TWO FACES OF ZANU-PF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000340

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR J. HARMON AND L. DOBBINS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR MICHELLE GAVIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: TWO FACES OF ZANU-PF

Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) A courtesy call by the Ambassador on Co-Ministers of
Home Affairs Giles Mutsekwa (MDC-T) and Kembo Mohadi
(ZANU-PF) on April 23 devolved into an anti-U.S. diatribe by
Mohadi who walked out of the meeting. This followed remarks
by the Ambassador that the U.S. wanted to help Zimbabwe, but
non-humanitarian assistance would be dependent on GOZ
progress; continuing violent farm invasions were not helpful.
Mutsekwa subsequently apologized on behalf of the Ministry
and expressed his desire for GOZ-U.S. cooperation. In an
earlier -- and pleasant -- meeting with Minister of Tourism
and Hospitality Walter Mzembi (ZANU-PF),Mzembi took on board
the Ambassador's points, pledged cooperation, and appealed
for technical assistance. END SUMMARY.

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Mutsekwa-Mohadi Meeting
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2. (C) Mutsekwa and Mohadi were joined by the Permanent
Secretary, two other officials of the Ministry, and Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) U.S. desk officer. (NOTE: We
continue to schedule meetings with MDC ministers directly; if
they are accompanied by a permanent secretary or other aide,
it is by their choice. With the exception of Mzembi, ZANU-PF
ministers are routinely joined by a representative of the
MFA. END NOTE.)


3. (C) The Ambassador began by stating U.S. desire to help
Zimbabwe and its new government. This would require efforts
by the government to help itself, particularly in how it is
perceived in Washington and elsewhere. He noted that the
government had made progress, but the world was seeing
violent farm invasions as the face of Zimbabwe. He pointed
out that Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara, accompanied
by the two Home Affairs ministers and others, had visited a
farm on Saturday, possession of which was contested by Edna
Madzongwe (president of the Senate) and the Etheridge family.
An agreement had been reached for both parties to share
possession until the GOZ decided the issue. The Ambassador
related that on Monday, as the Etheridges tried to reenter
the farm, a confrontation had occurred and police shot three
farm workers, one of whom lost part of his leg. Further, one
of the Etheridge sons was under arrest. The Ambassador also
lamented that Congressional staff member Pearl-Alice Marsh,
who recently visited Zimbabwe after receiving a visa at the
airport, had been unable to obtain a visa at the Zimbabwean
Embassy in Washington.


4. (C) Mohadi preempted Mutsekwa, who was about to respond,
and began lecturing the Ambassador. Zimbabwe wanted the
international community to help it succeed, he said, but not
tell it how to succeed. Zimbabwe resented the bullying
tendency of the West. He continued that he had left Zimbabwe
at a young age to fight in the liberation struggle and had
received training in the USSR. His life was devoted to the
Qreceived training in the USSR. His life was devoted to the
continuing liberation struggle and he had lost his youth
fighting the British, U.S. and Australians. (COMMENT: We
have no idea where he might have fought Americans or
Australians, and did not have an opportunity to ask. END
COMMENT.) In 1999, Zimbabwe had embarked on the
unfulfilled task of economic independence based on land (a
reference to the beginning of farm invasions). Zimbabwe was
subsequently subjected to economic strangulation, including
ZDERA. Mohadi added that in Zimbabwe, ownership of the land
resided in the State; if it was a sin for the State to decide

HARARE 00000340 002 OF 002


the disposition of land, then "let us die."


5. (C) Turning to the Etheridge case, Mohadi said he and
Mutsekwa had talked with the Commissioner General of Police
(Augustine Chihuri). Their understanding was that police had
fired in the air. It was unclear if and how injuries had
occurred. An investigation was continuing. The U.S. was not
there and it was presumptuous of us to assume that police
acted illegally.


6. (C) On the issue of visas, Mohadi said issuance would be
based on reciprocity. If the U.S. was not forthcoming with
visas for Zimbabweans, we could expect no assistance in
Washington.


7. (C) Having said his piece, Mohadi left the room.


8. (C) Mutsekwa apologized to the Ambassador on behalf of
the Ministry. He said Mohadi had expressed personal feelings
which did not represent the government. The policy of the
government was to open up and look ahead. He noted that
during the negotiations leading to the formation of the
government, there had been extremists on both sides (implying
this was also true of the current government) and it was
necessary to persevere. Since the formation of the
government, Mutsekwa emphasized, he and Mohadi had been able
to work collaboratively. He reiterated that Mohadi's remarks
were "unfortunate" and "uncalled for."


9. (C) Mutsekwa concurred with Mohadi that they had called
the Commissioner General of Police about the Etheridge
situation. The Commissioner General had promised to send an
investigative team. Mutsekwa was not aware one of the sons
was in detention. He promised to establish the truth.


10. (C) Mutsekwa concluded by stating that his ministry did
not have a sufficient budget to professionalize, equip, and
pay police. He understood that assistance was dependent in
part on demonstrating law and order; he pledged to work for
this.

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Mzembi Meeting
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11. (C) The Ambassador made essentially the same points with
Mzembi as he did with Mutsekwa and Mohadi. In contrast to
Mohadi, Mzembi acknowledged that Zimbabwe's "brand" had
suffered. He believed that most ZANU-PF ministers recognized
the need for change; acknowledging there were hardliners who
were resisting change, he proclaimed Mugabe a "change agent."
But despite the majority desiring progress, ZANU-PF
collectively, Mzembi argued, tended to be retrogressive. All
in all, he believed significant change would come.


12. (C) As with other ministers, Mzembi said his ministry
lacked capacity. He appealed for help.

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COMMENT
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13. (C) Unfortunately, Mohadi is more representative of
ZANU-PF in government than Mzembi. This will make progress
more difficult. But it is significant that Mzembi has
Mugabe's ear, and that there are a significant number of
reformers in ZANU-PF. We continue to believe there will be
fitful advances; we should not expect too much too soon. END
COMMENT.

MCGEE