REACTION IN CUBA TO SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000244 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CU SUBJECT: REACTION IN CUBA TO SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS REF: HAVANA 226 Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: It is apparent that Fidel Castro is not pleased with the outcome of the Summit of the Americas, though it is far from clear yet what the government of Cuba's view is. Ordinary Cubans we have talked to have high praise for the President's speech, but not much hope that their own government will respond well. USINT believes we should pay little attention to the river of words flowing almost exclusively from Fidel and concentrate on carrying out our policy while watching for hard action from the Cuban government. End Summary. ¶2. (C) For those who pay attention to the official media, the week following the closing of the Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, Trinidad, has been dominated by Fidel Castro's "Reflexiones" articles, and seemingly endless replays of Daniel Ortega's "brilliant" speech at the Summit, and of the remarks made by participants in the ALBA meeting in Cumana, Venezuela. In the official media there has been no mention on President Obama's speech, except to the extent that Fidel chose to quote from it in his "Reflexiones," and little discussion of anything else that might have occurred in the Summit beyond calls for the U.S. to change its Cuba policy. When speaking in positive tones, Fidel has dedicated his "Reflexiones" to heaping praise on Daniel Ortega, and to a lesser extent on Bolivian President Evo Morales, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, and Argentine President Cristina Fernandez for their courageous stands against the U.S. at the Summit. Perhaps because he seemed to get publicly too close to the President, Fidel has been strangely silent on Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' participation. ¶3. (C) However, most of his pieces have been much darker and contained direct and rather crude attacks on the President, the OAS and OAS SECGEN Insulza, and dissidents in Cuba. In rejecting the package of measures announced by the President on April 13, Fidel was clearly angry that some Summit participants viewed the announcement as a positive step. He "clarifies" what Raul Castro had said at the ALBA meeting about "everything being on the table" by saying that issues such as Cuban observance of human rights and the status of political prisoners would never be on the table. He consistently rejects the notion that Cuba will ever rejoin the OAS, which he calls a "tool of the empire," and instead joins brother Raul in proclaiming the death of the institution. In clarifying his stand on political prisoners Fidel repeatedly refers to the prisoners and dissidents in general as paid mercenaries of the U.S. Except for replays of his speech before the ALBA, Raul Castro has been invisible for the past week. Fidel's sudden hyperactivity and high profile have once again eclipsed his younger brother, and leave one to wonder about how the relationship between the two really works. ¶4. (C) Ordinary Cubans we have spoken to seem to be looking past the noise coming out of the official media. Those who had a chance to see President Obama's speech via pirated satellite television or other informal means give it high praise. They continue to be as excited about prospects for improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations as they were when the April 13 measures were announced (REFTEL). They are somewhat discouraged, though not surprised by, the negative reaction of their government. They continue to hold out hope that the U.S. will stay the course on improved relations and that things eventually will get better. The only level of concern we have seen has been among family members of political prisoners who fear that we might take up Raul's offer to expel the political prisoners and their families in return for the release of the 5 Cuban agents in U.S. custody. All are emphatic in their contacts with us that their loved ones would prefer to remain in prison indefinitely rather than be exchanged for the five agents and exiled. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: With Fidel Castro, it is always better to focus on what he does rather than what he says. That said, he does appear to be quite angry at the moment. The fact that he has been lionizing Daniel Ortega may indicate that he had hoped for much more anti-U.S. rhetoric, and possibly a completely deadlocked Summit focused entirely on U.S. Cuba policy. That only Ortega seemed to get with the program, and that press reports highlighted the broadly positive response HAVANA 00000244 002 OF 002 to the President's remarks probably infuriated Fidel. He also may have been stung by the positive reaction worldwide to the April 13 announcement, and feels that Cuba is on the defensive. His attacks against the OAS and SECGEN Insulza could be genuine. They have at least put the GOC in a difficult position if the OAS membership were to move toward lifting its suspension of Cuba at the June OASGA. ¶6. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: USINT believes that, like most ordinary Cubans, we should not pay too close attention to what Fidel, or those writing on his behalf, say publicly. If any change is taking place, it will be evident in the actions that the government takes. We have asked once again for a COM meeting with MINREX. If it is granted, that will be a step forward in our relationship here. In any case, we do not believe we should be waiting for GOC actions. Rather, we should continue to push forward initiatives that further our own interests even in the absence of any positive response from the GOC. We already have outlined some of these initiatives in other channels and will be suggesting others soon. FARRAR