FRAUD SUMMARY Q CUBA

UNCLAS HAVANA 000327

DEPT FOR CA/FPP
DEPT PASS TO KCC
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS SMIG CPAS CMGT ASEC CU
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY Q CUBA

Ref: (A) 08 State 00844 (B) HAVANA 142

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COUNTRY CONDITIONS
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1. Although initially optimistic that Raul CastroQs
formal assumption of power might bring significant
improvements to their lives, the economic and
political reality on the ground continues to drive
many Cubans either to the Interests Section or more
unacceptably, the high seas, in any hopes for
emigration. Over 20,000 Cuban immigrant visas and
paroles were issued in FY2008 in compliance with the
1994 US-Cuba Migration Accords, with the number of
petitions filed in FY08 alone tripling as a result
of the Cuban Family Reunification Program (CFRP).
CFRP provides fast-track status for Cubans currently
awaiting a non-current immigrant visa case. In
conjunction with SpainQs new nationality law (see
paragraph 10),these programs have resulted in new
opportunities for legal migration. Between 2009 and
2011, a quarter of a million Cubans out of a total
population of 11 million will either legally
emigrate or acquire a second nationality. With much
of the Cuban public still eager to leave the island,
significant incentive still exists for illegal
migration to the US for those who do not qualify via
legal migration procedures. END SUMMARY.


2. The level of consular fraud at Post is medium.
Although post believes the market for fraudulent
civil documents is growing, the Cuban governmentQs
stringent controls on the exit visa process and the
countryQs general reputation for the stringent
policing of its citizens result in lower levels of
corruption than elsewhere in the Caribbean.

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NIV FRAUD
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3. There is little large-scale fraud among Post's
NIV applicants. Most applicants are senior citizens
who have family in the United States. Younger
people who might otherwise be inclined to apply for
a visa to facilitate a permanent stay in the United
States are often deterred from applying by Post's
high refusal rate for such applicants. The MRV
application fee, which is the equivalent Qfive
months wages for most Cubans, effectively places a
U.S. visa application out-of-reach for many Cubans,
especially the large percentage with no access to
hard currency.


4. A validation study recently conducted by the NIV
unit of B1 issuances pointed out both successes as
well as causes for concern. The study, conducted
with DHS assistance, determined a B1
overstay/adjuster rate of 3.49 percent for the Aug
2007-Aug 2008 time period. However, DHS has alerted
post that religious ministers previously issued
numerous B-1 visas are using R-1 visas obtained in
the United States as a method of circumventing
CubaQs lengthy Security Advisory Opinion process and
its one entry visa.


5. Post has also recently attempted to curb the use
of B1/B2 visas by the families of African diplomats
after recognizing patterns of behavior inconsistent
with legitimate tourist travel. In one particularly
egregious case, a family member affiliated with the
Congolese embassy made over 15 trips to the US in a
four-month period. The results of an RSO
investigation concluded that these diplomats were in
fact engaging in the sale in Cuba of US-origin goods
in violation of US economic sanctions against the
island. Subsequent visa applications for these
individuals have been denied.


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IV FRAUD
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6. Post continues to see a high incidence of fraud
involving K and Immediate Relative (IR and CR) visa
applications. The dismal results of a 2006 K-1
validation study confirmed USINTQs anecdotal
evidence that approximately 38% of issued applicants
did not marry their petitioning fianc after arrival
in the US. As a result, post initiated mandatory
Lexis-Nexis searches on all K-1 applicants to combat
fraud and sends roughly 1/3 of all K cases back to
the US for revocation. The IV unit has seen a
significant drop-off in fianc visa interviews
scheduled in FY09, and hopes to continue avoiding
spurious K petitions by combating mala-fide
applicants while managing the necessary increase in
back-office investigations of these cases.


7. Post expects to fill the vacant Fraud Prevention
LES position during FY 09. One IV/P locally
contracted employee is assigned to the FPU on a
part-time basis.


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DV FRAUD
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8. Post has begun to scrutinize DV cases in which
the primary applicant marries after receiving
notification of a successful DV entry. Recent cases
of what appear to be marriage fraud and mala-fide
supporting documentation have led the FPM to pursue
more stringent methods of document verification (see
paragraph 16).



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ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD
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9. Travel restrictions prohibiting most Americans
from visiting Cuba limit the demand for ACS
services. American citizens requesting a
replacement passport generate the greatest volume of
citizenship work, and rarely pose a problem
involving fraud. Even cases involving Cubans making
claims for American citizenship are usually quickly
resolved without any suspicion of fraud.


10. Recent changes in SpainQs citizenship and
nationality laws may affect Cuban migration patterns
over time. The Spanish government has announced that
all Cuban citizens with at least one documented
Spanish-born grandparent are eligible to receive
Spanish citizenship. The Spanish Embassy in Havana
expects approximately 150,000 Cubans to take
advantage of this program, which was implemented in
December 2008. Since Spanish passport holders may
enter the United States without a visa under the
Visa Waiver Program, there may be an increase in
Cuban-born Spanish citizens arriving in the U.S. and
attempting to adjust status under the Cuban
Adjustment Act.

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ADOPTION FRAUD
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11. Cuba does not permit adoption of its citizens
by foreign nationals.

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USE OF DNA TESTING
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12. Post uses DNA testing in IV and CRBA cases in
which evidence of a biological relationship cannot
be sufficiently supported by other evidence. In
general, US law does not allow American citizens to
spend more than 14 days in Cuba under an authorized
OFAC license. Therefore, post sees a relatively
small number of cases in which DNA exams are
required to establish a relationship that could not
have been sufficiently supported by other evidence.

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ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD
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13. Post continues to work with DHS stateside in
confirming the legitimacy of Cuban civil documents.
DHS continues to receive claims of Cuban birth from
a number of migrants crossing the Mexican border,
replete with Cuban birth certificates to facilitate
residency. Recent checks on average have shown one-
third to half of the current DHS civil document
submissions to post to be fraudulent.

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ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING AND TERRORIST TRAVEL
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14. Organized trafficking organizations based in
Florida continue to attempt to smuggle significant
numbers of migrants to the United States each year.
In recent years, the majority of Cuban migrants
reaching the United States have come through Mexico.
USINT is becoming increasingly concerned as this
route is attracting migrants from further afield.
In the last month, two American citizens have been
detained by the Cuban authorities on suspicion of
smuggling Chinese migrants to the US and Mexico
through Cuba. While migrant flows declined
significantly in FY 08 (Ref B),the smuggling of
undocumented migrants to the United States remains a
serious problem.

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DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS
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15. In Havana, the RSO Section provides
investigative assistance to the Consular Section on
an as-needed basis. Since the last fraud summary
submitted, RSO has assisted interview applicants who
provided questionabQdocuments, applicants who
appear to have obtained either an appointment or
appearance notice outside of established procedures,
and LCN employees who may have tried to assist
applicants in various ways. Given the lack of
bilateral relations, RSO does not have an
established mechanism to work law enforcement
investigations with the GOC. (see paragraph 17)


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HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CIVIL
REGISTRY
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16. As mentioned previously, post is increasingly
concerned with document fraud, specifically as it
relates to the large number of Cuban parole cases
adjudicated at post. Because of the lack of
cooperation with Cuban government authorities for
verification purposes, HavanaQs FPM has sought to
strengthen ties with other interested parties.
Recent positive developments in this area have led
to one-on-one meetings with the Canadian EmbassyQs
fraud prevention team as well as an upcoming visit
to the Mexican Embassy to determine what further
measures the FPM and USINT in general can make in
confirming the validity of birth, marriage and
divorce certificates.

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COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
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17. The United States does not have diplomatic
relations with Cuba. The GOC actively seeks to
frustrate USINTQs efforts to carry out many aspects
of its daily work. Post occasionally receives
cooperation from working-level Cuban law enforcement
officials in helping resolve ACS cases with
immigration implications. However, the lack of
systematic cooperation severely hampers the work
being conducted by USINT, which is by far the
largest issuer of visas out of diplomatic posts in
Cuba. For example, Italian counterparts have
confirmed their ability to verify documents by
sending them directly to MINREX, assistance which
would be much welcomed by post in its efforts to
combat fraudulent activity.


18. Post continues to enhance cooperation with
colleagues by attending and sharing information
within a multi-embassy fraud prevention working
group. PostQs FPM has found this an especially
invaluable tool in developing working-level
relationships with colleagues who share similar
overlap in Cuban fraud issues, such as the Mexicans
and Canadians, but who otherwise might hesitate to
meet with USINT officials privately due to GOC
intransigence. Strong continued interest and
cooperation led the British Embassy to host the
groupQs next meeting in May.

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AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
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19. Questions about the political and economic
future of Cuba abound; their resolution will likely
impact the scale of Cuban migration to the United
States. Post remains vigilant to the possibility
that any number of dramatic political or economic
developments could lead to a mass migration crisis
similar to the 1994 Balsero (QRafterQ) Crisis or the
1980 Mariel Boatlift.

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STAFFING AND TRAINING
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20. Anita Lyssikatos is Havana's FPM. She is
assigned concurrently to the IV/P Unit as a line
officer, which allows her to attend to the fraud
portfolio on a part-time basis only. She has
completed PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular
Managers at FSI as well as the distance learning
courses PC544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents, PC 128
Detecting Imposters, and PC 545 Examining US
Passports.

FARRAR