AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH TSVANGIRAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000959 SIPDIS AF/S FOR B.WALCH DRL FOR N. WILETT ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU NSC FOR M. GAVIN STATE PASS TO USAID FOR J. HARMON AND L. DOBBINS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH TSVANGIRAI REF: HARARE 955 Classified By: Ambassador Charles A. Ray for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (SBU) The Ambassador called on Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai December 10, a day after presenting his credentials to President Robert Mugabe (Ref). Tsvangirai greeted the Ambassador by stating that he had arrived in Zimbabwe at a defining moment in moving the transition forward. The discussion focused on outstanding Global Political Agreement (GPA) issues, sanctions, security sector reform, and elections. ¶2. (C) Tsvangirai said progress on resolving outstanding issues had been made with the help of South African President Jacob Zuma's mediation team. ZANU-PF, MDC-T, and MDC-M negotiators would report to the principals -- President Robert Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and Arthur Mutambara -- on the status of negotiations, and the principals would then meet on December 14. ¶3. (C) Tsvangirai addressed specific outstanding issues: -- MDC-T would not budge on its intention to make Roy Bennett the deputy minister of agriculture. Resolution would await the end of Bennett's treason trial, set to resume on January ¶15. --Mugabe had acted illegitimately in appointing Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono and Attorney General Johannes Tomana after the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the parties on September 15, 2008, which called for consultation between Mugabe and Tsvangirai before making appointments. But a solution to the stalemate over the two officials would be political and decided by the principals. Tsvangirai suspected the parties would agree that one of the two step down -- Mugabe's choice. MDC-T would prefer to see Tomana step down. Gono was the lesser of two evils. Tomana was incompetent and dangerous -- he had set out to selectively prosecute MDC-T officials. Assuming agreement was reached for Tomana to step down, MDC-T would seek an additional agreement that Gono step down after a specified time. (COMMENT: Tsvangirai and Gono are both Karanga from the same village. Tsvangirai appears much more conciliatory toward Gono than does Minister of Finance Tendai Biti. END COMMENT.) --An agreement had been reached on the appointment of MDC-T and MDC-M governors. --Media Commission members had been agreed to. Names had been selected for the Human Rights and Electoral Commissions but had not yet been reviewed by Mugabe and Tsvangirai. ¶4. (C) Tsvangirai said he hoped the principals would make a statement on December 14 on agreements reached on outstanding issues. If Mugabe was not prepared to join in, he and Mutambara would consider their own statement on items agreed to. ¶5. (C) Turning to sanctions, Tsvangirai said that progress should be rewarded. Assuming agreement on most outstanding issues, the U.S. should remove non-personal sanctions and ZDERA should be suspended while Congress considered its permanent revocation. ZANU-PF had used sanctions to put MDC-T on the defensive, according to Tsvangirai, and U.S. (and presumably EU) action would remove the pressure. ¶6. (C) Tsvangirai noted that security reform was essential. The MDC was engaging in quiet negotiations with some of the QThe MDC was engaging in quiet negotiations with some of the securocrats. Their primary concerns were prosecution and financial security now that they were no longer supported by Gono. Tsvangirai said he had talked to Zuma and other SADC leaders about the security sector, but was unclear how he would attempt to remove the securocrats. He was also unclear on how he would deal with the security establishment in a HARARE 00000959 002 OF 002 post-Mugabe Zimbabwe other than to say some of the security establishment would have to be retained. (COMMENT: This is a potentially troubling deficiency in Tsvangirai's otherwise rational approach to governing this country. If he should prevail in elections and become the head of state, he will need to have a program for managing the military and police well in advance.) ¶7. (C) On elections, Tsvangirai said the constitutional process was proceeding and that general elections could take place in 2011. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) There were no surprises. We suspect that Tsvangirai is overly optimistic on making an announcement on resolution of outstanding issues next week, and on when elections will be held. On security sector reform, he understands its importance, particularly dealing with the securocrats, but we have yet to see concrete evidence of discussions or negotiations. END COMMENT. RAY