Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HAVANA351
2009-06-12 20:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:
CUBAN MINREX SOUNDS OFF - AGAIN
how-toVZCZCXYZ0019 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUB #0351/01 1632038 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 122038Z JUN 09 FM USINT HAVANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4481 RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL PRIORITY RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA PRIORITY 0140 RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY RUWDHDP/OBLA LOS ANGELES CA PRIORITY RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000351
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2029
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: CUBAN MINREX SOUNDS OFF - AGAIN
REF: HAVANA 341
Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4(B) & (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000351
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2029
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: CUBAN MINREX SOUNDS OFF - AGAIN
REF: HAVANA 341
Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4(B) & (D)
1. (C//NF) Summary: On 11 June 2009, U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG) Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the
United States Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba,
attended a repatriation of 14 Cuban migrants at Bahia de
Cabanas. During the transit to the migrant receiving pier,
DIS engaged in a candid conversation with a Cuban Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MINREX) official who, like his counterpart
in recent weeks, gave some possible insight into the possible
Government of Cuba (GOC) approach to the upcoming migration
talks. However, unlike his counterpart, this MINREX official
spoke solely to one recent issue involving 2 Cuban Border
Guard (CBG) recruits who commandeered a go-fast (gf) vessel
from a Cuban Border Guard base in Pinar del Rio province on
31 May, in an apparent attempt to flee the island. End
Summary.
2. (C//NF) MINREX official Eduardo Martinez Borbonet
(Borbonet),an officer in the Ministry's North American
Division, and who attends repatriations somewhat infrequently
(DIS has had contact with this official on only 2 occasions-
USINT consular officers have also met this officer on other
occasions while attending repatriations),exchanged
pleasantries with the DIS at the outset of the repatriation.
During the boat ride to the receiving pier, Borbonet almost
immediately asked about the status of 2 CBG recruits who
commandeered a gf from a CBG base in Pinar del Rio province
in May. Case Background: Acting on information provided to
the DIS from the CBG command center in Havana, and forwarded
to USCG District 7 in Miami, the USCG was able to locate the
recruits in good condition- the case was treated as a
search-and-rescue case after a CBG Colonel informed the DIS
that neither of the 2 onboard had seamanship or navigation
skills.
3. (C//NF) The 2 recruits were eventually located by the
USCG in their broken-down gf approximately fifty nautical
miles northwest of Cuba. Both were brought onboard a USCG
cutter after they responded in the affirmative when they were
asked by the cutter crew if they wanted to be taken off their
vessel; both recruits were transferred to a Cuban migrant
holding platform (USCG cutter) and treated and processed per
current migrant processing procedures. Ultimately, it was
decided that both recruits should be forwarded to the migrant
processing facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The
commandeered gf, weapon, and global positioning satellite
unit used by the recruits have since been returned to Cuban
authorities by the USCG.
4. (C//NF) In response to his question, DIS advised
Borbonet that the 2 recruits will be forwarded to Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. DIS further advised Borbonet that the decision
had been made per standing Cuban migrant processing
procedures.
5. (C//NF) Borbonet, like his co-worker Armando Bencomo
(see reference A),stated "in my own personal opinion," he
would imagine the forwarding of the 2 recruits to Guantanamo
may cause/present a problem. He elaborated and spoke to the
idea that this seems like a political decision on the part of
the United States, made to keep the Cuban American population
in Miami happy (DIS has heard Borbonet refer to Cuban
Americans in Miami as "the mafia" on more than one occasion).
Borbonet stated that this may be an issue, again, in his
own opinion, considering the timing of the decision to send
the recruits to Guantanamo with the recently-agreed to
migration talks to be held between both nations in the coming
weeks. When asked what in his mind should happen to the two,
Borbonet's primary complaint/argument was that the two
recruits are hijackers, and should be considered as such by
the USG; in his mind their actions constituted a hijacking
scenario, not one pertaining to human rights, and they should
be returned to Cuba.
6. (C//NF) Comment: DIS judges the contents of Borbonet's
words as the predictable GOC response to the US decision to
transfer both recruits to Guantanamo. DIS further believes
that he was speaking on behalf of the GOC. The GOC's
knowledge that the USG would more than likely send both
recruits to Guantanamo Bay provides the GOC with just the
right fodder to give themselves what they may believe is
leverage and media exposure/propaganda over the USG entering
said talks. Ultimately, however, DIS judges this maneuver to
be deliberate on the part of the GOC, whose leadership has
stated its willingness to discuss any topic with the USG, but
which is trying to create conditions that give it greater
control over the proceedings. End Comment.
FARRAR
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2029
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: CUBAN MINREX SOUNDS OFF - AGAIN
REF: HAVANA 341
Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4(B) & (D)
1. (C//NF) Summary: On 11 June 2009, U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG) Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the
United States Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba,
attended a repatriation of 14 Cuban migrants at Bahia de
Cabanas. During the transit to the migrant receiving pier,
DIS engaged in a candid conversation with a Cuban Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MINREX) official who, like his counterpart
in recent weeks, gave some possible insight into the possible
Government of Cuba (GOC) approach to the upcoming migration
talks. However, unlike his counterpart, this MINREX official
spoke solely to one recent issue involving 2 Cuban Border
Guard (CBG) recruits who commandeered a go-fast (gf) vessel
from a Cuban Border Guard base in Pinar del Rio province on
31 May, in an apparent attempt to flee the island. End
Summary.
2. (C//NF) MINREX official Eduardo Martinez Borbonet
(Borbonet),an officer in the Ministry's North American
Division, and who attends repatriations somewhat infrequently
(DIS has had contact with this official on only 2 occasions-
USINT consular officers have also met this officer on other
occasions while attending repatriations),exchanged
pleasantries with the DIS at the outset of the repatriation.
During the boat ride to the receiving pier, Borbonet almost
immediately asked about the status of 2 CBG recruits who
commandeered a gf from a CBG base in Pinar del Rio province
in May. Case Background: Acting on information provided to
the DIS from the CBG command center in Havana, and forwarded
to USCG District 7 in Miami, the USCG was able to locate the
recruits in good condition- the case was treated as a
search-and-rescue case after a CBG Colonel informed the DIS
that neither of the 2 onboard had seamanship or navigation
skills.
3. (C//NF) The 2 recruits were eventually located by the
USCG in their broken-down gf approximately fifty nautical
miles northwest of Cuba. Both were brought onboard a USCG
cutter after they responded in the affirmative when they were
asked by the cutter crew if they wanted to be taken off their
vessel; both recruits were transferred to a Cuban migrant
holding platform (USCG cutter) and treated and processed per
current migrant processing procedures. Ultimately, it was
decided that both recruits should be forwarded to the migrant
processing facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The
commandeered gf, weapon, and global positioning satellite
unit used by the recruits have since been returned to Cuban
authorities by the USCG.
4. (C//NF) In response to his question, DIS advised
Borbonet that the 2 recruits will be forwarded to Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. DIS further advised Borbonet that the decision
had been made per standing Cuban migrant processing
procedures.
5. (C//NF) Borbonet, like his co-worker Armando Bencomo
(see reference A),stated "in my own personal opinion," he
would imagine the forwarding of the 2 recruits to Guantanamo
may cause/present a problem. He elaborated and spoke to the
idea that this seems like a political decision on the part of
the United States, made to keep the Cuban American population
in Miami happy (DIS has heard Borbonet refer to Cuban
Americans in Miami as "the mafia" on more than one occasion).
Borbonet stated that this may be an issue, again, in his
own opinion, considering the timing of the decision to send
the recruits to Guantanamo with the recently-agreed to
migration talks to be held between both nations in the coming
weeks. When asked what in his mind should happen to the two,
Borbonet's primary complaint/argument was that the two
recruits are hijackers, and should be considered as such by
the USG; in his mind their actions constituted a hijacking
scenario, not one pertaining to human rights, and they should
be returned to Cuba.
6. (C//NF) Comment: DIS judges the contents of Borbonet's
words as the predictable GOC response to the US decision to
transfer both recruits to Guantanamo. DIS further believes
that he was speaking on behalf of the GOC. The GOC's
knowledge that the USG would more than likely send both
recruits to Guantanamo Bay provides the GOC with just the
right fodder to give themselves what they may believe is
leverage and media exposure/propaganda over the USG entering
said talks. Ultimately, however, DIS judges this maneuver to
be deliberate on the part of the GOC, whose leadership has
stated its willingness to discuss any topic with the USG, but
which is trying to create conditions that give it greater
control over the proceedings. End Comment.
FARRAR