JAGDEO UNREPENTANT AFTER LATEST ANTI-US OUTBURST,

C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000157 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR GY SUBJECT: JAGDEO UNREPENTANT AFTER LATEST ANTI-US OUTBURST, BUT SEEKS COLLABORATION REF: A. GEORGETOWN 124 ¶B. GEORGETOWN 149 Classified By: Ambassador John M. Jones, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: A day after another set of searing public criticisms of the U.S. Government and its "condescending lectures" on fighting drug trafficking and other issues through its annual reports, an entirely unrepentant President Jagdeo asserted to the Ambassador on March 19 that the tone of these reports should change in the future if the U.S. expected countries to cooperate on such issues. He reiterated privately what he had expressed publicly and vociferously the day before: that he had been asking the U.S. "for years" for greater counternarcotics collaboration, including the opening of a DEA office in Guyana, but had been "met with silence." He nonetheless claimed an interest in developing a framework for law enforcement cooperation -- which would involve enhanced investigations and prosecutions of drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, money laundering, and extraditions to the U.S. He reiterated his intention to write to President Obama regarding the State Department's "unfair and biased" annual reporting on drugs, human rights, and trafficking in persons. "It's a different world now," Jagdeo declared to the Ambassador. "We're not going to be lectured anymore." End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) At the annual Police Officers Conference in Georgetown on March 18, President Jagdeo rnewed his scathing public attacks on the U.S. Goernment for what he perceives as its double-talkon fighting drug trafficking. Restating many of he charges he levied during a public presentation on February 27 (reftel A),Jagdeo asserted that hewas "tired of the lectures" contained in the Stae Department's annual reports on narcotics (the NCSR): "If the U.S. is serious about working wit us then this will change." As he has often done in the past, Jagdeo used the opportunity to counterunch on what he perceived to be the United State' own weaknesses, stating that in the fight agaist drugs and crime, "...they have the biggest falure of law enforcement and they are the largest source of money laundering." Jagdeo criticized publc recriminations on the issue, then proceeded toengage in that very act by noting: "We can tradetit for tat and the drug traffickers would be hapy. I am interested in serious collaboration wher there is real assistance, real commitment, and esources to match what we say." ¶3. (C) At the Abassador's request, Jagdeo met with Ambassador ad PolOff on March 19 to discuss these latest remrks, the government's last-minute cancellation ofparticipation in a regional drug enforcement confeence, and the President's views about how to mov forward. Ambassador began by asking "How can weput things back together again?" on the counternrcotics front. Jagdeo responded by saying it had o start with "changing the tone of these unfair, iased reports from the State Department," particularly the INCSR. He alleged: "These reports don't reflect the positive steps we have taken," referring specifically to the dismissal of nine Customs Anti-Narcotic Unit (CANU) Officers last year, including the Head, after they had failed polygraph tests. When PolOff noted that this CANU transition had indeed been described and even praised in this year's INCSR, the President responded that it had received only "one tiny mention" in the report. (Note: not true. It was cited in the summary and again in the narrative. End Note.) Jagdeo also highlighted the passage of several new laws last year that enabled wiretapping, plea bargaining, and other useful law enforcement tools. PolOff replied that this also had been mentioned and lauded in this year's INCSR, in two different sections. ¶4. (C) Jagdeo expressed particular exasperation at what he perceived as a complete lack of progress on establishing a permanent DEA office in Guyana. "This is not a recent thing; I've been asking for this for years!" he exclaimed. Referring to the March 2008 visit of WHA A/S Tom Shannon, Jagdeo averred: "There's a long history to this: we've written, we've asked, we even mentioned it when Mr. Shannon was here, and nothing has happened." Ambassador inquired what exactly the President sought regarding law enforcement collaboration; Jagdeo replied that he was interested in a "framework by which we can define our exact cooperation. How are we going to collaborate, in broad terms? That is what we must establish." Taking care to delineate the difference between broader policy issues and the operational details of actual investigations, Jagdeo claimed he was only interested in the former: he wanted to clarify the framework, and then let the actual enforcement work happen. In response to the Ambassador's inquiry about who would be the principal POCs for the GoG on such discussions, Jagdeo identified four: Cabinet and Defense Board Secretary Dr. Roger Luncheon; Minister of Home Affairs Clement Rohee; Guyana Defense Force Chief of Staff Gary Best; and Guyana Police Force Commissioner Henry Greene. He affirmed: "These are the people I trust on this issue." ¶5. (C) PolOff raised the question of the GoG's own counternarcotics commitment after a debacle the previous weekend regarding a U.S. invitation for CANU Director James Singh to attend the regional Drug Commanders Conference in St. Kitts the week of March 16-20, with all expenses covered. (Note: After belatedly accepting the invite on March 13, Minister Rohee rescinded permission for Mr. Singh to travel on March 14, with no explanation. End Note.) PolOff asked what message the President thought this action sent in the context of his pleas for assistance and collaboration. Jagdeo evaded that question, and in fact expressed frustration with Rohee for having granted the initial permission without the Cabinet's consent. (Note: official travel by all GoG employees -- at any level of the bureaucracy and even if a sponsor is covering all costs -- must be approved by the Cabinet in advance before permission to travel is granted. End Note.) ¶6. (C) Jagdeo circled back at several points during the 30-minute meeting to the annual reports that grate on him "and many other countries around the world, who feel the same way I do." Referring at various points to the Human Rights Report and the Trafficking in Persons Report, in addition to the INCSR, Jagdeo complained that they were "unbalanced" and did not include the government's point of view. PolOff noted that he was the principal author of each, and clarified that the government's perspective had very much been part of the information-gathering process, although numerous GoG agencies had failed to respond to multiple requests for even basic, non-controversial statistics. (Note: in response to the latter point, Jagdeo nearly apologized, asserting that he had ordered his ministers to comply with all such requests in order to help establish an accurate picture. Jagdeo then offered: "If that happens again in the future, drop me a line about it." End Note.) PolOff asked if the President understood that each of the cited reports were required by -- and written for -- the U.S. Congress, and by their very nature and structure would not necessarily reflect any particular government's perspective. Jagdeo contradicted himself impressively within the same response: "I understand that. I don't have any problem with you identifying deficiencies that exist." Moments later he avowed: "If you're going to say bad things about us, we have the right to say things about you. The only difference between what I have said publicly about you and what you have written about us is simply that I did not take the time to put my remarks in a report." ¶7. (C) Ambassador noted that post would relay the President's interest in a framework for cooperation to Washington, and would work to get something together. Jagdeo expressed hope that something could be arranged, and looked forward to future discussions after his return in early April from an 18-day trip to the Middle East (reftel B). ¶8. (C) Comment: In President Jagdeo's world, Guyana has met the full measure of external expectations regarding its commitment to fighting drug trafficking and other crimes, and demonstrated its competence and diligence as a partner in these areas. This could hardly be further from the truth. The individuals he identified to work with on this "framework" -- Luncheon, Rohee, Best, and Greene -- are the Four Horsemen of Inertia. All have been in their positions for at least 18 months, and none have shown a proclivity for meaningful actions that would truly address Guyana's numerous law enforcement shortcomings. Luncheon in particular, as the source of virtually all government power outside of the President, has repeatedly sought to disembowel the most critical reform components of the British-funded Security Sector Reform Program. End Comment. Jones