heard. END NOTE He further mentioned that reintegration is already going on at the local level in the Finnish-Swedish area of responsibility and that Finland was working to create &alternative livelihoods8 for former fighters. He agreed that the process must be Afghan-led, local, and that results won,t happen quickly. ¶3. (SBU) Heimola indicated that the GOF would be eager to hear directly from U.S. officials after President Obama makes his decision on the new U.S. strategy. He noted that many GOF officials will be difficult to reach from 25 December until 7 January. ¶4. (C) In a separate November 23 meeting with the Director of the MFA's Security Policy unit, Timo Kantola, poloff solicited information regarding the possible reconfiguration of the Finnish-Swedish PRT based in Mazar-e-Sharif. A somewhat uncomfortable Kantola was dismissive of media reports indicating that the PRT could become civilian-led and that the number of Finnish troops might be doubled to two hundred. "This is not what the Swedes are planning," Kantola indicated, going on to explain that the Swedes and Finns were unlikely to adopt the model being used by the Turks, also in Mazar-e-Sharif, under which Turkish soldiers provide the force protection while civilians are responsible for most other duties. Kantola revealed that Finland was nlikely to continue fielding the four civilians it had in the PRT due to problems they posed in maintaining a clear chain of command and the different security standards prevailing for civilians and soldiers. Kantola expected that the Finnish military contingent of the PRT would remain at about 100 soldiers but that Finland would probably provide a few more police trainers to EUPOL in order to rise from the current 24 to the goal of 30. A political decision on implementing a redesigned PRT, whatever it might look like, is likely to come before April or May, with implementation in the last half of 2010, according to Kantola. NOTE: GOF sources had previously indicated that a decision was likely after April/May 2010 with implementation in 2011. END NOTE. ¶5. (C) Kantola, whose unit is principally responsible for ISAF within the MFA, expressed some frustration with the short time windows in which non-ally ISAF troop contributors are asked to provide their input. "We usually get a request for input in the evening and the response needs to be back in Brussels the next morning," he explained. Even six more hours to formulate a response would be a welcome improvement and would go some way towards making Finland feel like its input was actually valued. Kantola indicated that the GOF was examining its own internal information flow from its mission at NATO to ensure the speediest possible communication regarding ISAF matters. ORECK