WAY FORWARD ON DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH VIETNAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000497 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, PM/RSAT, PM/WRA, PM/PPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019 TAGS: KPKO MARR MASS MOPS PREL PGOV OTRA VM SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH VIETNAM HANOI 00000497 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Michalak, Reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The United States and Vietnam are moving to a new level of defense cooperation not previously seen in our bilateral relationship. While progress in some areas is slower than we would like, we have now expanded our engagement to the point where setting priorities will be key to our continued success. We are focusing on building relationships that are bearing fruit particularly in the areas of maritime security, search and rescue, peacekeeping, medical exchanges, and humanitarian assistance, while IMET training is slowly expanding the number of Vietnamese defense officials with English language capability and exposure to the U.S. defense establishment. Our first-ever U.S.-Vietnam Security Dialogue in October 2008 laid the groundwork for further progress. Government of Vietnam (GVN) officials agree that we need more concrete progress in the upcoming second round, but they have not yet provided specifics. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials note that they wanted early talks (only eigh t months after the first round) to consult with the U.S. before the ASEAN Regional Forum meetings in July, the final ARF gathering before Vietnam assumes the chair of ASEAN at the beginning of 2010. End summary. The U.S.-Vietnam Relationship -------------- ¶2. (C) Our bilateral relations with Vietnam continue to broaden and mature, spurring economic, social and technological development that has eased the path for a limited expansion of personal freedom for the people of Vietnam. Vietnam is taking a greater role in international and regional affairs, as reflected in its current non-permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council and its upcoming chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010. GVN leaders understand that the United States plays a direct role in creating the conditions for their nation's success and are committed to advancing the bilateral relationship. MFA and MFA-affiliated track-two scholars have voiced an interest in consulting with the United States in advance of Vietnam's assuming the ASEAN Chair in the beginning of 2010; according to the MFA, this is a primary reason why the GVN pushed to have the second round of security talks before the ASEAN Regional Forum meets in July. ¶3. (C) Our strengthening relations are also due to Vietnam's realization that the United States is an important force in maintaining a stable geopolitical environment in which even "small" countries like Vietnam are assured their independence and freedom of action. As such, Vietnam's leaders speak positively and optimistically about the future of U.S.-Vietnam ties. Differences over human rights remain, however, and lingering fears that the United States supports the overthrow of the current regime continue to complicate the relationship. The Ministries of Defense and Public Security, both of which participate in the dialogue, are particularly suspicious of the United States and of our deepening bilateral ties. Fear of a Chinese counter-reaction also colors Hanoi's reactions to our proposals in the security realm. Growth of U.S.-GVN Defense Cooperation -------------- ¶4. (C) The GVN is in the midst of a shift of its defense posture from inward to outward looking. Historically, the primary missions of People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) were defense of the homeland, regime, and revolution, essentially a continuation of its posture from the conflicts with the French and the United States. With increasing international engagement, the MOD and PAVN are now slowly changing their perspective to include security cooperation with others - a shift that only recently started and is still ongoing. As a result, our defense relations have advanced at a measured pace, but reflect the overall positive shift in the relationship. We conduct professional military exchanges with the PAVN in a limited but growing range of areas including military law, military nursing, medical readiness exercises, public affairs, search and rescue, meteorological/ oceanographic (METOC) prediction, and disaster preparedness. PAVN officers have been invited as observers to Cobra Gold for the past four years an d routinely attend U.S. Pacific Command-sponsored multilateral conferences. Since 1997, over sixty GVN HANOI 00000497 002.2 OF 004 officials, including more than thirty PAVN officers, have attended courses and seminars at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). PAVN also now sends observers to the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises. ¶5. (C) Since 2003, U.S. Navy ships have made five port visits to Vietnam, including most recently a November 14-18, 2007 visit by two mine countermeasures ships, the USS Guardian and the USS Patriot, at Haiphong port. In June 2008, Vietnam participated in the Pacific Partnership mission of the USNS Mercy. In 2005, Vietnam agreed to participate in the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). In 2007, we accelerated the pace of IMET and provided a language laboratory in Hanoi using IMET funds. In 2008, IMET expanded mil-mil contacts through a U.S. mobile training team visit for military medical techniques training. The GVN also continues to send well-qualified candidates to English language training and English language instructor training to the Defense Language Institute (DLI). ¶6. (C) This nascent but multi-faceted defense and security relationship has matured into an important aspect of our overall relationship. Closer cooperation in defense activities is attainable but will require persistence and patience. The second U.S.-Vietnam Security Dialogue is another opportunity to deepen this relationship and expand our cooperation. Building on Progress Since the First Dialogue -------------- ¶7. (C) Prioritizing our security engagement will get results. Pressing forward full steam ahead in too many areas is more likely to result in GVN interlocutors who are confused, distrustful of our intentions, and more apt to drag their feet on any engagement. At present, the most promising area of our cooperation is maritime security and search and rescue. Our engagement on this is growing rapidly and offers spillover into a number of other areas - humanitarian assistance, UXO clearance, defense academy exchanges, to name a few. EXBS too is an area where our engagement has paid off with a GVN commitment to move forward. Progress on implementing Vietnam's declared intention to participate in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) has been slower and the GVN still lacks a clear understanding of how FMF works. Search and Rescue: Progress and Promise -------------- ¶8. (C) Search and Rescue (SAR) cooperation has taken off, with a senior GVN delegation observing a U.S. SAR exercise in Hawaii and visiting U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington and the a U.S. Coast Guard training facility in Yorktown next month. Based on the steps towards a joint exercise laid out by the GVN at the October 2008 dialogue, we should seek GVN invitation to observe a Vietnamese SAR exercise with a view to begin SAR exercise planning before the end of 2009. We can express appreciation for their open discussions with the PACOM SAR team that visited in April and encourage the GVN to continue discussions with the U.S. on ways we can further our cooperation. GVN Ready to Engage on EXBS and Megaports -------------- ¶9. (C) The GVN has shown a remarkable willingness to cooperate on the Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program. Prime Minister Dung also recently gave the go ahead to begin negotiations on an agreement with DOE on Megaports. We should express appreciation for the open and frank discussions the MOD and Vietnam Marine Police shared with the U.S. Coast Guard Assessment team in March and encourage the GVN to continue to develop and expand its relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard. We should also express appreciation for the hospitality shown to the Department of Energy team that conducted the Megaports assessment visit and encourage Vietnam to begin negotiations with DOE immediately. Pushing for Progress on Peacekeeping -------------- ¶10. (C) In March, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies held a successful peacekeeping workshop with HANOI 00000497 003.2 OF 004 participants from MFA, MOD, and MPS, leading to a greater understanding at the working level of peacekeeping and what participation might mean for Vietnam. We should brief the GVN on the benefits and challenges associated with becoming a troop-contributing country to UN peacekeeping operations to continue to expand their knowledge of overall international peacekeeping concepts and processes, stressing the longstanding participation of other ASEAN nations. ¶11. (C) At our invitation, MOD will send Major General (select) Do Van Tac, Deputy Director for the Operations Department, General Staff to the GPOI Capstone exercise--Garuda Shield in June 2009. Having a senior officer directly responsible for the development of Vietnam's PKO capabilities observing the exercise will help to build confidence in Vietnam's future role in peacekeeping operations and GPOI activities. We should congratulate Vietnam for accepting the invitation and encourage Vietnam to continue planning for real participation in peacekeeping and GPOI. Further, we should seek Vietnam's commitment to send active participants (vice observers) to the 2010 GPOI exercise. While the GVN is unlikely to commit on this occasion, we should raise the issue of their participation early and often. Getting the Most Out of Ship Visits -------------- ¶12. (C) In June 2009, the GVN issued a national guideline that enabled a team from the Joint POW-MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) aboard the USNS BRUCE HEEZEN to conduct at-sea search operations for Missing in Action (MIA) remains within Vietnam's territorial seas, a major step we should note with appreciation. In April, the GVN agreed for the first time to accept our invitation to fly-out to a visiting U.S. aircraft carrier off the coast of Vietnam. The visit resulted in pages of positive publicity and was a resounding success, paving the way for future visits of this nature. We should note the benefits of such visits for both sides and seek GVN support for a follow-up visit when possible. ¶13. (C) In the past we have pushed Vietnam to allow more U.S. ship visits as a tool to increase out engagement, but with our GVN interlocutors citing the need for changes in law to allow more than one visit per year we do not believe this is likely to happen in the short or medium term. Instead, we should press for more substantive activities during the ship visits we do have - not only more joint community outreach activities, but more mil-mil activities and increased operational engagement. We should also seek GVN views on the possibility of a Vietnamese Navy ship visit to a U.S. port. Pacific Partnership and Health Diplomacy -------------- ¶14. (C) Meanwhile, we continue to build on the success of past Pacific Partnership missions and expect to host Pacific Angel later in 2009. We should seek GVN commitment to begin planning for Pacific Partnership 2010. ¶15. (C) Health diplomacy via medical exchange also continues to be a key factor in our engagement. We should preview the U.S. Navy Surgeon General's proposed visit (tentatively scheduled for July) to engage in a dialogue with the MOH and MOD regarding medical cooperation opportunities on offer from Navy medicine. Vietnam Military Medical Department also plans to send a senior-level military delegation comprised of three regional commanders (Lieutenant Generals) and senior representatives from the Military Medical Department to Hawaii in November 2009 to observe U.S. screening procedures for soldiers deploying overseas. The exchange will be funded by DOD PEPFAR and special emphasis will be on HIV/AIDS prevention. We should welcome Vietnam's initiative in seeking out these engagement opportunities and encourage them to continue these efforts. Humanitarian Mine Action/UXO Clearance -------------- ¶16. (C) The GVN has made strides in cooperation and coordination with the establishment of the Vietnam Bomb and Mine Action Center (VBMAC) in February. The Center is now the civilian coordinating authority for UXO clearance, mine risk education and assistance to victims nation-wide. HANOI 00000497 004.2 OF 004 However, much work remains to be done - a national strategy would assist Vietnam in gaining much needed donor funds, the data from the USG-funded Landmine Impact Survey is still not accessible, and VBMAC does not yet have the capacity to live up to its mandate. We should applaud the creation of VBMAC, ask for its priorities for assistance and capacity building, and encourage the GVN to develop a national strategy for mine action. We should also seek simple, transparent USG and NGO access to the Landmine Impact Survey data. Finally, and in response to past GVN requests for assistance with underwater clearance, we should preview potential cooperation between the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) and MOD on underwater explosive ordnan ce disposal and mine countermeasures and seek GVN agreement to receive a PACFLT assessment team to discuss potential cooperation in more detail. Security Assistance: FMF -------------- ¶17. (C) MOD's leadership is still hesitant to accept its first $500K in FY09 FMF and has expressed a policy of not accepting military related funding to purchase military equipment from any country. We have informed them about the potential of using FMF like IMET for training (English language instructors, medical, military-related skills training, etc.),to purchase more language labs, or to hire a certified U.S. English instructor to come to Vietnam to teach. The MOD still does not yet have a clear understanding of how FMF works. We need to better educate the leadership and explain FMF in such a way that it is understood as a credit or value amount of military equipment that the U.S. will give to Vietnam, rather than a lump sum of cash to be handed over for military purchases. Defense Academy Exchanges -------------- ¶18. (C) A number of senior MOD officers have expressed their desire for an increased number of academic exchanges between our two militaries. We should press the GVN to begin discussing the establishment of an official exchange program between the U.S. and GVN service academies and senior staff colleges. Given our growing cooperation on maritime security, an exchange with the U.S. Coast Guard Academy would be an ideal starting point. We should highlight that for the upcoming academic year at U.S. military academies, Vietnam is a priority country and could send a cadet to each of our military academies, provided they put forward competitive candidates. While Vietnamese candidates must compete with other countries for a slot, Vietnam's chances of having a cadet accepted are better than ever. DAO Hanoi will be working with ERD to determine the best way forward. A Word of Caution: Priorities and Patience -------------- ¶19. (C) We are regularly reminded by our GVN counterparts about the measured pace that they wish to take when we seek to expand our defense cooperation, and we must take this into account and seek avenues and areas of cooperation where the GVN and MOD are most enthusiastic while pressing forward on issues of key interest. Overall, we see a positive long-term future in our continued engagement with Vietnam on defense and security issues. The upcoming Security Dialogue is another key event to move our cooperation forward and continue the process of turning a former enemy into a valued partner. MICHALAK