FINLAND: MISCOMMUNICATION OVER AFGHANISTAN TROOP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000392 SIPDIS NSC FOR J.HOVENIER E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019 TAGS: FI MARR PGOV PREL SUBJECT: FINLAND: MISCOMMUNICATION OVER AFGHANISTAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL EMBARRASSES GOVERNMENT REF: HELSINKI 378 Classified By: DCM Michael A. Butler for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The Finnish Government's (GOF) withdrawal from Afghanistan next week of its Election Support Force (ESF) caught the GOF's top leaders unaware, leaving them embarrassed and scrambling for explanations. The President and Foreign Minister publicly claimed the ESF would stay through the runoff elections, while the Defense Ministry insisted they would withdraw the full ESF starting October ¶28. The Prime Minister admitted learning of the "early" withdrawal from the news. Finnish government officials provided contradictory information about the withdrawal, but eventually all acknowledged the October withdrawal date. Government officials publicly admitted a breakdown in communications. Privately, they acknowledge the need for serious damage control, given a perception of "cutting and running" just when troops are needed, even though their normal ISAF contingent of 100 remains at the PRT. If we have suggestions on ways the Finns might contribute more, such as fielding an additional Operational Mentor and Liaison Team, the near future might be the right time to float them. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The Finnish Government's (GOF) withdrawal from Afghanistan next week of its Election Support Force (ESF) caught the GOF's top leaders unaware, leaving them embarrassed and scrambling for explanations. (NOTE: The ESF consists of some 86 soldiers who arrived in Mazar-e-Sharif in early July. A majority of the soldiers are reservists on short contracts, or are conscripts whose period of service soon would be over. Once they depart, Finland's contribution to the PRT will number around 100 troops, the same number as pre-July. END NOTE.) Having stated publicly that the troops would remain for the runoff elections, President (and Commander in Chief) Tarja Halonen and Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb publicly admitted surprise that they would withdraw before the election. Prime Minister Vanhanen acknowledged in Parliament that he learned of the withdrawal from the news. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Oreck previously was told of a firm withdrawal date of October 28 (reftel). Once Halonen and Stubb publicly asserted the ESF would remain into November, Embassy staff encountered a maze of conflicting and contradictory information about the withdrawal from various GOF officials. Those officials gave differing accounts of whether the arrival of more Swedish troops posed a space problem should Finns extend, and to what extend that played a role in the withdrawal date. They also provided conflicting information as to whether all or part of the ESF would remain past October 28. Eventually GOF officials in the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Foreign Affairs (MFA) confirmed the October withdrawal for the entire ESF, and acknowledged a breakdown in communication between ministries and with the President's office. ¶4. (C) Following conversations with GOF officials, we assess that the MOD and Finnish Defense Force (FDF) based the original plan for the ESF's deployment on the assumption that any runoff would have already taken place by the end of October, and that they assessed that an extension would not be needed. Extending beyond October would have required executing new contracts. Throughout the controversy Defense Minister Hakamies has insisted that the President and the rest of the government were properly informed and that the withdrawal was "according to plan." Because the troops were set to leave in October "as scheduled," it seems that the MOD/FDF did not make a special effort to bring this to the attention of the President's office or the MFA. An advisor to FM Stubb told DCM that the MOD was fully aware of the MFA's expectation that the ESF would remain beyond October, and asserted the MOD rigidly held to the pre-determined departure date. What remains unclear is what efforts the MFA made to ascertain whether and how the ESF would extend their stay. ¶5. (SBU) The controversy sparked critical coverage in the Swedish press, coming as it did when the Swedish government presented to the Parliament its request to renew the troop mandate. An article quoted an FDF officer as saying that additional Swedes were being deployed to replace the ESF; a Swedish officer denied that the Swedish troops were deployed to replace the departing Finns but admitted that the Swedes would have to take over tasks from them. The critical coverage (some of it re-published in the Finnish press) HELSINKI 00000392 002 OF 002 included a reference to how the Finnish troops are eager to depart Afghanistan, as assertion contradicted by information coming to the Embassy from State's PRT officer in Mazar. The Finnish media responded with acid jokes about Swedish military capability and resolve. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) The entire Finnish security policy apparatus has a generous amount of egg on its face. The President appears ill-informed, as does the MFA, and both have pointed fingers at the MOD. The MFA Security Policy Unit chief told poloff that "we look very bad and need to do some serious damage control." They understand the appearance that they are cutting and running just when troops are needed, even though their normal ISAF contingent remains. It seems likely that the GOF will be looking for ways to counter the negative publicity it is now receiving in Sweden and at home (Finnish editorials are uniformly lambasting the President, MOD and MFA for their poor internal communication). If we have suggestions on ways they could be more helpful, such as fielding an additional Operational Mentor and Liaison Team, the near future might be the right time to float them. ORECK