SOUTHCOM Visit Provides Opportunity to Showcase USG

C O N F I D E N T I A L GUATEMALA 001031 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/23 TAGS: SNAR PGOV KCRM PHUM KDEM GT SUBJECT: SOUTHCOM Visit Provides Opportunity to Showcase USG Assistance and Areas for Improvement REF: A) 09 GUATEMALA 1029; B) 09 GUATEMALA 943; C) 09 GUATEMALA 289 CLASSIFIED BY: Stephen G. McFarland, Ambassador, STATE, POL/ECON; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: USSOUTHCOM's Military Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Ken Keen's visit provided an opportunity to highlight USG assistance in Guatemala while noting areas where the Guatemalans need to improve. The USG-trained Guatemalan military/police joint unit boasts some successful missions and enjoys a strong esprit de corps but suffers from a lack of consistent fuel supplies, standardized equipment and actionable intelligence to be even more effective. The USG-sponsored Naval Special Forces Unit has not yet confiscated any narcotics aboard illicit vessels but has interdicted 75-80% of its assigned targets. Playa Grande, a border area, however, is in greatest need of Guatemalan and USG support. While the military recently established a 6th Brigade there, the overall lack of state presence has resulted in narco-infiltration. In a meeting with Guatemalan military leaders and human rights leaders, LTG Keen stressed USG support for military cooperation with investigations of human rights abuses (Ref A). End Summary. Naval Special Forces Unit (FEN) ¶2. (SBU) The November 21-23 visit of USSOUTHCOM's Military Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Ken Keen provided an opportunity for post to showcase USG assistance to the Guatemalan military and highlight continued areas for improvement. On November 21, LTG Keen visited Puerto Quetzal on the Pacific coast to see the USG-sponsored Naval Special Forces Unit (FEN). This unit was established to conduct maritime narcotics interdiction activities. The FEN currently has one operational unit on the Pacific coast and has future plans for another on the Caribbean coast. To date, the FEN, however, has had limited success. It has interdicted ships suspected of carrying narcotics; however, it has never encountered the vessels early enough to seize any drugs onboard. Rather, the drug traffickers likely dumped the narcotics into the sea when they suspected that they had been compromised. ¶3. (C) The FEN's operational success is largely dependent on actionable intelligence. At its inception, it was responsive and intercepted vessels; however, following a change in leadership, the FEN's effectiveness has fizzled. On several occasions, USG agencies provided reliable intelligence to the FEN but it failed to successfully act upon it for unknown reasons. In addition, the FEN lacks basic capabilities that could make it more effective. For example, its base in Puerto Quetzal provides little in the way of operational security since local residents are free to observe its activities from the picnic area which overlooks the port. The FEN has no forward-operating bases which would allow it to pre-position boats at sea and preserve operational integrity. The FEN could utilize the Navy's existing cutter boats to haul FEN boats out to sea thereby pre-positioning them. It also has no air support to assist it in identifying illicit vessels during night operations when visibility is decreased. Air support would greatly assist in identifying illicit vessels and if equipped with video recording technology, the recordings could serve as evidence to show that narcotics were on the illicit vessel and thrown overboard when intercepted. Radio capability along the Guatemalan coast would also make it easier to track illicit vessels and then pinpoint the location for the FEN to intercept. ¶4. (C) The FEN commander, Captain Saul Tobar, has demonstrated lackluster leadership and since he took over the command in the summer of 2009, many of the five FEN boats suffered from engine problems and the transponders on each boat (used to track their movements by the Tactical Analysis Team (TAT)) needed to be repaired. Two boats are currently operational. (Comment: It is unclear if mechanical problems resulted from sabotage or if the machinery itself is too sophisticated for the FEN to maintain. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) Comment: FEN members seemed enthusiastic and proud of their collaboration with the USG. However, the unit's inability to seize drugs carried by illicit vessels as well as the mechanical problems encountered under the current commander has frustrated its supporters. The FEN would likely benefit from a change of leadership. The former FEN commander, Captain Tyrone Hidalgo, is currently on a U.S.-sponsored training program at the Inter-American Defense College. MILGRP plans to discuss his possible reintegration as FEN commander when he returns to Guatemala in June 2010. The FEN will almost certainly continue to have limited success until a more comprehensive maritime interdiction force, including radio capability along the coast, forward-operating bases and air support is established. End Comment. Playa Grande - No Man's Land ¶6. (C) On November 22, LTG Keen visited Playa Grande, a virtual no man's land in northwestern Guatemala near the Mexico-Guatemala border. According to Ministry of Defense (MOD) representatives, in the Playa Grande area some 80,000 residents are divided into 175 communities in seven micro-regions, encompassing different ethnic/linguistic groups. The area has recorded some of the worst human development indicators in the country. The area is so isolated and prone to infiltration from narcotraffickers that the MOD decided to quietly install a new 6th Brigade there focused on supporting other institutional elements such as police and prosecutors. MOD representatives noted that there is an overall lack of state presence, including a small number of police, and no tax or immigration authorities. A MOD representative told PolOff that the brigade would start at approximately 300 soldiers and grow to 1,080 soldiers. (Note: According to a Government Accord signed by President Alvaro Colom in November 2009, the cap on the Guatemalan military force size has been raised from 15,500 members to 20,000 although there are no funds available to pay for the personnel increase. End Note.) The forces making up the brigade are existing soldiers drawn from other units, some with knowledge of the local language. The military is not clear on how it intends to pay for upgrades to the barracks at Playa Grande to eventually accommodate the increased number of soldiers or if additional communications equipment and support vehicles would be transferred to Playa Grande. (Note: During an October 2009 visit to Playa Grande, the base commander explained that their limited resources, including only three trucks, prevented them from adequately patrolling the area. End Note.) (Ref B). Poptun - USG Assistance at Work ¶7. (C) During LTG Keen's visit to Poptun in the northern Peten department, he was treated to an extensive demonstration by the Guatemalan Army's Special Forces (GEIR) and members of the National Civilian Police's Special Police Force (FEP) which make up the joint military/police GEIR/FEP unit. This unit receives actionable intelligence from USG agencies. Given the short reaction time required to intercept planes with drug shipments headed to Guatemala, the GEIR/FEP relies on helicopter support from the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in Guatemala or the Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo) based in Honduras. The GEIR/FEP has had some successful missions capturing aircraft, vehicles, and weapons (Ref C). According to U.S. Special Forces training officers, the GEIR/FEP could be even more effective if it had committed air support, ground transportation, consistent fuel supplies, standardized equipment and increased actionable intelligence. ¶8. (C) Comment: USG assistance to the Guatemalan military has had mixed results. The GEIR/FEP unit has successfully interdicted illicit aircraft and has demonstrated the ability of the Guatemalan Army and police officers to work well together. However, the results of the FEN have been disappointing. Maritime interdiction is critical if Guatemala is to decrease the flow of illicit narcotics through the country. Additional support and better leadership are needed to make the FEN program more comprehensive and address the complexity of the task by including radio and air support. Moreover, additional attention should be paid by both Guatemalan and U.S. authorities to the multifaceted situation in Playa Grande. A lack of state presence has left the area open to narco-infiltration. It is also not clear if the new 6th Brigade will be effective without the compounding effect of other state actors such as police, prosecutors, judges, customs and immigration, and tax authorities as well. End Comment. MCFARLAND