KEEP YOUR FRIENDS CLOSE AND CUBA EVEN CLOSER

S E C R E T HAVANA 000187 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2029 TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC SUBJECT: KEEP YOUR FRIENDS CLOSE AND CUBA EVEN CLOSER Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: On 18 March 2009, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the United States Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba attended a repatriation of 16 Cuban migrants at Baha de Cabaas. During the repatriation, the DIS spoke at length with the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX) official (herein "official") who commonly accompanies the DIS and USINT consular officers during Cuban migrant repatriations. The conversation was one of 18 such conversations since the DIS arrived in August 2008, each of which has led to increased discussion on contemporary political issues, primarily centering on U.S.-Cuban relations. End Summary. ¶2. (S) DIS attended the subject migrant repatriation in Baha de Cabaas to receive 16 migrants from a USCG cutter. The repatriation followed routine protocol, and the DIS met the official for the short boat ride to the receiving pier at Cabaas. After exchanging greetings and pleasantries, the official immediately steered the conversation toward the normal politically-oriented conversation. ¶3. (S) The DIS has worked with this official a total of 18 times during routine migrant repatriations. The official studied international relations/law, human rights, and psychology in the former Soviet Union for a period of 5-6 years. He utilized that time to study the Russian language, traveled around the former Soviet bloc (spent a significant period of time in Poland),and has since served in Moscow as a GOC official. Official currently works in the MINREX North America Division, and accompanies the DIS and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (CIS) officer at USINT when excludable flights arrive in Havana. This official's next posting will likely be the Cuba Interests Section (CUBINT) in Washington, DC, or at the United Nations in New York City. Official is a cordial individual who is adept at towing the party line, and undoubtedly utilizes exchanges with the DIS to communicate a message to USINT and USG. It should be noted that this official routinely attends the monthly meetings held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba between the USG and GOC. The official has alluded numerous times to current DOS officers working at the Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs (CCA) desk, leading the DIS to believe this official is well connected to CUBINT officers in Washington, DC who communicate with CCA. Finally, this official consistently alludes to U.S. and international press reporting, as well as numerous think tank pieces, especially when these outlets speak and publish on the need for greater U.S.-Cuban dialogue and a change in U.S. policy towards Cuba. ¶4. (S) During the boat ride to the pier, the official was adamant, as he has been in the past, about the need for U.S.-Cuban cooperation on issues of mutual concern, including the environment, law enforcement - including counternarcotics and migration, the need/desire for academic and cultural exchanges, athletic exchanges between both nations, and, for the first time, stated that both sides should cooperate on combating prostitution. The official repeatedly spoke about the hard-line attitude of the former Bush administration, and stated several times that "before the Bush administration," the relationship was better. He also stated that most of the world wants to see a change in the U.S. attitude and treatment of Cuba. ¶5. (S) The official was adamant about the need for bilateral discussions on these topics to be held without preconditions. DIS asked the official what he meant by preconditions, to which he responded that the United States should not attempt to push Cuba to adopt capitalism or democracy, and instead should be respectful of Cuba and its current system; talks should be held despite the current make-up of the Cuban system, and in an environment of "respect." ¶6. (S) After safely disembarking all 16 Cuban migrants from the USCG cutter, the official and DIS waited for the cutter to depart the pier. The official immediately began reiterating his earlier point regarding the need for discussions on issues of mutual concern between the U.S. and Cuba. He then stated (and began speaking English),in a somewhat frustrated but sincere tone, that both sides need to "do something" (with emphasis). He further stated (and was equally frustrated),that there needs to be a starting point for bilateral talks between both sides. When asked what level such talks should occur at, he did not provide a definitive answer; rather, the official stated that talks needed to start somewhere, and suggested that Cuban President Raul Castro had offered to talk to President Obama in a neutral place (Guantanamo Bay),and added that "this is a good place." ¶7. (S) After boarding the boat for the ride back, the official mentioned (speaking Spanish again) that Cuba would like to see more "transparency" at Guantanamo Bay, and used the example of military exercises. He stated that Cuba would like to be notified, as the Cubans do, when the U.S. military will hold exercises at Guantanamo Bay. ¶8. (S) DIS used the return boat ride as an opportunity to question the impetus behind a recent MINREX Diplomatic Note to USINT about the DIS's "penetration of the Port of Mariel," and supposed veering off of the established route to and from the repatriation site, as well as the DIS's not adhering to the established repatriation itinerary. When asked, the official immediately denied knowing anything about the note, and stated (correctly) that he was not in attendance during the subject repatriation (19 February 2009). DIS advised the official that in the United States "penetrating" a port facility is a grave mistake, to which the official once again stated he had no knowledge of the Diplomatic Note. DIS stated he would ask the MINREX official who attended that day's repatriation for clarification. Note: While DIS is unsure if the official was being truthful during this particular conversation, recent events and indications lead DIS to believe it is entirely possible that the official was unaware of the Diplomatic Note, pointing to the possibility that even MINREX is a highly compartmentalized entity that keeps its officials in the dark. ¶9. (S) Wanting to leave the repatriation on a positive note, as well as wrap-up the day's conversations, DIS stated that he appreciates the opportunity to speak about current issues with the official. DIS turned the conversation to the World Baseball Classic (official is an avid baseball fan),and the day's conversation and repatriation evolution ended on a positive note. ¶10. (S) Comment: DIS believes this official is engaged in an effort to influence the DIS's position on U.S.-Cuban relations. This official utilizes access to the DIS during repatriations as a conduit for imparting Cuba's desire to communicate with the United States, and over what specific issues. DIS believes that the GOC genuinely desires greater collaboration on issues of mutual concern in order to shore-up its own national interests (primarily through confidence and security building measures),but will ultimately wish to conduct these exchanges on its own terms. Cuban officials persistently call for the United States to "respect" Cuba. In the Cuban sense, "respect" is a revolution-inspired word and ideology, wherein outsiders with dealings on the island in general are expected to be deferential to the Cuban revolution and system of government. To the extent that Cuba desires to deal with other foreign nations, notably the United States, it will try to steer such interaction in a pre-determined direction based on the perceived level of "respect" afforded the island by its interlocutor. In some cases, a chosen, perceived lack of respect may provide an easy exit from difficult decisions for the GOC. FARRAR