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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 28,
2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-035.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 28, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:50 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The fourth meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working
Group (IPWG) was held at the Russian Mission on October 28,

2009. The U.S. and Russian sides continued their detailed
analysis of Section V of the Inspection Protocol (General
Rules of the Conduct of Inspection Activities and Continuous
Monitoring Activities). Topics discussed included the use of
cameras to take photographs during inspections, the size and
composition of inspection teams, inspection time limits, the
time required to transport inspectors to an inspection site,
and sequential inspections. The U.S. Delegation proposed a
common inspection team size of 10 individuals for all types
of inspection activities. The Russian side continued to link
their positions on team size and sequential inspections with
their proposed small annual quotas for different types of
inspection activities.


4. (S) The Russian side emphasized that it was trying to
ease the burden on inspectors and base personnel by allowing
additional time to transport a team to the inspection site
and a longer period to carry out inspections of non-deployed
SOAs. Finally, the sides briefly discussed the
Russian-proposed text of Article XI of the treaty that
discusses inspection activities.


5. (U) Subject Summary: Back to Section V of the IP;
Inspection Team Size and Composition; Pre-Inspection Movement
Restrictions; Inspection Time Limits; Sequential Inspections;
Transport Time to the Site; Article XI of the Treaty; and,
Wrap-Up.

--------------
BACK TO SECTION V OF THE IP
--------------


6. (S) Colonel Ilin opened the meeting and proposed that the
sides continue their review of Section V (General Rules of
the Conduct of Inspection Activities and Continuous
Monitoring Activities) of the Inspection Protocol (IP). Dr.
Warner suggested a discussion of the inspection activity
table provided by the Russian side at the previous IPWG
meeting, adding that the sides appear to be moving closer on
naming and categorizing the various types of inspection
activities and that the U.S. side intends to discuss the
matter at the afternoon one-on-one meeting between him and
lin at the U.S. Mission.


7. (S) Ilin resumed the previous IPWG discussion of
paragraph ((21))1((7))2 on clarifications that are provided
when ambiguities arise during inspections, including the
issue of taking photographs of such ambiguities. (Begin


comment: The paragraphs are numbered using the convention in
the most recent version of the U.S. Joint Draft Text (JDT).
End comment.) Ilin stated that the Russian side had agreed
on this paragraph ad-referendum, but he wanted to return to
the procedures for taking photographs. The sides clarified
that: (1) the photographic equipment (instant development or
a digital camera capable of instant print out of photographs)
would be supplied by the inspecting Party; (2) the
photographs would be taken by the inspected Party; and (3)
both Parties would retain one hard copy of each photograph.
After much discussion about whether this language should be
located in the IP ("tier two") or one of the annexes (Annex
3, General Procedures),or in "tier three", it was agreed
that the paragraph would appear in tier two and consist of
the first four sentences, without the word "promptly" in the
second sentence. The remainder of the paragraph could be
deleted, since it existed already in the Section of the IP
dealing with inspection reports.

--------------
INSPECTION TEAM SIZE
AND COMPOSITION
--------------


8. (S) Moving to paragraph 22 on inspection team size,
Warner noted that the general phrase "inspection activities"
could replace the first four lines of text. In addition, he
highlighted the change in the U.S. position on the size of
inspection teams--rather than providing for a team size of up
to 20 inspectors for conversion or elimination inspections,
the United States could agree to a common team size of 10
inspectors for all types of inspection activities. Ilin
replied that this was still not the Russian position, and
suggested that the United States had arrived at a common
number of 10 inspectors by calculating an average team size
over all types of inspections. Warner denied this, stating
that the United States had determined that a team size of 10
inspectors was sufficient to carry out any type of inspection
being considered. Moreover, 10 represented a maximum team
size; it was not a requirement to use 10 inspectors on any
type of inspection activity. Ilin stated that the issue of
team size was related to both the total number of inspectors
on the inspection list and to the annual inspection quota.
He then read a proposed revision to the first part of
paragraph 22: "For all types of inspection activities, the
number of inspectors shall not exceed 10 individuals." The
Russian side would bracket the sentence and return to the
issue after the sides had discussed inspection quotas.


9. (S) Warner agreed that the inspection team size was
related to the total number of inspectors, but disagreed with
linking team size to the number of inspections conducted.
The team size is ultimately determined by the number of
inspectors necessary to perform all the required tasks during
an inspection activity. He stated that the sentence proposed
by Ilin could be placed in paragraph 3 of Article XI of the
treaty text as a "hook" to the more detailed language in the
IP and the Annexes, provided that the Russian side agreed to
use a common number for inspection team size across all types
of inspections. However, if the size of teams differed for
the various types of inspection activities, Warner opined
that the sentence should be placed in the tier two IP. Ilin
stated that the team size sentence belonged in the treaty as


bracketed language.


10. (S) After skipping over subparagraphs (a) through (c) of
paragraph 22, which are related to continuous monitoring,
Warner addressed paragraph 23 on inspection team composition.
He noted that the opening of the paragraph should be
relegated to tier three, but the last sentence, which
provides the right to establish subgroups of inspectors, was
a critical part of the inspection process and should remain
in the IP. Ilin agreed with this approach, but noted that
the bracketed language on monitors had not been removed from
the paragraph, despite the U.S. presentation on mobile ICBMs
in the Plenary Meeting on October 27, 2009. (Begin comment:
The United States presented a revised approach to mobile ICBM
verification at the October 27 Plenary that offered a package
of verification measures as an alternative to continuous
monitoring of mobile ICBM final assembly facilities. End
comment.) Warner replied that the United States had not
dropped continuous monitoring as part of its position; it had
just offered an alternative approach for continuous
monitoring of mobile ICBM production.


11. (S) Turning to paragraph ((23))1((8))2 on pre-inspection
procedures, the sides agreed to use the Russian language
(with the exception of references to continuous monitoring).

--------------
PRE-INSPECTION
MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS
--------------


12. (S) Warner noted that paragraph 24 addressed the
completion of pre-inspection movement restrictions (PIMRs).
Ilin questioned the second sentence, which provides for when
objects, containers, or vehicles can leave a structure within
the inspection site. He asked Warner to explain the U.S.
view regarding the types of structures to which this
provision applied. Warner replied that it could refer to a
building where a mobile ICBM is kept. Ilin replied that this
provision may have been in START, but it was not in the
Russian proposal for START Follow-on (SFO). The Russian side
could accept the first and third sentences of the paragraph,
but not the sentence under discussion. He offered two
options: (1) bracket the sentence, or (2) clarify what kind
of structures the sentence covered. He proposed a
replacement for the sentence, "During inspections of
structures located at ICBM bases and capable of containing
non-deployed ballistic missiles, as well as at heavy bomber
bases not equipped for nuclear armaments ... (as in the rest
of the text)." Warner rejected his version, stating that too
many things were left out. For example, SLBM bases also have
non-deployed missiles in structures, and the United States
was not prepared to drop potential references to mobile ICBM
fixed structures. He asked why the Russian side singled out
non-nuclear heavy bombers for special treatment, instead of
including all heavy bombers. Ilin replied that Russian
inspectors wanted to check that there were no nuclear weapons
at bases for non-nuclear heavy bombers. Warner ended the
discussion of this paragraph by noting that both sides had
serious differences, and the brackets should remain.

--------------
INSPECTION TIME LIMITS


--------------


13. (S) After a break in the meeting, Warner moved on to
paragraph ((25))1((9))2 on inspection time limits and noted
that the U.S. side had prepared a condensed version. He
passed the revised language to the Russian side and
explained the time limits for inspections as follows: For
nuclear warhead inspections (NWIs) of ICBMs or SLBMs, the
time limit would be the period of time necessary to achieve
the objective of the inspection; for NWIs for heavy bombers,
the time period should be limited to 24 hours; for
inspections of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs,
mobile launchers of ICBMs, and non-deployed heavy bombers,
the time limit would be 24 hours in the U.S. position, and 36
hours in the Russian position; and for exhibitions, the time
limit would be the period of time necessary to achieve the
objective of the exhibition. He noted that the Russian side
agreed on the time limit for NWIs of ICBMs and SLBMs, but did
not provide a time limit for NWI of a heavy bomber.


14. (S) Ilin stated that the U.S. and the Russian sides
agreed on the time limit for NWIs of ICBMs and SLBMs, but
then turned to a description of the Russian view on types of
inspections. The Russians envisioned inspections of deployed
SOAs and nuclear warheads as one type of inspection, with a
time limit of 24 hours plus a possible 8-hour extension. For
non-deployed SOAs, the Russian side supported a time limit of
36 hours. He turned to Colonel Ryzhkov to provide additional
background on the Russian position. Ryzhkov explained that
the Russians wanted a 36-hour limit on inspections of
non-deployed SOAs based on their experience with START. He
noted that there are some very complicated and large
inspection sites for which a data update inspection (DUI)
usually took the full 24 hours without any break for
inspectors, their escorts, or the facility personnel, e.g., a
DUI at the test range at Plesetsk. The Russian goal was to
make life easier for inspectors and base personnel, noting
that this was not a "wartime" situation.


15. (S) Warner agreed that it was worthwhile taking the
burden on personnel into account, which was one of the
reasons the U.S. side believed that the time limit for NWIs
of ICBMs and SLBMs should be "as needed." However, NWIs of
heavy bombers were not as much of a challenge as NWIs of
ICBMs or SLBMs, since there was no need to move or open
missiles. He shared the Russian side's concern for
inspections at complex facilities. However, he added that
this applied to just some facilities; inspections at most
other facilities can be completed in less than 24 hours.
Warner stated that the United States would consider the
Russian proposal for longer duration inspections of sites
holding non-deployed SOAs. Finally, after several additional
exchanges, Warner said the sides would return to the issue of
time limits once agreement was reached on the types of
inspection activities.


16. (S) Warner then turned to paragraph ((26))1((11))2 on
post-inspection procedures, and noted that the United States
would accept the Russian language.

--------------
SEQUENTIAL INSPECTIONS
--------------




17. (S) Warner stated that paragraph 27 in the U.S.-proposed
JDT defined the term "sequential inspection." However, the
issue was bracketed, since the Russian side does not accept
the use of sequential inspections in SFO. Warner again noted
that he believed that the low annual quota for inspections
proposed by the Russian side was tied to their rejection of
sequential inspections; however, once the sides agreed on
what were likely to be substantially higher quotas for
inspection types, he was confident the Russians would
recognize the utility of sequential inspections. Ilin asked
Warner how high the annual quota would have to be in order
for sequential inspections to make sense. Warner replied
"28." (Begin comment: The U.S. position calls for an
aggregate quota of 28 NWI, data update, and formerly declared
facility inspections. End comment.) Ilin immediately asked
whether 27 inspections per year would be enough for
sequential inspections; Warner replied that he believed that
total inspection quotas of "some number in the 20s" would be
sufficient to make sequential inspections attractive.


18. (S) The discussion on sequential inspections continued,
with Warner noting that sequential inspections are a more
efficient way to use an inspection team. Ilin agreed, but
added that there was another way to be efficient in addition
to sequential inspections--the more rational Russian approach
of establishing a smaller annual inspection quota, which
would force the Parties to be very judicious about which
places to inspect. Ilin asked whether the United States
wanted to bracket paragraphs 27 and the first two versions of
paragraph 28, which also applied to sequential inspections.
Warner replied that a new paragraph 28 had been inserted.
This new paragraph represented the effort of Warner's staff
to pull together all sequential inspection provisions from
START into one convenient and easily readable location. The
new paragraph 28 should be placed into tier 3, and would be
very useful if sequential inspections are ultimately agreed
to in the treaty.

--------------
TRANSPORT TIME TO THE SITE
--------------


19. (S) The Russian side agreed that the new paragraph 28
represented a marked improvement in readability and clarity
and complimented the U.S. side on its development. Ilin
noted the 18-hour time period for transporting an inspection
team to the site, and asked whether the U.S. side had agreed
to the Russian position on this matter from paragraph
((9))1((6))2 of Section V of the JDT. Warner replied that
the United States had not accepted the Russian position of 18
hours for transporting the inspection team from the point of
entry (POE) to the inspection site; rather, the 18-hour
period in paragraph 28 referred to site-to-site movement
associated with sequential inspections. The U.S. side
continues to believe the 9-hour period cited in paragraph
((9))1((6))2 was sufficient to transport a team from the POE
to the initial inspection site. The U.S. side had determined
that 18 hours was necessary to transport a team from site to
site for a sequential inspection that goes directly from one
site to another, particularly when crew rest considerations
were taken into account.



20. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Party transporting a team to
an inspection site has the incentive to accomplish it as fast
as possible, since the site is effectively "closed" one hour
after it has been designated for inspection, which hampers
the operation of the site. The Russian proposal for 18 hours
was made with the huge geographic scope of Russian territory
in mind; the Russian side wanted to avoid rushing to get a
team to the site in a manner that might endanger its safety
and security. He asserted that the Russian side had made
this proposal without any intention to cheat, and added that
the Russian position on notifying a site that an inspection
team would be arriving at the POE was similar in that it
allowed the inspected site to arrange for hotels and meals
for the team prior to its arrival. (Begin comment: The
Russian position on inspection arrival notification provides
for 72-hour advance notification, vice the U.S. proposal for
24 hours. End comment.) "Why squeeze ourselves?" he asked,
adding that Russia had no other motives or reasons in mind.
Warner agreed to take the Russian position under
consideration.


21. (S) Turning next to the departure of the inspection team
from the POE, Warner stated that the United States could
agree to use the Russian formulation. Ilin added that the
Russian side would like to add the phrase "unless otherwise
agreed" at the end of the sentence to cover those situations
in which the inspection team was unable to depart the POE
within 24 hours. Ryzhkov cited an instance at the Ulan Ude
POE in which the inspection aircraft had technical
difficulties and could not leave within the 24-hour period
provided for in START; the addition of the phrase "unless
otherwise agreed" would provide additional flexibility.
Warner agreed to accept the addition of the phrase, after
which Ryzhkov added that, in fact, it was the Russian side
that was delayed from departing the POE more often than the
U.S. side.


22. (S) Closing out the detailed work on Section V of the
IP, Warner noted that both versions of paragraph 29 were
related to continuous monitoring and would be placed in the
tier three Annex on Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring,
awaiting the decision on continuous monitoring overall, and
paragraph 31 had been deleted, as it was incorporated in
paragraph 27 on sequential inspections.

--------------
ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY
--------------


23. (S) Ilin stated that, before Amb Antonov had left for
Moscow, he had asked that the IPWG focus on Article XI of the
treaty, which addresses inspection activities. At this time,
only the first paragraph represented common text and he
suggested the IPWG needed to help develop a joint draft text
for the rest of the article. Warner immediately replied that
it would not be very useful to attempt that in the IPWG since
so much had changed. Ilin proposed that instead of trying to
work on creating a JDT from the proposal of the two sides,
the IPWG could just rewrite Article XI from scratch.


24. (S) Warner walked through the Russian text of Article
XI, agreeing that the first paragraph was the only one where
both sides had similar formulations. Paragraph two of the


Russian text referenced their Annex (the IP in the U.S.
treaty structure),while paragraph 3 contained a provision
which pointed toward the Russian equivalent of the IP as the
place to find the sizes of the inspection teams for various
types of inspection activities. Warner reiterated that the
third paragraph could remain in Article XI if the sides were
able to agree on a common number of inspectors for all types
of inspection activities, or it could remain as a "hook" to
the IP if the numbers would vary depending on the type of
inspection activity. The United States agreQ with the
content of paragraph 4, which referenced inspectors'
privileges and immunities, but believed it belongs in the IP
(tier two). Warner noted that paragraph 5, which limits the
number of inspections, visits, and exhibitions that can take
place at one time, would remain bracketed for the time being;
he further noted that resolution of this issue ultimately
depended on agreement on annual inspection quotas for the
major types of inspections. Paragraph 6 on non-disclosure of
information was similar to paragraph 4, Warner stated, in
that the sides agreed on the content of the paragraph but not
where it should be located in the treaty.


25. (S) Ms. Kotkova stated that the sides had previously
discussed this issue, and that the information in paragraphs
4 and 6 is located in two places, Article XI and the IP. She
proposed that paragraph 6 on non-disclosure be removed from
Article XI but retained in the IP. Warner stated that the
IPWG would need to coordinate its work on Article XI with the
Treaty Text and DefinQons Working Group, and asked Kotkova
whether paragraph 4 on privileges and immunities could also
be removed from Article XI. She did not agree to do so,
stating that the Russian side would need to discuss the
matter further.


26. (S) Warner continued reviewing Article XI, noting that
the more substantive closing portion of the article is a
description of the major categories of inspection activities
and these matters would be discussed during that afternoon's
one-on-one meeting between Ilin and him. Ilin asked whether
Article XI should just list the types of inspection
activities, or should it include the goals and objectives of
each type of inspection? Warner replied that, at a minimum,
the purpose of each type of inspection activity would need to
be included in Article XI.

--------------
WRAP-UP
--------------


27. (S) Warner noted that it was too close to the end of the
meeting to begin detailed work on Section VI of the IP, which
addresses nuclear warhead inspections (NWIs) on deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs, but added that the United States believes
that the differences between NWIs of ICBMs and SLBMs versus
NWIs of heavy bombers are sufficient to warrant separate
sections in the IP. The biggest difference was the number of
missiles to be inspected in order to confirm the number of
reentry vehicles/warheads mounted on them. The Russian side
included a footnote pointing out this difference in the table
they had given to the U.S. side that compares the sides'
positions on types of inspection activities. Warner
concluded the meeting by stating that the United States would
provide the Russian side with an edited version of the


Russian chart.


28. (U) DocumentsQxchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text for Inspection Protocol
Section V, paragraph ((25))1((9))2.


29. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dwyer
Maj Johnson
Mr. Rust
Mr. Smith
Dr. Tarrasch
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Ivanov
Col Izrazov
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Ms. Melikbekian
Mr. Novikov
Mr. Pischulov
Mr. Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Ms. Zharkih
Mr. Gayduk (Int)


30. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS