CANADIAN SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: LESS THAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000366 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM CU CA SUBJECT: CANADIAN SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE REF: OTTAWA 436 Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Canada's democracy)oriented foreign policy toward Cuba apparently is being implemented more vigorously in Ottawa than in Cuba, although some help may be on the way. End Summary. CANADA'S PRIORITIES IN CUBA -------------- ¶2. (C) USINT read with interest reftel relaying the GOC's description of its efforts to promote human rights and democracy in Cuba. Canada has one of the larger diplomatic presences here to help cover its commercial interests, serve Canadian tourists, and run its development program. So far as we can tell, however, that presence does not extend to robust activities in the area of democracy or human rights. ¶3. (C) USINT contacts among Cuban civil society are quite open with us on the assistance and moral support they receive from the Dutch, Czech, and other friendly embassies. We never hear tales of similar support from Canada. As recently as a year ago, the Canadian political and economic officers maintained regular contacts with Cuban civil society. However, their replacements have only had incidental contact at events held by EU diplomats, and appear to have no instructions to attempt to contact civil society members. Reftel reports of frank discussions in private with GOC officials on human rights also seem unlikely. The Canadian ambassador recently took a similar line in a one-on-one lunch with the chief of mission. When asked whether there were ever any results from such discussions, the ambassador first replied, "It depends upon what you mean by results," and then cited a 1998 meeting in which Canada presented a list of political prisoners for whom it requested early release. ¶4. (C) On the academic and aid fronts, the "Canadian Corners" at seven Cuban universities give the GOC potential entree to university students that many other diplomatic missions do not enjoy. These Corners are modest, though, at least as described by the embassy here (we have not seen any of them due to our travel restrictions). While the GOC has given approval to a few Canadian Centers to have an Internet connection, most do not. The Canadian Centers appear to us to have untapped potential to support freedom of information in Cuba, especially outside of Havana. Meanwhile, the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA's) programs focus on modernizing the state (Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Audit and Control, Department of Forests, etc.) and local economic and agricultural development (including hurricane recovery and growing bio-fortified rice),and not on democracy building. ¶5. (C) The Canadian embassy here was dismayed by Minister Kent's public comments on the lack of human rights in Cuba prior to his (canceled) visit in May, fearing (accurately, as it turned out) that the Cubans would not want to chance his making similar comments from Havana. Following Cuba's cancellation of the visit, Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment Malmierca applied for a visa to visit Canada and attend a board meeting of Sherritt International, the largest mining investor in Cuba. According to the embassy, the DFIAT bureaucracy in Ottawa decided to express its displeasure at the cancellation by "slow rolling" Malmierca's application until the approval came too late for him to attend the Sherritt meeting. REINFORCEMENTS MAY BE COMING -------------- ¶6. (C) Following a Canadian government worldwide review of overseas personnel, the embassy here is receiving two new positions: a defense attache and a political officer. The Canadian ambassador told us he would have preferred an RCMP attache focused on law enforcement to a defense attache but in the end took what he could get (Comment: we agree the RCMP would have been more useful. The few defense attaches here describe the armed forces as virtually impenetrable, and we expect the Canadian to have no more luck). The incoming political officer is to focus on domestic politics and has the potential at least to expand Canada's role on human rights issues in Cuba. This potential will only be fulfilled, however, if he or she is given the mandate to focus on such issues in a meaningful way. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: Not surprisingly, the Canadian Embassy in Havana is focused primarily on advancing Canadian interests. In Cuba that means building solid commercial ties that will endure even if trade relations between Cuba and the U.S. begin to return to normal. It also means being able to work closely with Cuban officials to protect the welfare of Canadian tourists on the island. Promoting democracy may play well in political circles in Ottawa, but the Canadian government appears to have decided that doing anything serious about it in Cuba under the current regime could jeopardize the advancement of Canada's other interests. END COMMENT. FARRAR