The Contenders: How Elite Cadre Advance, Prospects for 2011

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HANOI 000881 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/22 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON VM SUBJECT: The Contenders: How Elite Cadre Advance, Prospects for 2011 REF: A) HANOI 809, B) HANOI 823, C) 08 HCMC 450, D) HCMC 535 HANOI 00000881 001.2 OF 005 CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Michalak, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Decision-making at the top of Vietnam's Communist Party structure is broader based and more consensus driven than in China, and the full Politburo and Central Committee take an active role in policy and personnel matters. While the most fervid speculation about the January 2011 Party Congress focuses on the top four positions, jockeying for the 6-8 projected Politburo vacancies and, a step lower, for a position on the Central Committee (CC) will be fierce and consequential. What qualifies an ambitious cadre for a seat on the CC and, ultimately, on the Politburo? A close look at the resumes of the fifteen current members of the Politburo, as well as prominent members of the CC likely to make the Politburo in 2011, suggests two paths to advancement: 1) provincial leadership and 2) service in the central-level Party and state bureaucracies. Top CPV officials are expected to broaden their resumes, but there is no established system of provincial rotation. Cadre go "out of cone" relatively late in their careers, typically in their first term on the Central Committee. While ideology remains important, economic patronage networks -- money politics - are increasingly supplanting wartime ties as a basis for factionalism. END SUMMARY What's at Stake -------------- ¶2. (C) The most fervid speculation about Vietnam's Eleventh Party Congress, scheduled for January 2011, tends to focus on the CPV's commanding heights -- General Secretary, Prime Minister, State President, and National Assembly Chair -- as well as possible vacancies in the foreign affairs and public security ministries (refs A, B). Just as consequential, however, are contests for national-level leadership positions farther down the Party structure: as many as eight vacant Politburo seats, as well as a significant portion of the 160-member Central Committee. This reflects the fact that decision-making in Vietnam's Party leadership tends to be "flatter" than it is in China, less hierarchical and more consensus driven. With no standing committee or a single "paramount leader," Vietnam's full Politburo, which meets weekly, is involved in a broad range of decisions with consensus required on relatively minor decisions, according to the CPV External Relations Committee's lead official on China, Le Quang Ba. This pattern essentially replicates, on a national level, the decision-making model prevalent in HCMC (ref C),according to one of the staff supporting HCMC Party Secretary and Politburo Member Le Thanh Hai. Vietnam's Central Committee, which convenes as many as three times a year, also has a direct say in policy and personnel matters. Vietnam's Party politics is as a result considerably messier -- more "democratic," as PRC Ambassador Sun Guoxiang put it bluntly, and in confidence -- with policy argued at lower levels and pre-Congress personnel decisions much more volatile. ¶3. (SBU) The system may be volatile, but it is not capricious. There are two clear paths to advancement, according to contacts familiar with the Party structure: 1) provincial leadership and 2) service in the central-level state and Party bureaucracies. Of the Central Committee's 161 members, fifty are provincial Party secretaries or deputy Party secretaries (at least nine others formerly held such positions). Forty-nine can be considered as serving in a state capacity, that is in a ministry or executive agency, with an additional twelve from the military and fifteen from the National Assembly. Thirty-five are in the Central Committee by virtue of their Party position alone. (Of course, all are Party members, by definition). A close look at the resumes of the fifteen current members of the Politburo shows a similar division: seven rose through the local ranks to positions of provincial leadership, seven ascended through central-level State/Party structures, and one, Ho Duc Viet, had a more mixed resume, at one time serving as the Chair of Vietnam's National Football Federation. HANOI 00000881 002.2 OF 005 Path I: Provincial Leadership -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The pattern of localism present in southern Vietnam (ref. D) prevails throughout the country. While it is not uncommon for senior officials from the central-level Party/state bureaucracy to "parachute" into a position of provincial leadership as a vice Party chair -- either to broaden their experience or to serve as a "fixer" -- this is the exception, rather than the rule. There is no regular system of provincial rotation, as in China, and it is rare for a rising provincial star to be moved to a distant province. When moves do occur, they are most often to a nearby province. State President Nguyen Minh Triet, for example, took over as HCMC Party Chief after what was viewed as an extremely successful run in neighboring Binh Duong province. As the older generation retires, economically based patronage networks are coming to play an increasingly dominant role in defining factions within the CPV, particularly in the South. While provincial leaders remain homegrown, they often have ties to groups that extend beyond their own provincial boundaries, and they take these ties with them as they rise. ¶5. (SBU) Within the Politburo, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and MPS Minister Le Hong Anh are perhaps the clearest examples of the traditional "provincial route" to the top, having risen through the CPV apparatus in Kien Giang, each reaching the position of Party Secretary. (Anh is a native of Kien Giang, Dung was born in neighboring Ca Mau, but moved to Kien Giang after serving in the army.) CPV Standing Secretary Truong Tan Sang and HCMC Party Chief Le Thanh Hai, Southerners from provinces bordering HCMC, each attained increasingly powerful positions within the local HCMC government and Party structure. DPM Truong Vinh Trong followed a similar path in his native province of Ben Tre. Among Northerners, General Secretary Nong Duc Manh rose almost exclusively in his native province of Bac Thai (since split into Bac Kan and Thai Nguyen),becoming Bac Thai Party Secretary in 1986. The Politburo's sole representative from Central Vietnam, Nguyen Van Chi, rose through the CPV apparatus in the Hoa Vang District of Danang, where he was born, before ascending to the top position in the (then combined) province of Quang Nam-Danang. Path II: Central-Level Party/State -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The second path to advancement runs through Hanoi, through service in the central-level Party or state bureaucracy. The lines between Party and state authority are blurred. Within the ministries and state-related agencies, internal Party cells continue to play an important role, particularly in personnel decisions and the transmission of general Party policy; likewise, a bureaucrat cannot rise above a certain rank (office director usually) without being a Party member. Still, among cadre whose careers were made at the central level in Hanoi, there is a further, useful distinction between those who advanced through the ministries or military and those who were more specifically involved in propaganda, ideology, and "Party building." ¶7. (SBU) Politburo members who rose through the ministries or military include Standing DPM Nguyen Sinh Hung, who spent his entire career in the Ministry of Finance, eventually serving as Vice Minister and then Minister; DPM/FM Pham Gia Khiem, who had a twenty-year career in the Ministry of Planning and Investment and its predecessor, the State Planning Committee; and Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh, a career military officer. The second sub-category, "ideological cadre," includes National Assembly Chair Nguyen Phu Trong, who worked for nearly thirty years on the CPV's leading theoretical journal, "The Communist Review," and Hanoi Party Secretary Pham Quang Nghi, who spent over twenty years working for the Central Ideology and Culture Commission, as it was HANOI 00000881 003.2 OF 005 then called. The Politburo's newest member, To Huy Rua, the hard-line Chair of the CPV Propaganda and Education Commission, spent the better part of two decades as a professor of Marxist philosophy at the Central Political Propaganda and Training School before taking leadership positions at the Ho Chi Minh Political Academy. Rounding out the Resume -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Elite cadre are expected to have a varied curriculum vitae. By the time they are considered for Politburo membership most will have served in both the provinces and at the central level. Party leaders broaden their resumes relatively late in one's career, however, typically during their first term on the Central Committee. Prior to this, most cadre stay "in cone." GS Manh, PM Dung, President Triet, DPM Trong, MPS Minister Anh, and CPV Inspection Commission Chair Chi, for example, all assumed powerful positions in the central-level Party/state system shortly after joining the Central Committee, but before that they served exclusively at the provincial level (wartime military service excepted). Likewise, NA Chair Trong, Hanoi Party Secretary Nghi, and CPV Propaganda and Ideology Commission Chair Rua -- all of whom were Communist theorists before joining the Central Committee -- were given important administrative positions in the provinces during their first CC term. This is not an iron-clad rule: Le Thanh Hai has never left HCMC; CPV Standing Secretary Sang did leave HCMC, but this occurred after he made the Politburo and only because he was forced out as a consequence of the Nam Cam organized crime scandal of the late 1990s; and DPM Hung, DPM/FM Khiem, and Defense Minister Thanh have never served in the provinces. Nevertheless, as a general principle, top-level cadres are expected to fill out their resumes. Patronage: The Ties that Bind -------------- ¶9. (C) While regionalism (north/south/central) and central Party connections traditionally have formed the basis for promotion into the top ranks of the CPV, those factors are increasingly intertwined with money politics. In years past, regional and local patronage networks were reinforced by wartime bonds: where one served and with whom. This was true not just for military officers, but for "political" cadre, who functioned through regionally distinct Party networks and chains of command. At the onset of Doi Moi, these regional ties took on an ideological coloring: southerners such as GS Nguyen Van Linh, Prime Ministers Vo Van Kiet and Phan Van Khai, and President Nguyen Minh Triet were generally viewed as favoring economic reform, while others -- often, though not exclusively Northerners -- argued for continued state control. These disputes have largely subsided, however, as Vietnam became institutionally bound to market-oriented development. Today, patronage networks and factionalism tend to follow the money. This is, our contacts baldly state, the sole reason, for example, that HCMC Party Chief Le Tanh Hai not only has survived, but continues to wield considerable influence on the Politburo; it is the real basis for Danang Party Chief Nguyen Ba Thanh's ambitions for Politburo membership; and it is a source of leverage for PM Nguyen Tan Dung, who exercises effective control over many of Vietnam's most important state-owned enterprises and thus dictates the flow of patronage jobs and contracts. ¶10. (C) In this environment, a growing number of party members are neither "conservative" nor "reformist," but choose their alliances solely on economic grounds, calculating which regional/money faction offers the biggest financial return. Even the "ideological cadre" of the type discussed in paragraph eight are not immune to economic forces and generally either attach themselves to, or are recruited by, a regional/money faction. To Huy Rua, to cite the HANOI 00000881 004.2 OF 005 most current example, is connected to former GS Le Kha Phieu's Thanh Hoa network, but within the faction he was not in a position to control patronage, at least until he took over as Haiphong Party Chair. This changes, of course, as one rises, and one can expect that Rua is now gaining material clout to match his ideological influence. A similar case can be made for Pham Quang Nghi, contacts say, who is rumored to have made a lot of people rich, grateful, and -- he hopes -- loyal during the 2008 expansion of Hanoi. In this sense, rounding out the resume not only provides broader experience, it allows even the most ideologically pure cadre to benefit from and develop lines of patronage. Waiting in the Wings -------------- ¶11. (C) Based on the considerations listed above, as well as the specific vacancies expected in 2011 (refs. A,B) our contacts identify several leading contenders to ascend to the Politburo at the Eleventh Party Congress. These include: -- MPS VM Tran Dai Quang: If MPS Minister Anh steps aside, his successor will get an automatic promotion to the Politburo. As the clear front-runner for Anh's job, Quang is also the front-runner for his Politburo chair. -- VFM Pham Binh Minh: Minh's promotion this year to full voting status at the Central Committee was significant. Minh is the leading contender to replace Pham Gia Khiem as Foreign Minister, if not concurrently as DPM. Unlike the MPS, Vietnam's Foreign Minister is not guaranteed a position on the Politburo. -- Nghe An Party Secretary Tran Van Hanh: Hang worked for the Ministry of Labor, invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) for over twenty years, eventually rising to Vice Minister. He then gained provincial experience as Deputy Party Chief in Soc Trang. After that he was brought back to Hanoi, where he served as the Chair of the CPV External Relations Committee before being sent to his home province of Nghe An. Hanh's resume is well suited for a DPM, and he has also been mentioned as a dark-horse candidate for FM. -- Danang Party Secretary Nguyen Ba Thanh: Thanh is not popular in Hanoi, but may be selected to provide regional balance to a Politburo that is about to lose its sole representative from Central Vietnam. The fact that Danang reached the number one spot on the Provincial Competitiveness Index gives Ba Thanh claim to some of the technocratic clout that helped propel President Nguyen Minh Triet from Binh Duong to the top. Lastly, Ba Thanh has amassed the type of personal wealth and economic connections that could help him develop broad patronage ties within the CPV, much as HCMC Party Secretary Hai has done. -- National Assembly Vice Chair Pham Thi Phong: Contacts on the NA assert that she is a real possibility to replace Trong as NA Chair. Phong is already a member of the CPV Secretariat. An ethnic Thai, Phong served nearly her entire career in Son La. Both her gender and ethnic origin could count in her favor given the Party's stated emphasis on becoming more inclusive. -- DPM Hoang Trung Hai: Two of the three DPMs on the Politburo are expected to retire. Of the two DPMs not on the Politburo, Hai is said to have fared much better than DPM Nhan, who is viewed as a brilliant man but poor administrator and has been widely blamed for failing to reform Vietnam's faltering educational system. HANOI 00000881 005.2 OF 005 -- Sr. Lt. General Le Van Dung: Also on the Secretariat, Dung is chair of the Defense Ministry's powerful Political Department. The military is comparatively underrepresented in the current Politburo, and could press for an additional seat. Dung was reprimanded by the CPV in 2001 for his alleged role in former GS Le Kha Phieu's plot to wiretap fellow Politburo members. If Dung makes it onto the Politburo, this would likely be interpreted as a further sign that Phieu's protege's continue to gain influence. -- Ngo Van Du: Newly selected to the Secretariat, Du is Chief of the Central Committee Office. He is in a good position to assume one of the Politburo positions that focus on internal CPV matters. -- Inspector General Tran Van Truyen: A leading candidate to succeed Nguyen Van Chi as Chair of the CPV Central Inspectorate Commission. Before assuming his present position, Truyen was the Commission's deputy. He also has valuable provincial experience, having served as Ben Tre Party Secretary. -- Ca Mau Party Secretary Nguyen Tuan Khanh: Khanh was appointed to his present post in 2008 to replace Ca Mau's scandal-ridden previous Party Chief. A former Deputy Chair of the CPV Organization Commission, Khanh has excellent central-level Party experience. He also has served as Party Secretary of Gia Lai. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Promotions and assignments are important to Vietnam's Communist Party and influence its approach to policy. "Election year" jostling is already underway and may impede progress on still-sensitive issues such as participation in global peacekeeping, as well as exacerbate pressure on political dissent as contenders vie to prove their moxie. The career paths taken by Vietnam's most ambitious, successful cadre tend to exacerbate an already entrenched localized system of alliances that is both historically fraught and -- on a personal level -- increasingly lucrative. This can, in turn, both inhibit the leadership from developing a coherent national perspective and make it difficult to impose policy on the provinces. On the other hand, as with the National Assembly, the result is also a feistier politics, with Party officials in a certain sense answerable to identifiable constituencies. This is hardly democracy, but as the Chinese Ambassador remarked to us recently it is considerably less tidy than his own leadership would find comfortable. END COMMENT. ¶13. (U) This cable was coordinated with ConGen HCMC. Michalak