START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) SECOND MEETING OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
WORKING GROUP, OCTOBER 29, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0977 (SFO-GVA-VI-038)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-040.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 29, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The second meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) Working Group (MOUWG) during the sixth round of
negotiations and sixth MOUWG meeting overall was held at the
Russian Mission on October 29, 2009. General Orlov opened by
commenting on the U.S. START Follow-on (SFO) package provided
to the Russian Federation in Moscow. He said the United
States employed a good strategy by proposing the package at
the highest possible level. The Russian Delegation had not
yet received an official translation of the package but,
based on the morning briefing provided by the U.S.
Delegation, Russia would request clarification on a few
issues to include: the 800 strategic delivery vehicle limit;
counting rules associated with determining deployed and
non-deployed systems; and provisions regarding heavy bombers.
The Russian Delegation expressed disagreement with the U.S.
concept of "considered to contain" and pressed the U.S.
Ddelegation to explain how the concept could work in a treaty
designed to count deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA).


4. (S) The sides continued to review the U.S. MOU joint
draft text (JDT),making several editorial changes and
agreeing to delete duplicative information. The Russian
Delegation also explained that its proposed term "basing
area" would replace the term "re stricted area." General
Poznihir explained that "basing areas" would be located
within the boundaries of an ICBM base for road-mobile
launchers, but did not define the size of the road-mobile
base, the size of a "basing area" or what term Russia would
propose to replace "fixed structure." Russia clarified,
however, that the United States would receive new site
diagrams with updated terminology and coordinates, and with
"fixed structures" noted on the site diagram once the issue
was resolved.


5. (S) During a discussion on the Russian proposal to
combine space launch facilities with test ranges, Mr. Trout
delivered talking points stating that the United States
rejected the Russian proposal to merge the two facilities,
primarily on the basis that activities at space launch
facilities were dissimilar to activities at test ranges and
were not associated with SOA. Therefore, space launch
facilities should not be inspectable. Russia explained that
the proposal was intended to increase transparency by
allowing both facilities to be subject to inspection.


6. (U) Subject Summary: Let Us Take a Look at your Package;
A Review of the MOU JDT; What Exactly Do You Mean By
"Considered to Contain?"; TMOMs are Support Equipment So


Should Not Count; Politically Correct Terminology for
Road-Mobile; More Counting Missiles at the Production
Facility; Heavy Bombers; and, U.S. Rejected Merging Space
Launch Facilities with Test Ranges.

--------------
LET US TAKE A LOOK
AT YOUR PACKAGE
--------------


7. (S) Orlov opened the meeting by stating the United States
had employed a good strategy by proposing its SFO package at
the highest possible levels. The package would require
thorough study and, once the appropriate political decisions
were made, the sides would decide how to proceed. He said
strategy is strategy and this is a situation where the
Russians could learn from the United States. Orlov said that
the Russians had a few informal questions regarding the
package based on what was briefed by the U.S. Delegation
earlier that morning. Russia would need clarification on
what exactly would be included in the proposed 800 SDV limit.
He commented that the sides still needed to decide how to
distinguish between deployed and non-deployed and there would
be much discussion ahead on heavy bombers. Noting that such
issues related to counting rules, Orlov suggested that
discussing these topics did not fall outside the framework of
the MOUWG.


8. (S) Trout agreed that the morning discussion of the U.S.
proposal was interesting, as new concepts had been introduced
and Russia would need time for review. With the
understanding that the Russian Delegation would advise senior
leaders in Moscow, Trout clarified that the U.S. side was
prepared to clarify any questions, but that those issues
should be addressed in the Ad Hoc Group. Trout proposed a
review of the MOU JDT.

--------------
A REVIEW OF THE MOU JDT
--------------


9. (S) Orlov referenced a discussion about non-deployed
delivery vehicles during the morning Ad Hoc Group meeting
(REFTEL) and suggested the sides accept the category,
"Non-Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and Heavy Bombers," under Section
I Aggregate Numbers. Trout responded that, despite an
interesting discussion of new concepts introduced during the
morning meeting, the U.S. position had not changed. Orlov
asked to have all technical data moved to the third tier.
Trout said the United States would consider the proposal, but
the sides still needed to reach an understanding on the
function of the third tier.


10. (S) Orlov questioned the title of MOU Section II stating
that the U.S. concept "ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers"
was senseless. Orlov said that Dr. Warner had proposed
alternative thoughts during the morning meeting. Trout
repeated that concepts mentioned during the morning meeting
would be considered, but the U.S. position had not changed.
The Russian side then proposed to change titles and
categories of data so that the wording would be more clear in
Russian. For example, the Section II title would read
"ICBMs, Launchers of ICBMs, and Warheads Deployed


(razmeshony) on Them." (Begin comment: The Russian
interpreter used the word deployed, however, the word that
Orlov proposed was "razmeshony," meaning placed or arranged.
The Russian word for deployed is razvernuty. End comment.)
The Russians also repeated their disagreement with the
U.S.-proposed term "nuclear warhead" and proposed deleting
the term "nuclear."


11. (S) In the interest of simplifying Section II, Poznihir
suggested removing the categories "Test Launcher" and
"Training Launchers" and just listing such launchers under
the category "Non-Deployed Launchers of ICBMs." Trout
responded that mobile launchers should be a separate
category. Returning to a previous argument, Poznihir
questioned why the U.S. proposed a separate category of data
for mobile test launchers as a sub-category under test
launchers. In that case, he argued fixed test launchers
should also be a sub-category. Trout reminded Poznihir that,
under the U.S. proposal, non-deployed mobile training and
test launchers are limited which was why the category was
necessary. Poznihir responded that data for non-deployed
mobile test and training launchers was listed later in the
Annex on Reference Data, for example, under Test Ranges.
With that in mind, Poznihir argued that removing the
sub-categories from Section II should not affect limitations
so he did not see a need to duplicate information. (Begin
comment: The Russians refer to the MOU as the Annex on
Reference Data. End comment.) The sides agreed to delete
the Russian-proposed Section II category of data
"Non-Deployed ICBMs" in the aggregate information for a silo
ICBM base since the data is recorded at the maintenance
facility.

-------------- --------------
WHAT EXACTLY DO YOU MEAN
BY "CONSIDERED TO CONTAIN?"
--------------


12. (S) Poznihir again proposed adding the category
"non-deployed launchers of ICBMs" in Section I Aggregate
Numbers, noting that the United States would have such
launchers for its MX/Peacekeeper ICBM and asked whether the
United States agreed. Trout said it would depend on counting
rules. Under the U.S. counting rules, Trout explained, the
category would not be acceptable, however, if Russian
counting rules were adopted, then maybe it would. Referring
to silos being converted at Tatischevo Silo ICBM Base,
Poznihir asked how U.S. counting rules would apply to an ICBM
silo launcher undergoing conversion. He reasoned that if a
launcher is being converted it cannot launch an ICBM so why
should it count as "deployed." He said that such a
conversion could take over a year and it would make no sense
to count a launcher as deployed when it would be incapable of
launching a missile.


13. (S) Trout responded that, under the U.S. proposal, a
deployed launcher of an ICBM remains deployed even if it is
empty. A silo being converted would count as having the old
type of missile deployed in it until it was loaded with a
missile of the new type. For example, a silo being converted
at Tatischevo would count as deployed with an SS-19 ICBM
until an SS-27 ICBM or TMOM was emplaced in the launcher,
just as under START. However, warheads would not be counted.


Seemingly baffled by the explanation, Poznihir argued that
those were rules under the old treaty and that we were now
negotiating a new treaty. The new treaty would deal with
counting operationally deployed ICBMs and warheads.


14. (S) Orlov said he was still trying to digest how the
United States planned to count deployed and non-deployed
ICBMs and launchers. Orlov asked whether conversion was
unlimited in time, and whether those launchers would still be
considered to be deployed during that time. Trout answered
that they would because, under the U.S. concept, a launcher
is considered to be deployed from birth to elimination.
Orlov stated that, according to this logic, neither side will
have non-deployed items, so why even discuss distinguishing
between them. He moved on to SSBNs saying that, under the
U.S. concept, an SSBN and its launchers will be considered to
be deployed from the moment of production until they are
destroyed, and the same goes for ICBM silos, or at least
until they are filled with gravel. Referring to heavy
bombers, Poznihir added that they would all be counted as
deployed under the U.S. concept.


15. (S) Looking for clarification, Novikov explained his
understanding of "considered to contain"; an empty silo is
considered to contain a deployed SDV, but warheads do not
count. Trout confirmed this statement. Novikov reasoned
that if an SDV is considered to be deployed, then the
warheads should also count. He asked why the United States
would count a delivery vehicle as deployed even if it is not
in its silo, and yet not count the warheads--then propose to
count warheads on heavy bombers even if they are not deployed
on them.


16. (S) Trout responded that Mr. Elliott had raised this
issue in the morning meeting and explained the U.S. position.
Orlov responded he did not understand the U.S. position.
Posing a rhetorical question, Orlov asked how one would
explain to an officer of long-range aviation that a
nuclear-armed heavy bomber counts as having zero warheads.
Orlov said it would have been a better idea to attribute a
bomber with 100 warheads for example. Under this concept,
the heavy bombers and their bases would still be subject to
verification measures. Orlov claimed Elliott had said during
the morning meeting that all the LRNA would be moved from the
base to central storage and then moved back. He said Russia
would need clarification. Trout responded that some LRNA
would be moved to central storage, but others would remain at
the air base.


17. (S) Pischulov asked how the U.S. concept of "considered
to contain" would be applied to SSBNs at production
facilities. Specifically, will an SSBN be "considered to
contain" even if it is not operational at sea. Trout
explained that under U.S. counting rules, the SSBN launchers
would count once the SSBN is launched. Just like under
START, he continued, the SSBN is accountable from birth until
elimination. Pischulov argued that the SSBN is not
strategically operational at sea. (Begin comment: A Russian
SSBN at the production facility is still under control of the
design bureau and not under control of the Navy. End
comment.) Pischulov proposed that the SSBN fall under
accountability only once it arrived at the operational base.
He argued that if an SSBN at the production facility is




accountable, then the sides should list the hull. Pischulov
continued that an SSBN could return to the production
facility after sea trials or later in its operational life.
Since the U.S. proposed adding the category SSBN hull at
submarine bases for SLBMs, and since there would be
notification requirements regarding the SSBN location, then
it would be reasonable to add the category "SSBN Hull" to
production facility as well. Trout said the United States
would take the point under consideration.


18. (S) Not wanting to let go of the counting rules debate,
Orlov asked another rhetorical question. If the United
States were to build a new SSBN, hold a ceremony as it is
launched, then, at that moment, the SSBN and its launchers
would both count as deployed. Trout replied that Orlov was
correct. Orlov asked about the warheads. Trout explained
the warheads would not count until the SSBN arrived at base
and SLBMs were loaded in the launch tubes. Orlov countered
asking why should the launchers count at the production
facility. Trout repeated the concept of "considered to
contain" and that an SSBN and its launchers count once the
SSBN is launched. He reminded Orlov that the point was
raised in the morning meeting and the United States would
take a closer look at the concept. Orlov once again
described the U.S. concept and said the Russian word to
describe it was "nesurazny," (meaning, ridiculous) because an
SSBN without SLBMs loaded inside it could not contain
deployed SLBMs no matter what term was used.

--------------
TMOMS ARE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
SO SHOULD NOT COUNT
--------------


19. (S) Moving away from the discussion on counting rules,
Poznihir said that Russia did not intend to designate
training models of missiles (TMOM) as a category of data. He
explained that TMOMs are connected with support equipment
which Russia proposed not to include in SFO. Poznihir
claimed that TMOMs are functionally different from
operational ICBMs and SLBMs and inspectors could verify those
differences during inspection. Trout asked where the sides
would list the distinguishing features. Poznihir said it
would be obvious because there is a hole drilled in them.
Trout responded that there are different types of TMOMs which
have various distinguishing features and asked where those
distinguishing features would be identified. Poznihir said
there would not be requirements covering TMOMs in the new
arrangement.


20. (S) Trout asked how an inspection team would know how
many TMOMs were at a base. Poznihir responded that the base
would inform the inspection team at the time of inspection.


21. (S) Moving on, Poznihir proposed deleting the category
"Mobile Training Launchers," since Russia did not have them
and did not plan on having them. He explained that Russia
used non-deployed launchers for training at training
facilities. Trout said the United States would consider
deleting the category, but reminded the Russian side that
training launchers carry TMOMs and that Russia proposed to
delete TMOMs as a category. (Begin comment: Though it was
not translated into English, Novikov explained to Poznihir


that this was the U.S. argument because the TMOM on a
launcher could not be distinguished from a deployed launcher.
End comment.) Poznihir said that if the United States
wanted, it could restrict TMOMs at training facilities.
Trout responded that the United States was not trying to
limit TMOMs, but needed to understand numbers and locations.

--------------
POLITICALLY CORRECT
TERMINOLOGY FOR ROAD-MOBILE
--------------


22. (S) Trout requested clarification as to how Russia
proposed to list information under "Road-Mobile ICBM Bases"
in Section II. Trout asked how the term "basing area" would
be incorporated into the treaty referring to the Russian
proposal to delete the terms "re stricted area" and
"deployment area." Orlov confirmed that Russia intended to
delete the terms "re stricted area" and "deployment area."


23. (S) Drawing a diagram, Orlovained that the term "re
stricted area" would be replaced by the term "basing area"
and that launchers would be located in garages within the
"basing area." Orlov drew a big circle that he explained was
the road-mobile ICBM base. He drew rectangles which he
referred to as "basing areas" and one maintenance facility.
Inside the "basing area" he drew smaller rectangles which
represented fixed structures. Trout requested clarification
as to what the fixed structures would be called. Pischulov
claimed that the site diagram would reflect the same
information but contain different terms. DeNinno used the
current reentry vehicle inspection designation process as an
example and asked whether the teams would designate using the
term "fixed structure." Pischulov responded that teams would
designate a "basing area." Poznihir responded that Russia
would think about how "fixed structures" would be handled.


24. (S) Trout asked about size limits and coordinates in
relation to the road-mobile base and the "basing area."
Poznihir, Orlov, and Pischulov each replied with different
statements after a series of conversations and diagrams.
Trout pressed for a better understanding of the size of the
base and "basing areas" and the type of coordinates listed in
the MOU. Poznihir said the base would not have a size limit.

--------------
MORE COUNTING MISSILES AT
THE PRODUCTION FACILITY
--------------


25. (S) Raising an issue concerning items at production
facilities, Trout noted he understood the Russian proposal to
use the term "non-deployed ICBM (returned)" but the U.S.
position would be to use "non-deployed ICBM." Trout reasoned
that the basis for this was the U.S. proposal for a 60-hour
advance notification of mobile ICBMs leaving the Votkinsk
Production Facility. Poznihir argued that ICBM exits cannot
be a part of the Reference Annex because, if the missile had
not left the facility it would not yet exist. Poznihir
proposed to add either the word "returned" or "leaving."
Trout said the United States would think about it, but
informed Poznihir that when the United States sends
notifications of TRIDENTs leaving it says the "SLBM exits."



--------------
HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


26. (S) The sides agreed to delete the category "Heavy
Bombers Converted for Use as Ground Trainers," but did not
agree on categories for heavy bombers. Trout clarified that
the United States had no intention of basing different
categories of bombers at the same base--heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments would be based separately from
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Referring
to the additional technical data in Annex C, LT Lobner
prodded the Russians to explain their rationale behind
including so much technical data and, specifically, how such
data would support their verification of items subject to the
limits of the treaty. The Russian Delegation acknowledged
that they could present some further details on this subject
at a later time.


27. (S) Trout explained that if the Russian side were to
accept the U.S. SFO package delivered in Moscow, the United
States would accept the Russian proposal for airbases for
non-nuclear armaments. Under the package, U.S. bombers would
be based at such bases and Russia would have the right to
inspect those bombers once a year. In response toconfusion
over how the package was connected to heavy bomber categories
and air bases, Trout explained that, under the current U.S.
proposal, a heavy bomber converted to a non-nuclear
configuration would no longer be subject to treaty
limitations and, as such, there would be no reason to list an
air base for heavy bombers i a non-nuclear configuration.
Novikov said that ussia understood that a non-nuclear heavy
bomberwould not be part of the U.S. central limits jus like
non-deployed systems but, under the Russian proposal, these
bombers would still be a category of data, as well as the
bases where the non-nuclear heavy bombers are based.


28. (S) Trout explained that currently the United States
would consider heavy bombers converted to a non-nuclear
status as eliminated from the treaty. Orlov said that Russia
would require verification rights to confirm that converted
bombers could not be used for their original purpose.

--------------
U.S. REJECTED MERGING
SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES
WITH TEST RANGES
--------------


29. (S) Poznihir asked whether the United States was ready
to accept the Russian proposal to merge space launch
facilities with test ranges in order to increase transparency
by making space launch facilities subject to inspection.
Trout presented the following U.S. points explaining why the
United States would not agree with the proposal:

-- During the third meeting of the MOUWG on September
29, the Russian Delegation introduced a proposal to merge
space launch facilities and test ranges. The United States
carefully studied the proposal weighing its merits and
considering the implications.


-- The United States opposes the idea to merge these two
categories of facilities, because they serve two distinctly
different purposes.

-- Space launch facilities and test ranges have
fundamentally different purposes. Space launch facilities
declared under START utilize treaty-accountable missiles that
are configured to deliver payloads into the upper atmosphere
or outer space and not to test reentry vehicles or other
capabilities related to the further development or readiness
of SOA, as occurs at test ranges.

-- This fundamental difference explains why the United
States has retained the Article V prohibition on
flight-testing ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles
from space launch facilities.

-- We have also retained a requirement for test
launchers to be located only at test ranges.

-- We want to retain these provisions and avoid any
blurring of distinction between a space launch facility and a
test range.

-- Since test ranges support the actual testing and
deployment of SOA, they should be subject to the inspection
regime for START Follow-on, whereas space launch facilities
should not be subject to inspection as they represent
endeavors unrelated to the objectives of the treaty.

-- Inspectability of test ranges is an important
monitoring tool because the SOA located there are used for
the development and testing of strategic forces that could
become subject to the limitations of the treaty.

-- Conversely, any SOA at space launch facilities must
be used for purposes unrelated to the development of SOA. It
is important that the activities at space launch facilities
not be disrupted by inspection activity.

-- Both types of facilities should be declared in the
MOU. Additionally, the SOA located and launched from both
types of facilities should be subject to notification.

-- Based on the functional differences and clear
distinction in observable application of missile launchers
conducted at these facilities, the United States believes it
is necessary to retain separate definitions and provisions
for each type of facility in the new treaty.


30. (S) The Russian side did not pose any questions
following the U.S. response.


31. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S. Delegation paper containing Talking Points -
START Follow-on Treaty MOU, dated October 29, 2009.

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text for Annexes A-D, dated
October 27, 2009.



-- U.S.-proposed text for Annex J to the MOU, dated
October 22, 2009.


32. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Trout
LtCol Blevins
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Coussa
Mr. Colby
Mr. DeNinno
LT Lobner
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Tarrasch
Ms. Cherry (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov
Mr. Pischul
Gen Poznihir
Mr. Shevchenko
Ms. Zharkih
Mr. Gayduk (Int)


33. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS