VIETNAM ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL: MORE CONFIDENT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000101 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR EAP/MLS, IO/UNP, USUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV USUN ECON VM SUBJECT: VIETNAM ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL: MORE CONFIDENT, BUT NOT MORE AMBITIOUS REF: A. 08 HANOI 1163 ¶B. HANOI 60 ¶C. 08 HANOI 1311 ¶D. 08 HANOI 1094 ¶E. 08 HANOI 338 ¶F. 08 HANOI 1359 HANOI 00000101 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Michael Michalak. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As Vietnam enters its second year on the UN Security Council, few here anticipate significant changes in policy or approach. Contacts in the MFA, Party, and think tank community express satisfaction that Vietnam was able to acquit itself professionally in its first year and had weathered what they describe as difficult votes on Iran, Kosovo, Georgia, and Somalia without alienating any of Hanoi's major international partners. For 2009, Vietnam will be increasingly confident, though hardly more ambitious. In a recent conversation, one of Vietnam's senior diplomats pledged to "do better" to work with Hanoi's partners. But other than playing a more conspicuous role as the Council's "ASEAN representative" and chairing the UNSC during UNGA, Vietnam appears content, still, simply to have a seat at the table. ¶2. (C) COMMENT: Vietnam can be justifiably criticized for an exceedingly modest agenda, and we should continue to emphasize that being a responsible member of the international community frequently entails hard choices. Still, charges that Vietnam has simply toed China's line miss the mark. Vietnam has on important occasions voted with China (and Russia),but for reasons that serve Vietnam's perceived interests and are consistent with its Non-Aligned Movement principles: non-interference and an aversion to sanctions, an almost reverential commitment to consensus, and -- above all -- a desire to pursue a balanced, independent foreign policy. Vietnam is not impervious to persuasion; however, as votes on Iran and Somali piracy suggest, high-level engagement is sometimes required, the earlier in the process the better. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. ¶3. (C) A note on sources: This cable draws on conversations January 21-February 9 with a range of Embassy contacts including Nguyen Ba Hung, MFA Americas Division Director General; To Anh Tuan, MFA International Organizations Deputy Director; Pham Tien Nhien, Director of the CPV External Relations Commission's Department for Northwest Europe and North American Affairs; Tran Nguyen Tuyen, Director of the Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy; Luan Thuy Duong, Deputy Director General of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV); Nguyen Hong Son, Director of the DAV Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies; and Nguyen Quoc Chinh, Chief Foreign Affairs Editor for Hanoi Moi Newspaper. MODEST GOALS AND A FOCUS ON PROCESS -------------- ¶4. (C) Vietnam actively lobbied for its UNSC seat and viewed its first year on the Council as a signature achievement, according to contacts within the MFA and CPV External Relations Commission. Nevertheless, Vietnam came to the Council with modest goals. As To Anh Tuan, the MFA official directly responsible for UNSC matters, described it, Vietnam sought to demonstrate that it could be a "reliable and constructive partner" able to "participate actively in discussions." People in the MFA, Party, and think tank community familiar with the UN readily concede that Vietnam had few policy initiatives of its own and simply wanted to acquit itself professionally. Pressed to name concrete achievements on the Council last year, our contacts pointed to Vietnam's turn chairing the UNSC in July and their Mission's decision to consult with the General Assembly in the drafting of UNSC mid-year reports. ¶5. (C) Vietnam's focus was largely on process, both within the UNSC and internally. And at least initially, the process caused a great deal of "heartburn," according to the Chief Foreign Affairs Editor for the Party-affiliated Hanoi Moi newspaper, Nguyen Quoc Chinh. As Chinh and others described it, the rapid pace of work, coupled with a 12-hour time difference, presented difficulties for Vietnam's diplomats. The MFA's Tuan was less direct, but acknowledged that he frequently had to wake his bosses in HANOI 00000101 002.2 OF 003 the middle of the night with calls from New York. Eventually, many of the kinks were worked out, and the MFA and its UN mission developed a three-tiered system to determine which matters could be handled in New York, which required consultations with the MFA, and which could only be acted on with explicit instruction from Hanoi. According to Pham Tien Nhien, a high-ranking official in the CPV External Relations Commission, DPM/FM Pham Gia Khiem was empowered to speak for the Politburo on all but the most sensitive of issues. SOME TOUGH VOTES, BUT SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Nhien declined to specify which decisions were problematic enough to need approval by the wider Politburo; however, contacts in the MFA and at the MFA-sponsored Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV) identified votes on Iran, Kosovo, Georgia, and Somalia as particularly challenging. The issues of Kosovo independence and Abhkaz and South Ossetian separatism -- linked, in Vietnam's mind -- were, if anything, more irksome than voters on Iran sanctions, according to the Director of the DAV Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Nguyen Hong Son. This was particularly the case since the votes came in the run-up to important visits to Moscow (ref. A). The substance of particular resolutions aside, our contacts expressed satisfaction that Vietnam's votes had not alienated any of its major international partners. PERMREP GETS A PROMOTION -------------- ¶7. (C) Several of our contacts pointed to the promotion of Vietnam's UN Ambassador Le Luong Minh to Vice Foreign Minister as evidence that the country's leadership was pleased with Vietnam's performance on the Council. The DAV's Son said that the impetus for Minh's promotion came not from the MFA, but from elsewhere in the CPV hierarchy; in a separate conversation, Son's colleague, DAV Deputy Director General Luan Thuy Duong, said that many consider Minh to be cinch for a future spot on the Central Committee. (Comment: This would be a significant development as VFM Pham Binh Minh, recently given full CC membership, is currently the only professional diplomat on the Central Committee. See ref. B. End comment.) 2009: NO SHARP TURNS -------------- ¶8. (C) Duong and others in the MFA cited Ambassador Minh's elevation to VFM status as a sign that he might be given more scope to make decisions on his own authority. Others disagreed. None of our contacts, however, saw the promotion as evidence that Vietnam would pursue a more ambitious agenda on the Council. On the contrary, the individuals with whom we spoke were unanimous that, if anything, the promotion served as a senior-level endorsement of Vietnam's cautious approach. While increasingly assured of its ability to manage the workflow, there would be "no sharp turns" in policy or approach, Son confidently asserted. ¶9. (C) Asked about Vietnam's priorities on the council in 2009, our MFA, Party, and think tank sources could not identify any particular initiatives that Vietnam would seek to promote. With Indonesia no longer on the Council, Vietnam would seek to provide an "ASEAN perspective," DDG Duong and the MFA's Tuan noted. Our contacts declined to be more specific, save to indicate that Vietnam would be more mindful, broadly, of Southeast Asia's interests as a region; one practical consequence is that Vietnam will likely continue to insist that the Security Council is not an appropriate venue to discuss Burma (see ref. C for a discussion of ASEAN as a central factor in Vietnam's Burma policy). Our contacts also said that Vietnam would have its hands full in October when it chairs the Council during UNGA. Beyond these rather modest goals, Vietnam would be content simply to manage decisions as they come. MODEST BUT SERIOUS-MINDED -------------- ¶10. (C) This is not to say, however, that Vietnam is rudderless on the Council or that it does not take policy HANOI 00000101 003.2 OF 003 issues seriously. In nearly every matter of substance, we have found our MFA International Organizations interlocutors to be well briefed and responsive. Nor is it to say that Vietnam simply follows China's lead. Vietnam has on several important occasions voted with China (and Russia),but for reasons that serve Vietnam's overall foreign policy interests and are consistent with its principles. ¶11. (C) Vietnam shares with China a commitment to non-intervention and a reflexive aversion to sanctions. This has caused it to align with China (and Russia) on issues such as Georgia and Darfur. Like China, Vietnam will almost always prefer to build consensus -- such as on Iran sanctions -- rather than push for a position-forcing vote. But Vietnam, above all, is committed to an independent foreign policy. Vietnam's "friends with all" foreign policy is based on a clear-eyed acknowledgment of the country's status as a small power locked into an asymmetrical relationship with China. Vietnam can ill-afford to ignore its northern neighbor, on the UNSC or elsewhere, but this does not mean that Vietnam is somehow in China's pocket. (See ref. D for a wider assessment of Vietnam's China policy.) If anything, Vietnam's positions tend to follow most closely those of the Non-Aligned Movement. WORKING WITH VIETNAM -------------- ¶12. (C) If last year is any guide, we should not expect leadership from Vietnam on the Council in 2009. But even with an exceedingly modest agenda, Vietnam takes its responsibilities seriously and is, at times, open to persuasion. "Vietnam is focused on self interest, not ideology," the DG for the MFA's Americas Division Nguyen Ba Hung put it frankly. In a recent conversation with the DCM, DG Hung pledged that Vietnam would "do better" in its second year on the Council and work more closely with the United States, but cautioned that the two countries would retain their differences. "Of course we are not quite like-minded," he noted, adding that the two countries should at the very least consult more often to gain a better understanding of each others' positions. ¶13. (C) What this requires from us is a demonstration of respect and a commitment to consultation, as early in the process as possible. Our MFA and Party contacts repeatedly emphasized how much Vietnam values its "partnership" with the United States on the Council. Many still point to the February 2008 call from Secretary Rice to DPM/FM Khiem as a pivotal moment in Vietnam's UNSC diplomacy (ref. E) DG Hung, who was with Khiem when he received the Secretary's call, called the conversation "historic." More recently, intense discussion in Hanoi, Washington, and New York was successful in assuaging Vietnam's concerns about December's Chapter VII resolution authorizing measures against Somali piracy (ref. F). Despite its perceived "success" on the Council, Vietnam has no pretentions that it should be deferred to as a great power. Our experience is that a selective measure of high-level engagement, artfully applied, can go some way in swaying Vietnam's positions. MICHALAK