SPAIN ON THE LOOKOUT FOR SIGNS OF CHANGE IN CUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000683 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CU SUBJECT: SPAIN ON THE LOOKOUT FOR SIGNS OF CHANGE IN CUBA REF: HAVANA 639 (A SPLENDID LITTLE VISIT ) HAVANA 00000683 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. The Spanish Mission in Cuba is looking for signs of change that will help them move along EU-Cuba relations, and sway their EU partners. Featuring prominently in their case for normalization is progress on U.S. - Cuba relations. Our Spanish counterparts note that U.S. willingness to free the five Cuban spies from U.S. jails would likely result in the freeing of political prisoners in Cuba, and mention the possibility of the GOC offering a token gesture during our next Migration Talks, especially if it coincides with Human Rights Day. At the working level, Spanish diplomats understand that they are unlikely to turn up much to convince their EU colleagues -- they claim that the GOC is ill-equipped to change or make significant gestures, and they completely dismiss the ability of the Cuba's opposition to be agents of change. End Summary. SPAIN ON A MISSION -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) In a two-hour meeting with USINT's Polchief on November 5, the Spanish Political Counselor spoke at length about the frustrating task that lies ahead for Spain, as it searches for evidence of change in Cuba to use in building a case for normalization of EU-Cuba relations. The Spanish diplomat, who has served two tours in Cuba, restated that Spain would try to change the current EU course on Cuba during its Presidency starting this January. The EU Common Position on Cuba is "too in your face" and counterproductive in getting the Government of Cuba (GOC) to open up politically, he said. ODDS AGAINST THE SPANISH -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) The Spanish know that the odds are stacked against them. The Polcouns said his country has no realistic hopes for changing the Common Position during Spain's term, "but perhaps we could tee it up enough to change during the following Presidency" (Belgium's). (He had no doubt that, Lisbon Treaty notwithstanding, the Spanish would speak for the EU in Cuba during the first half of 2010.) He also acknowledged that the Spanish lobbying efforts may have started on the wrong foot, with Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos voicing his intentions too publicly (Reftel) and when he met with the wives of two of the Cuban spies jailed in the United States after refusing to meet with dissidents or their families while in Cuba. However, the biggest obstacle to the Spanish may be the GOC itself. A PARTNER THAT WON'T PLAY ALONG -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) The Spanish diplomat complained that, despite Spain,s engagement with the GOC, "there is no political will to change." He said that if their efforts to move the GOC come to naught, they would have to wait for the so-called biological solution. He claims that former president Fidel Castro continues to meddle in the running of the government, and on issues like prisoner releases entirely calls the shots. He said that even getting the release of a gravely sick prisoner from a hospital --the GOC's concession to Moratinos-- had to be justified to the former Cuban president. He said that Spanish officials had told the GOC that, unless they do something significant over the next few months (release prisoners foremost),"nothing will happen" in the EU. U.S. - CUBA RELATIONS AND CUBAN CONCESSIONS -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) The Spanish are also looking at improvements in U.S. - Cuba relations to justify subordinating the EU's human rights agenda to the goal of normalizing relations. The Spanish Polcouns asked whether the United States had considered freeing the five Cuban spies, adding that such a move would result in the release of political prisoners here. He also inquired about whether we had considered the HAVANA 00000683 002.2 OF 002 possibility of the GOC making a gesture during the Migration Talks in Havana, which may coincide with the December 10 United Nations Human Rights Day. USINT's Polchief replied that all goodwill gestures would be well received but that the impact of a piecemeal symbolic gesture would be limited. DISMISSING THE DISSIDENTS -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) The Spanish diplomat added that in the wake of Moratinos' departure, he had met with most of the dissidents who criticized harshly the visit. He said that he had told them that if Moratinos had met with dissidents, he would have been frozen out, "and what good would that have done?" Like most diplomats who don't engage with dissidents and some who do but would like to downgrade (Holland and Canada, to name two) he dismissed the intentions and/or the influence of most of them. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) The Spanish have their work cut out for them. Over the short term, Spain gains little but the hostility of some of its EU partners and of Cuba's civil society. Cuba's intransigence doesn't help -- and the detention and roughing up of Cuba's best-known bloggers (Septel) on November 6 dents further the hopes that the GOC will play along nicely to Spanish efforts on its behalf. Although there are commercial interests at stake, what Spain really wants is to maintain a presence that will outlive the current regime and be able to match the U.S.'s interests and influence on the Island. Thus, they want to remain engaged with the GOC at any cost, to ensure that whatever administration emerges is Spain-friendly. They, and all others, are watching closely to see how we balance our priorities as we continue to engage with the GOC on specific issues. FARRAR