ASEAN-CHINA NEGOTIATIONS ON SOUTH CHINA SEA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000362 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR EAP/MLS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON VM SUBJECT: ASEAN-CHINA NEGOTIATIONS ON SOUTH CHINA SEA "GUIDELINES" STALLED BY DISPUTE OVER ASEAN'S NEGOTIATING STATUS REF: A. HANOI 134 ¶B. 08 HANOI 1094 HANOI 00000362 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: PolCouns Brian Aggeler. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: ASEAN and China have made progress in developing "guidelines" to supplement the 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), according to MFA and think tank contacts. The parties remain deadlocked, however, on a key point: whether follow-on discussions, including the resolution of disputes, will be conducted a) between China and ASEAN as an organization or b) between China and the separate ASEAN member states. This is much more than a procedural matter, our contacts insist. While the rest of the guidelines amount to little more than an anodyne restatement of original DOC principles, the question of ASEAN's status would have a significant bearing on future, more substantive negotiations. Along these lines, Vietnam takes its extended continental shelf "baseline" claim seriously and plans to meet the May 13 UNCLOS deadline. Our Vietnamese contacts have also taken a keen interest in events surrounding China's March 8 harassment of the USNS Impeccable, though they voice conflicting -- and conflicted -- opinions about how the United States should deal with such incidents. END SUMMARY. MODEST PROGRESS -------------- ¶2. (C) According to officials from the MFA departments most directly involved in the negotiations, ASEAN and China have made progress on six of seven "guidelines" intended to elaborate on the 2002 DOC. The guidelines themselves remain in draft form and are considered internal documents; however, as described by the Deputy Director of Marine Affairs at the MFA's Border Commission, Nguyen Minh Hanh, they restate the DOC's commitment to dialogue and the non-use of force, and introduce modest initiatives on technical cooperation and fishing. As such they are welcome but not especially significant, Hanh said. ¶3. (C) Hanh and his counterpart in the MFA's Department of International Law and Treaties, Deputy DG Nguyen Manh Dong, emphasized that the guidelines, like the DOC itself, would be a non-binding statement of principles. China and ASEAN remain far apart on an actual Code of Conduct (COC). Asked whether he thought the guidelines could lead to a COC, the Deputy DG for the MFA's Southeast Asia Department, Ta Duy Chinh, laughed and said simply, "no." NOT JUST PROCEDURAL: ASEAN'S NEGOTIATING STATUS -------------- -- ¶4. (C) Our MFA and think tank contacts stressed that although there was agreement in principle on six out of the seven guidelines, China and ASEAN were deadlocked on point number two, which stipulates ASEAN's role in future negotiations, including the resolution of disputes. ASEAN insists that it, as an organization, be recognized as the representative of all ten member countries. China, according to our contacts, prefers that discussions be conducted on a bilateral basis, between China and individual member countries. ¶5. (C) Both sides cite the DOC as precedent. China points to the fact that the document has eleven signatories: itself and the ten individual ASEAN member countries. ASEAN maintains that the DOC represents, de facto, a joint declaration between itself and China; and in any case, ASEAN's charter now gives it standing as a separate legal entity (ref. A). The guideline negotiations are themselves an interesting exercise. ASEAN says that it is represented by the Association's "plus China" Chair, Brunei; however, all ten member states are present at the talks and participate in discussions. ¶6. (C) Specialists at the MFA=affiliated Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV) stress that ASEAN's disagreement with China is, in fact, a substantive one. At issue is not so much the guidelines, which are relatively HANOI 00000362 002.2 OF 002 noncontroversial, but ASEAN's standing in future negotiations. As the DAV's leading expert on Law of the Sea issues, Tran Truong Thuy, described it, giving ground now would set a dangerous precedent and would leave ASEAN member countries in a vulnerable position dealing with China. Thuy's DAV colleague, ASEAN specialist Nguyen Hong Son concurred, but argued that there is an important internal dynamic as well. Noting the recent decision by the Philippines legislature to assert its archipelagic baseline claims (a move that Vietnam, like China, protested),Son emphasized that there were competing claims among ASEAN members, particularly in the Spratleys. Consensus may be hard to reach, but having ASEAN lead discussions might help preclude the type of separate peace that member states might otherwise be tempted to strike with Beijing on their own. VIETNAM'S CONTINENTAL BASELINE CLAIM -------------- ¶7. (c) Underscoring the issue is the May 13 deadline for coastal states to submit extended continental shelf claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) pursuant to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Our MFA contacts emphasized that Vietnam fully intends to meet the deadline, understanding that while the CLCS is unlikely to reject individual South China Sea claims, future negotiations would likely proceed on the basis of states' submissions. COMMENT: VIETNAM'S SOUTH CHINA SEA DILEMMA -------------- ¶8. (C) In nearly all of our conversations, our Vietnamese contacts were eager to hear U.S. perspectives on China's March 8 harassment of the USNS Impeccable. Hesitant to offer direct advice, our contacts' comments and questions nevertheless betrayed a real ambivalence -- and said more about Vietnam's own South China Sea dilemma than about the incident itself. There is no more vexing, emotional issue for Vietnam than its relations with China (ref. B),and the country's relatively weak position in the South China Sea dispute encapsulates Vietnam's frustrations. Recognizing the Vietnam is caught in an inescapable, asymmetric relationship with China, many of our contacts clearly wanted a more bellicose reaction from the United States. At the same time, these same contacts cautioned us not to "provoke" Beijing, because this would be bad for Vietnam. Ultimately, Vietnam is pursuing a pragmatic China policy, but that doesn't mean it sits well, even among those who support it. MICHALAK