Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HAVANA494
2009-08-12 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

THE EXIT PERMIT: HAMMER, CARROT, AND RALLYING CRY

Tags:  PHUM PREL CU SMIG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HAVANA 000494 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2034
TAGS: PHUM PREL CU SMIG
SUBJECT: THE EXIT PERMIT: HAMMER, CARROT, AND RALLYING CRY

REF: A. 06 HAVANA 21638

B. 08 HAVANA 66

C. 07 BRATISLAVA 211

D. 06 HAVANA 23546

E. 07 HAVANA 210

F. 07 HAVANA 53

G. HAVANA 357

H. HAVANA 462

HAVANA 00000494 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reason 1.4 (d)

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HAVANA 000494

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2034
TAGS: PHUM PREL CU SMIG
SUBJECT: THE EXIT PERMIT: HAMMER, CARROT, AND RALLYING CRY

REF: A. 06 HAVANA 21638

B. 08 HAVANA 66

C. 07 BRATISLAVA 211

D. 06 HAVANA 23546

E. 07 HAVANA 210

F. 07 HAVANA 53

G. HAVANA 357

H. HAVANA 462

HAVANA 00000494 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reason 1.4 (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Edgard Lopez Moreno, a well-known Cuban youth
opposition leader, departed Havana for Miami on August 6,
2009 as a refugee. He quit the island eight days after GOC
immigration authorities gave him his exit permit and
passport, and two and a half years after he first applied for
permission to leave. Lopez's long struggle to obtain an exit
permit demonstrates how the Government of Cuba ("GOC")
systematically strives to break the will of opposition
leaders. His flight signifies both a victory for him and his
family, who await him in the United States, as well as a loss
for the Cuban opposition, which will be deprived of one of
its youngest and most creative leaders at a time when
opposition organization is weak at best, and youth are
overwhelmingly apathetic. The broad support he received in
his fight for an exit permit also illuminated how the right
to freedom of movement has emerged as a rallying point for
traditional and non-traditional Cuban dissidents, an
important point to bear in mind as we pursue migration talks
and other human rights issues with the GOC.


2. (C) This cable attempts to contextualize Lopez's
departure, and in doing so, illuminate how the GOC so
effectively uses psychological warfare as a tool in its
battle against any political opposition. This cable includes
Lopez's personal thoughts about the Cuban opposition, which
he shared with us in a final interview, as well as
descriptions of his recent mental and emotional state (please
protect strictly).

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THE EMERGENCE OF A YOUTH LEADER AND KEY USINT CONTACT
-------------- --------------


3. (C) After the "Black Spring" of 2003 saw 75 Cuban
dissidents imprisoned for their opposition work, Edgard Lopez
Moreno emerged as a youthful, dynamic opposition leader.
(Note: Lopez is currently 32 years old. End note.) According

to Lopez, the upheaval the "Black Spring" caused in
traditional opposition structures resulted in a wider
political space for Cuban youth to construct new opposition
groups, and allowed him to emerge as a leader. Lopez
co-founded the Marti Youth Coalition ("Coalicion Juvenil
Martiana" or CJM) in March, 2005 with opposition leaders
Marco de Miranda and Yuri Perez Vasquez. (Note: Marco de
Miranda departed Cuba for Miami as a refugee in June, 2006.
End note.) The CJM's stated goal was "to promote a space for
alternative (civic) participation." (REF A) Between 2005 and
2009, Lopez served as vice-president and then president of
the CJM. He encouraged a fresh approach to pro-democracy
advocacy and facilitated USINT outreach to opposition youth.


4. (C) His efforts included:

- launching "Despierta Juventud" ("Awakened Youth" or
"Enlightened Youth"),a newsletter which cataloged the CJM's
activities;
- creating a contest urging Cubans and foreigners to write
letters to political prisoners;
- surveying Cuban youth regarding their work, education, and
access to information;
- drafting a "Cuban version" of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, inserting "All Cubans" in front of every
article in order to emphasize to dubious Cubans that the
UNDHR also applied to them;

HAVANA 00000494 002.2 OF 004


- founding an independent library, based out of his home;
- appearing with other Cuban youth leaders on "A Mano
Limpia," a Miami television show, at least twice (with the
assistance of USINT);
- publishing GOC violations of human and civil rights;
- participating in USINT tele-conferences and video
conferences, including a video conference with former
Commerce Secretary Gutierrez (REF B),and a video conference
with Slovak dissidents from the 1989 Velvet Revolution (REF
C);
- helping USINT to organize an "unprecedented opposition
youth forum" in November, 2006, that brought together
"sixty-three young pro-democracy activists from three of
Cuba's most influential opposition youth groups," with two
young Mexican pro-democracy activists (REF D);
- helping USINT to organize an opposition art show in March,
2007 that featured paintings and other works of art
emphasizing freedom of expression (REF E);
- participating in and graduating from a USINT/Florida
International University course on independent journalism.


5. (C) As a result of his consistent, open opposition to the
regime, Lopez was harassed, threatened and detained by state
security officials, who would insinuate that he, his family,
and his colleagues in the opposition could be "disappeared"
or killed with impunity at any moment. He was subject to
multiple state-sponsored "actos de repudio," including a 2006
demonstration in front of his apartment, where over 100
people chanted pro-regime slogans and screamed offensive
terms at his family for forty-five minutes. He was also
prohibited from leaving Cuba.


-------------- --------------
HOW TO BREAK THE OPPOSITION: EXIT PERMIT AS HAMMER
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The United States granted Lopez refugee status in
February, 2007. Shortly thereafter, he married fellow
dissident Rufina Velasquez Gonzalez, who received status
after being incorporated into Lopez's application. Lopez
applied for an exit permit (or "tarjeta blanca") in early

2007. Several times a year, Lopez would answer summons by the
Department of Immigration ("Immigration"),only to be told
his exit permit was still "in process," because the Ministry
of the Interior (state security) had forbidden its issuance
due to his "counter-revolutionary" activities. Lopez told us
that he had lost track of how many times Immigration had
summoned him in order to remind him that he was still
prohibited from leaving. Throughout this process, state
security harassed and detained Lopez for his opposition work.


7. (C) Once Lopez's wife was granted refugee status under
his claim, she also applied for her exit permit. The GOC
authorized her departure, while continuing to stonewall
Lopez's permit. (Note: Velasquez's parents are also Cuban
dissidents; her father is a political prisoner and her mother
is currently gravely ill with cancer. End note.) Post noted
the severe emotional and mental strain this decision created
for both Lopez and Velasquez, but in June, 2008 ) with her
husband's support - Rufina Velasquez emigrated to Miami. Her
departure left Lopez with little family in Cuba; his mother,
brothers and wife were all in Miami. In December, 2008, state
security officials finally told Lopez he was "free."
Immigration authorities, however, denied that state security
had authorized his exit permit. State security officials then
told Lopez there must be a bureaucratic delay at Immigration,
and that he would have to continue to wait.


-------------- --------------
HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE OPPOSITION: EXIT PERMIT AS RALLYING CRY
-------------- --------------


8. (C) On April 15, 2009, Lopez began a hunger strike to
protest the continuing "denial" of his exit permit. His
strike, coming on the heels of another highly publicized
hunger strike by dissident Jorge Luis Garcia Perez
("Antunez"),garnered broad support on- and off-island. Lopez

HAVANA 00000494 003.2 OF 004


used a blog to gather electronic signatures in support of his
exit permit (over ninety) and also collected local signatures
(over forty). He received phone calls from news outlets in
Miami as well as Amnesty International, which eventually
posted an Urgent Action Alert detailing his case and
appealing for letters to be sent to the GOC.


9. (C) By April 18, state security had blocked off Lopez's
street and had detained at least a dozen supporters who tried
to visit his home. On April 25, state security officers
visited Lopez and "suggested" that he would have his exit
permit in "a few months, maybe two to three" if he would drop
his hunger strike and "stay quiet." They claimed they could
not arrange for his permit any sooner, because it might
appear that Lopez had "forced" the GOC's hand. Lopez told us
that he refused the bribe because he had "no faith in their
promises." On April 28, Lopez presented a formal demand and
his signed petitions to the Department of Immigration.
Immigration officials told Lopez they would respond to his
petition within "sixty working days." When Lopez presented
his demand, he was joined by a surprisingly broad swath of
non-traditional Cuban dissidents, including Yoani Sanchez of
the blog Generacion Y, as well as musician Ciro Garcia of the
Cuban punk band Porno para Ricardo. Sanchez blogged that day
about Lopez's struggle, linking it to her own notorious fight
for an exit permit. She also detailed state security's
"suggestion" to Lopez and Immigration officials' response to
his demands.


10. (C) Lopez quietly ended his hunger strike after
presenting his demands, but told us he would begin again if
the GOC did not respond in the promised time period. On July
14, the United States raised the issue of exit permits with
the GOC at the U.S.-Cuba Migration Talks. On July 16,
immigration officials summoned Lopez and, with a state
security officer present, informed him that his exit permit
had been approved, and that he should depart Cuba as quickly
as possible. When Lopez asked if he would be allowed to
return to Cuba, the state security officer answered, "That
depends on how you behave off the island." Lopez picked up
his permit on July 28. He departed for Miami on August 6, two
and a half years after he had been granted refugee status.


-------------- --------------
HOW TO BREAK THE OPPOSITION: EXIT PERMIT AS CARROT
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Although Lopez remained president of the CJM until
his departure, the organization's reach and impact has fallen
off steadily over the past year. In 2007, Lopez believed that
he and other youth leaders might be able to unite 300 youth
activists for a nationwide youth forum (REF F). In 2009, the
CJM's most notable activity was supporting and publicizing
Lopez's struggle to leave Cuba.


12. (C) The GOC routinely divides opposition families by
issuing one spouse (and/or children) an exit permit while
withholding another spouse's permit. This strategy was highly
effective in Lopez's case. Post noted Lopez's growing
depression and desperation after his wife's departure in
mid-2008. In his interviews with us throughout 2009, Lopez
shifted from detailing opposition activities to detailing
personal problems and his strategy to obtain an exit permit.
He increasingly used limited USINT internet time to instant
message with his wife and correspond with family and friends
off-island. Lopez acknowledged in meetings with us that he
was feeling overwhelmed by the psychological strain of being
trapped on the island by the GOC, and separated from his
family and wife in the United States. He viewed the denial of
his exit permit as deliberate "psychological torture" by the
GOC.


13. (C) Other youth leaders, who had previously been his
closest colleagues, noted in interviews with us that Lopez
had "checked out," and that he was "finished with the fight."
His focus on leaving the island demoralized other youth
leaders and occasionally bred resentment. One particularly
active contact told us, "(Lopez) publicizes events as if the

HAVANA 00000494 004.2 OF 004


CJM were still this active organization, and then when he
can't get anyone to come, he calls me in a panic and asks me
to bring my people...(he) was a tremendous opposition leader.
Tremendous! But now his heart and his head are in Miami, and
once he gets there, he'll never look back."


14. (C) Although Lopez maintained that he had rejected state
security's request to drop his hunger strike and "stay
quiet," he did end his strike three days after their visit,
and he substantially diminished his profile within the
opposition after April. His exit permit was issued July 24,
62 working days after he presented his petition at
Immigration and "a few months" after his state security
visit. (Note: The vice-president of the CJM, Yuri Perez
Vasquez, had doggedly attempted to file a complaint with
UNESCO regarding Cuba's educational system; he also appeared
to drop that complaint in April. He informed us in June that
the GOC had finally issued his exit permit after a long
delay, and that he would be departing for Miami as a refugee
sometime in the fall. End note.)


--------------
COMMENTS
--------------


15. (C) It is impossible to divine why the GOC granted Lopez
his exit permit after two and a half years. With publicity
from blogs and the support of Amnesty International, Lopez's
hunger strike might have increased the political cost of a
continuing denial. State security officers might have felt
that Lopez was adequately "broken," or that the CJM was no
longer any kind of threat. His close relationship to USINT
might have given the GOC reason to retain his exit permit as
a card that could be played during migration talks.
Alternatively, Lopez may be benefiting from a new GOC
strategy regarding exit permits. He is not the only notable
dissident to receive an exit permit recently: the
vice-president of the CJM has also been assured that he will
receive a permit, and famed dissident Dr. Hilda Molina was
granted an exit permit in June (REF G).


16. (C) Though the GOC's reasoning in this case remains
murky, Lopez's story does illuminate some common GOC tactics
towards the opposition. By cracking down early and hard on
emerging opposition leaders, the GOC creates tremendous
incentive for leaders to seek refugee status. Once leaders
win refugee status, their focus routinely shifts from
opposition work in Cuba to dreaming about a new life outside
of Cuba. State security then dangles the exit permit as
bait, pressuring opposition members to inform on their
colleagues, sow dissent within the ranks, (REF H) or lower
their profile; alternatively, state security can wield exit
permits as a sword, strategically dividing families and
psychologically incapacitating those who remain in Cuba.


17. (C) Freedom of movement in general has proven to be a
rare rallying point for the opposition and an issue that
resonates with the general populace. Cubans from multiple
areas of civil society will publicly denounce violations of
their freedom of movement, which includes not only exit
permits but also freedom of movement on-island.
Internationally, recent high-profile cases such as Yoani
Sanchez, Hilda Molina, and Edgard Lopez have attracted
considerable press, and presented the world with a human
rights violation the GOC is hard-pressed to defend or to
blame on US policies. Both the EU and the US have raised
freedom of movement as a key issue in talks with the GOC.
Cuban opposition leaders will continue struggling to change
Cuba, and many then will choose to leave it. So long as the
GOC continues to deny their right to exit, the opposition
will retain at least one issue that inspires unity.
FARRAR