Vietnam's "Track II" Engagement with Burma - U.S. Urged to

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000861 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/07 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR ECON ASEAN BM VM SUBJECT: Vietnam's "Track II" Engagement with Burma - U.S. Urged to Participate REF: EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE: AMEMBASSY HANOI - AMEMBASSY RANGOON HANOI 00000861 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Virginia Palmer, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Vietnam sees 2010 as a promising year to engage with Burma but is nervous that election-related unrest there could derail efforts to host a successful ASEAN summit, according to Dang Dinh Quy, Vice President of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV). Quy, who recently met with Burma's Deputy Foreign Minister and other senior MOFA officials as well as "track II" academics as part of a weeklong visit to Rangoon and Nay Pyi Taw, assessed that the Burmese regime was prepared to countenance "significant" opposition participation, but not an opposition victory. Vietnam continued to tout its experience emerging from international isolation, Quy said, and had urged Burma to view ASEAN as a "window" to the outside world, a message Vietnam's leadership would stress when Burma's third-ranking general, Defense Services Chief of General Staff Thura Shwe Mann, visits Hanoi later this fall. Following Thura Shwe Mann's visit, the DAV plans to invite official and quasi-official Burmese counterparts for a conference. Quy asked for U.S. support (including funding),stressing that his institution would be happy to facilitate contact with the Burmese participants, but provided no concrete details. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Meeting October 2, the Vice President of the MFA-affiliated Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV),Dang Dinh Quy, and the Deputy DG of the DAV's Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Nguyen Vu Tung, briefed poloff on their September 18-25 visit to Rangoon and Nay Pyi Taw. The trip, organized by the Vietnamese embassy in Burma, featured what Quy described as frank and in-depth exchange with Burma's Deputy Foreign Minister Maung Myint and the Deputy DG for Political Affairs, Hau Do Swan. Quy and Tung also met with the Directors General of MOFA's departments of International Cooperation and Economic Affairs; Research, Languages, and Training; ASEAN Affairs; and Personnel. Quy described his official meetings as the primary focus of his trip, but said that he and Tung also met with university scholars and the head of the MOFA-affiliated Myanmar Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Daw Than Than Htay. "Complicated Beyond Expectation" -------------- ¶3. (C) Quy and Tung said their first task was to assess the situation on the ground in Burma as the government lays the groundwork for elections and as Vietnam prepares to take over as ASEAN Chair in 2010. The two DAV scholars, who are not Burma experts, confessed they were struck by the complexity of the political situation. While the military's personnel and intelligence networks were pervasive and stretched down to the grassroots, they perceived considerable difference of opinion among civilian officials. The majority, Quy claimed, were surprisingly frank in saying that they wanted democracy; the problem, they acknowledged, was they had little clout. A smaller number of civilian officials with close ties to the military, including DFM Maung Myint, himself a former brigadier general, were much more cautious. Maung Myint bluntly told the DAV delegation that while Burma had two foreign policy goals -- development and security -- his government was prepared to sacrifice the former to ensure the latter. Quy said that his Burmese contacts were candid in describing their military rulers as an insular and isolated cadre (a "dictatorship," in Quy's words) with limited access to information. ¶4. (SBU) Quy said that he and Tung encountered among the civilian officials they met deeper support for elections than they had anticipated. Their interlocutors, he said, expected that the "opposition" would not only participate but be permitted significant representation in the legislature. Nevertheless, there was no chance that the opposition would be allowed to win outright. Asked if by "opposition" the Burmese meant the NLD and whether Aung San Suu Kyi would be permitted to campaign for office, Quy said that these remained open questions, which he was told depended as much on the NLD's position as the government's. (Embassy Rangoon notes the NLD has yet to decide whether the party will contest the election. In its April 2009 Shwegondaing Declaration, the NLD stated it would consider participation if the GOB frees all political prisoners, amends portions of the 2008 constitution and holds internationally supervised free and fair elections. It is highly unlikely the GOB will agree to the first two conditions. End note.) Tung stressed that the Burmese military was extremely nervous about the elections and viewed the "large-scale chaos" that erupted in Iran with particular trepidation. HANOI 00000861 002.2 OF 003 Vietnam Also Anxious about 2010 -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Burma's leaders were not alone in expressing anxiety about the elections, which Quy said he was told would most likely take place in October or November 2010. (Note: Burma's government has yet to specify a specific election date or promulgate electoral legislation. End note.) Vietnam's leadership, Quy said, worried that election-related strife could hijack Hanoi's efforts to host a successful ASEAN Summit. Quy said that the best outcome, from Vietnam's perspective, would be for the opposition to be "realistic" in its expectations, to accept a voice in Burma's post-election affairs and not push for outright victory. Tung insisted that even if elections were "distorted," it would be a mistake for the NLD to boycott. He noted, deadpan, that a significant voice in the national legislature was much more than Vietnam's political system currently allows its opposition. (Embassy Rangoon notes that NLD leaders told Senator Webb during his visit to Burma, and have repeated since, that they do not aspire for Burma to be like Vietnam, i.e. a one-party state. They are seeking political change, not only economic liberalization. End note.) Burmese Reactions to U.S. Policy -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Quy and Tung said that his Burmese counterparts welcomed the results of the U.S. policy review. If anything, expectations had to be tempered. Quy said that it was significant that Senator Webb had met Senior General Than Shwe. The United States too must be modest in its expectations, Quy insisted, arguing that the elections should be judged as a "moment of transition" rather than as a final goal. Tung said that it was difficult to overstate the degree of paranoia toward the United States that persists in the senior military, arguing that the leadership still needed to be assured that the United States does not plan to overthrow the regime. Doi Moi for Burma? -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Quy and Tung agreed that Vietnam offered a potentially attractive model for Burma and insisted that that was, in fact, the second main task of their visit. In all their meetings, they reportedly encouraged Burma to break out of its international isolation. They urged Burma's leaders not simply to wait for U.S. overtures, but to be proactive -- for example, by having staff at the Burmese Embassy in Washington reach out more effectively to the State Department and to members of Congress. They also made a pitch for ASEAN, explaining how Vietnam had used the association as a "window" to the outside world. These messages would be strongly reinforced when Burma's Burma's third-ranking general, Chief of General Staff Thura Shwe Mann, visits Hanoi later this fall. Invitation to a Conference -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Following the Mann visit, the DAV planned to organize a track II conference with Burmese officials and semi-official contacts. Quy said that the conference was still in its early planning stages, but urged the United States to participate in it (and to fund it, he added, if possible). Quy said that the DAV would be happy to facilitate contact at whatever level and with whatever degree of formality the United States decides is appropriate. COMMENT -------------- ¶2. (C) We should seriously consider the DAV offer, assuming its objectives are consistent with overall U.S. policy. Quy, a savvy MFA insider, would not have put forward the proposal without explicit approval. The track II format offers advantages: Vietnam and (we presume) Burma's participants will not stray from official positions; however, they may be more candid and forthcoming in a less formal setting. In general, Vietnam's turn as ASEAN Chair affords the United States leverage we do not ordinarily have: Vietnam might not give a fig about democracy in Burma, but it wants a smooth summit -- we should not necessarily be too eager to help Vietnam ease this tension. At the same time, however, Vietnam has expressed enthusiasm for the results of our policy review and is keen to be seen as an honest broker. As we look for productive HANOI 00000861 003.2 OF 003 ways to reengage with Burma, there is, we suspect, much to be learned from Vietnam's experience and contacts. Unless the Department objects, Post will engage Quy and others to ascertain more details about the conference as they develop and relay the information to the Department for consideration. Palmer