OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000462 SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2029 TAGS: PHUM PREL ECON CU SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CUBA REF: HAVANA 443 Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) This front channel cable was originally sent as Official/Informal in reftel. The following is a collection of observations by outgoing human rights officer on the state of human rights and civil society in Cuba. ¶2. (C) CONTINUITY: Repeat visitors to Cuba, whether they have been gone for a matter of months or years, always are struck by the impression that everything seems exactly the way it was when they left. Whether it is the absence of Fidel Castro from the scene or the abrupt discharge of the two government officials most known to foreigners, the Government of Cuba (GOC) seems endlessly capable of returning to a condition of stasis. In the fall of 2008 three hurricanes severely battered the island's economy prompting many to speculate that the system could not recover from the devastation. However, nearly all observers have been amazed at the steady progress the GOC has made in restoring the miserable but adequate quality of living in place before the disasters. The GOC faces serious challenges but its ability to muddle through cannot be underestimated. The Cuban people under the numbing effects of decades of repression, have long been accustomed to adapting, often with remarkable ingenuity, to whatever new deprivation comes their way. There is no reason to think that a new round of ration reductions or rolling power outages will change this fact. Noted opposition leader Oswaldo Paya has stated quite candidly that a situation of a growing opposition, in which the Cuban people become increasingly willing to demonstrate and demand their rights until the present regime is forced to yield to popular pressure, is a fantasy that exists only in the minds of those living off the island. Paya believes that a rapid, near overnight collapse of the system into total chaos is a far more likely scenario. ¶3. (C) THE INEFFECTUAL OPPOSITION: The Cuban opposition is small and divided into dozens of tiny groups, often with seemingly similar goals, but unable to coordinate their activities in any significant way. Although several opposition leaders, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, have a great deal of personal courage, they remain largely isolated from the community as a whole. Genuine opposition groups are heavily infiltrated by state security. Several others are state security fronts. Others exist only on paper and their only activities consist of taking photographs of six to ten people in a room holding up CAMBIO stickers and generating membership lists for the purpose of filing refugee cases. For the past two years the GOC has very effectively used the tactic of short term detentions to prevent any attempts to hold meetings or demonstrations. People are typically detained on the way to an opposition activity and then released some hours later without charges. As a result, the GOC has silenced dissenting voices without getting the type of international condemnation that earlier tactics of political trials and lengthy jail sentences of dissidents engendered. Over the past several months there has been a concerted campaign to provoke discord within the opposition that has had a devastating effect on major dissident organizations. Unity projects have crumbled, accusations are levied back and forth that prominent opposition figures are working for state security, bitter disputes have arisen over tactics, and organizations have split over rival leadership claims. Many opposition leaders have been approved for refugee status recently, and state security is able to dangle the "tarjeta blanca", an essential document for legal departure from the country, in front of many people to pressure them into informing on or sowing dissent among their colleagues within the opposition. Even though opposition members recognize these regime efforts at provocation, they still readily fall into mutual recriminations and bitter personal quarrels. ¶4. (C) In addition, and much like the regime, the opposition is aging and few younger people are joining its ranks. Even youthful opposition groups that seemed promising four or five years ago have been decimated by emigration and their leaders, now well in their 30's, have not been able to renew their membership base. Many of the prominent figures that are critical of the government, such as the independent bloggers, state that they cannot relate to the traditional opposition. Frequently they see themselves as part of a cultural community that has no relation with the political opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX told poloff that when someone does something challenging artistically, the artist receives no support from the political opposition, and therefore feels no inclination to support dissident activities. ¶5. (C) DISILLUSIONED YOUTH: The most dramatic failure of the Cuban Revolution has been the creation of the "new man", as Che Guevara termed him, who would work for the benefit of society without regard to self interest. Cuban youth are overwhelmingly bitter and disillusioned and see no future except the possibility of leaving Cuba. This bitterness is acute among the professional classes who, after years of training, cannot pursue employment in their fields at low salaries, and instead find themselves hustling after jobs in the tourist sector. After years of indoctrination, young people are often completely turned off by politics, and do not relate at all to the traditional opposition. However, they are hungry for opportunity and dialogue, as long as it is not done in a heavy-handed way or with anything that smacks of propaganda and recruitment. When USINT offered scholarship programs for community college and a summer institute, more than 600 applicants applied and most had had no previous contact with USINT. The applicants were surprisingly technologically savvy considering that in Cuba only 2% of the population reportedly has access to some form of the internet. ¶6. (C) THE RACIAL DIVIDE: In spite of official statistics to the contrary, African descendent Cubans probably constitute a majority of the population. However, they occupy few leading positions in government, state owned industries and academia. They live in the poorest and most marginal neighborhoods. They rarely occupy jobs with access to hard currency in the tourist industry. Refugee applicants are disproportionately white. African descendants have far fewer relatives in other countries and so by and large do not have relatives who can either send remittances or pay for them to be smuggled into other countries. African descendants rarely take to the seas in rustic vessels, partly because for years they have been told that racism in the United States is as brutal as it was 60 years ago. Accounts from inmates indicate that as much as 80% of the prison population are of African descent. Due to emigration, Cuban society is becoming increasingly black resulting in much more overt racism than was seen in the past. Nevertheless, there is complete silence from the GOC on the topic of racial prejudice, the official line being that racism was a problem solved by the Revolution. There are many people of good will who fear for the future of their nation, and who are initiating dialogue aimed at restoring integration and racial harmony. After all the GOC told African descendants about life in the United States, they view the election of Barack Obama as a miraculous event. There is a great desire to discover what can be learned from the U.S. experience with race relations. ¶7. (C) THE BATTLE FOR PRIVATE SPACE: Besides the parts of the cultural community who challenge the status quo, and those who are working towards racial integration, there are other not officially sanctioned groups trying to address social issues. They don't view their work as related to the political opposition. These include advocates for homosexual rights and those trying to work on women's issues. The homosexual advocates, while welcoming statements against prejudice by Mariela Castro, the daughter of Raul Castro who heads the Center for Sexual Education, are upset that she says nothing about employment discrimination and police harassment. There are local people in Cuba trying to intervene at the community level in cases of domestic violence. It is doubtful whether the GOC would allow a much more organized private effort to confront these and other insufficiently addressed problem areas. ¶8. (C) RELIGION: The group that has been most successful at creating space beyond the government's control has been the religious community. This has been a very slow process and the leading religious organizations have always known not to test the limits too far. Considering that only a few decades ago the GOC sought an eradication of religion, it is notable how the faith of many Cuban people remains strong. Even though the GOC is now seeking an accommodation with religious groups that still allows government control, religious groups have gradually regained ownership of their buildings and expanded their facilities. They increasingly issue their own publications, and conduct adult education and community service projects. Even though religious organization avoid confrontation, and look towards achieving very small goals, such as permission for one additional procession or a few more minutes of radio time, they are the only groups within Cuban civil society with absolute confidence that they will outlast the regime. Religious organizations should not be overlooked as agents of transformational change. FARRAR