START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000987 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 28, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-035. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 28, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:50 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The fourth meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) was held at the Russian Mission on October 28, ¶2009. The U.S. and Russian sides continued their detailed analysis of Section V of the Inspection Protocol (General Rules of the Conduct of Inspection Activities and Continuous Monitoring Activities). Topics discussed included the use of cameras to take photographs during inspections, the size and composition of inspection teams, inspection time limits, the time required to transport inspectors to an inspection site, and sequential inspections. The U.S. Delegation proposed a common inspection team size of 10 individuals for all types of inspection activities. The Russian side continued to link their positions on team size and sequential inspections with their proposed small annual quotas for different types of inspection activities. ¶4. (S) The Russian side emphasized that it was trying to ease the burden on inspectors and base personnel by allowing additional time to transport a team to the inspection site and a longer period to carry out inspections of non-deployed SOAs. Finally, the sides briefly discussed the Russian-proposed text of Article XI of the treaty that discusses inspection activities. ¶5. (U) Subject Summary: Back to Section V of the IP; Inspection Team Size and Composition; Pre-Inspection Movement Restrictions; Inspection Time Limits; Sequential Inspections; Transport Time to the Site; Article XI of the Treaty; and, Wrap-Up. -------------- BACK TO SECTION V OF THE IP -------------- ¶6. (S) Colonel Ilin opened the meeting and proposed that the sides continue their review of Section V (General Rules of the Conduct of Inspection Activities and Continuous Monitoring Activities) of the Inspection Protocol (IP). Dr. Warner suggested a discussion of the inspection activity table provided by the Russian side at the previous IPWG meeting, adding that the sides appear to be moving closer on naming and categorizing the various types of inspection activities and that the U.S. side intends to discuss the matter at the afternoon one-on-one meeting between him and lin at the U.S. Mission. ¶7. (S) Ilin resumed the previous IPWG discussion of paragraph ((21))1((7))2 on clarifications that are provided when ambiguities arise during inspections, including the issue of taking photographs of such ambiguities. (Begin comment: The paragraphs are numbered using the convention in the most recent version of the U.S. Joint Draft Text (JDT). End comment.) Ilin stated that the Russian side had agreed on this paragraph ad-referendum, but he wanted to return to the procedures for taking photographs. The sides clarified that: (1) the photographic equipment (instant development or a digital camera capable of instant print out of photographs) would be supplied by the inspecting Party; (2) the photographs would be taken by the inspected Party; and (3) both Parties would retain one hard copy of each photograph. After much discussion about whether this language should be located in the IP ("tier two") or one of the annexes (Annex 3, General Procedures),or in "tier three", it was agreed that the paragraph would appear in tier two and consist of the first four sentences, without the word "promptly" in the second sentence. The remainder of the paragraph could be deleted, since it existed already in the Section of the IP dealing with inspection reports. -------------- INSPECTION TEAM SIZE AND COMPOSITION -------------- ¶8. (S) Moving to paragraph 22 on inspection team size, Warner noted that the general phrase "inspection activities" could replace the first four lines of text. In addition, he highlighted the change in the U.S. position on the size of inspection teams--rather than providing for a team size of up to 20 inspectors for conversion or elimination inspections, the United States could agree to a common team size of 10 inspectors for all types of inspection activities. Ilin replied that this was still not the Russian position, and suggested that the United States had arrived at a common number of 10 inspectors by calculating an average team size over all types of inspections. Warner denied this, stating that the United States had determined that a team size of 10 inspectors was sufficient to carry out any type of inspection being considered. Moreover, 10 represented a maximum team size; it was not a requirement to use 10 inspectors on any type of inspection activity. Ilin stated that the issue of team size was related to both the total number of inspectors on the inspection list and to the annual inspection quota. He then read a proposed revision to the first part of paragraph 22: "For all types of inspection activities, the number of inspectors shall not exceed 10 individuals." The Russian side would bracket the sentence and return to the issue after the sides had discussed inspection quotas. ¶9. (S) Warner agreed that the inspection team size was related to the total number of inspectors, but disagreed with linking team size to the number of inspections conducted. The team size is ultimately determined by the number of inspectors necessary to perform all the required tasks during an inspection activity. He stated that the sentence proposed by Ilin could be placed in paragraph 3 of Article XI of the treaty text as a "hook" to the more detailed language in the IP and the Annexes, provided that the Russian side agreed to use a common number for inspection team size across all types of inspections. However, if the size of teams differed for the various types of inspection activities, Warner opined that the sentence should be placed in the tier two IP. Ilin stated that the team size sentence belonged in the treaty as bracketed language. ¶10. (S) After skipping over subparagraphs (a) through (c) of paragraph 22, which are related to continuous monitoring, Warner addressed paragraph 23 on inspection team composition. He noted that the opening of the paragraph should be relegated to tier three, but the last sentence, which provides the right to establish subgroups of inspectors, was a critical part of the inspection process and should remain in the IP. Ilin agreed with this approach, but noted that the bracketed language on monitors had not been removed from the paragraph, despite the U.S. presentation on mobile ICBMs in the Plenary Meeting on October 27, 2009. (Begin comment: The United States presented a revised approach to mobile ICBM verification at the October 27 Plenary that offered a package of verification measures as an alternative to continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM final assembly facilities. End comment.) Warner replied that the United States had not dropped continuous monitoring as part of its position; it had just offered an alternative approach for continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production. ¶11. (S) Turning to paragraph ((23))1((8))2 on pre-inspection procedures, the sides agreed to use the Russian language (with the exception of references to continuous monitoring). -------------- PRE-INSPECTION MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS -------------- ¶12. (S) Warner noted that paragraph 24 addressed the completion of pre-inspection movement restrictions (PIMRs). Ilin questioned the second sentence, which provides for when objects, containers, or vehicles can leave a structure within the inspection site. He asked Warner to explain the U.S. view regarding the types of structures to which this provision applied. Warner replied that it could refer to a building where a mobile ICBM is kept. Ilin replied that this provision may have been in START, but it was not in the Russian proposal for START Follow-on (SFO). The Russian side could accept the first and third sentences of the paragraph, but not the sentence under discussion. He offered two options: (1) bracket the sentence, or (2) clarify what kind of structures the sentence covered. He proposed a replacement for the sentence, "During inspections of structures located at ICBM bases and capable of containing non-deployed ballistic missiles, as well as at heavy bomber bases not equipped for nuclear armaments ... (as in the rest of the text)." Warner rejected his version, stating that too many things were left out. For example, SLBM bases also have non-deployed missiles in structures, and the United States was not prepared to drop potential references to mobile ICBM fixed structures. He asked why the Russian side singled out non-nuclear heavy bombers for special treatment, instead of including all heavy bombers. Ilin replied that Russian inspectors wanted to check that there were no nuclear weapons at bases for non-nuclear heavy bombers. Warner ended the discussion of this paragraph by noting that both sides had serious differences, and the brackets should remain. -------------- INSPECTION TIME LIMITS -------------- ¶13. (S) After a break in the meeting, Warner moved on to paragraph ((25))1((9))2 on inspection time limits and noted that the U.S. side had prepared a condensed version. He passed the revised language to the Russian side and explained the time limits for inspections as follows: For nuclear warhead inspections (NWIs) of ICBMs or SLBMs, the time limit would be the period of time necessary to achieve the objective of the inspection; for NWIs for heavy bombers, the time period should be limited to 24 hours; for inspections of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and non-deployed heavy bombers, the time limit would be 24 hours in the U.S. position, and 36 hours in the Russian position; and for exhibitions, the time limit would be the period of time necessary to achieve the objective of the exhibition. He noted that the Russian side agreed on the time limit for NWIs of ICBMs and SLBMs, but did not provide a time limit for NWI of a heavy bomber. ¶14. (S) Ilin stated that the U.S. and the Russian sides agreed on the time limit for NWIs of ICBMs and SLBMs, but then turned to a description of the Russian view on types of inspections. The Russians envisioned inspections of deployed SOAs and nuclear warheads as one type of inspection, with a time limit of 24 hours plus a possible 8-hour extension. For non-deployed SOAs, the Russian side supported a time limit of 36 hours. He turned to Colonel Ryzhkov to provide additional background on the Russian position. Ryzhkov explained that the Russians wanted a 36-hour limit on inspections of non-deployed SOAs based on their experience with START. He noted that there are some very complicated and large inspection sites for which a data update inspection (DUI) usually took the full 24 hours without any break for inspectors, their escorts, or the facility personnel, e.g., a DUI at the test range at Plesetsk. The Russian goal was to make life easier for inspectors and base personnel, noting that this was not a "wartime" situation. ¶15. (S) Warner agreed that it was worthwhile taking the burden on personnel into account, which was one of the reasons the U.S. side believed that the time limit for NWIs of ICBMs and SLBMs should be "as needed." However, NWIs of heavy bombers were not as much of a challenge as NWIs of ICBMs or SLBMs, since there was no need to move or open missiles. He shared the Russian side's concern for inspections at complex facilities. However, he added that this applied to just some facilities; inspections at most other facilities can be completed in less than 24 hours. Warner stated that the United States would consider the Russian proposal for longer duration inspections of sites holding non-deployed SOAs. Finally, after several additional exchanges, Warner said the sides would return to the issue of time limits once agreement was reached on the types of inspection activities. ¶16. (S) Warner then turned to paragraph ((26))1((11))2 on post-inspection procedures, and noted that the United States would accept the Russian language. -------------- SEQUENTIAL INSPECTIONS -------------- ¶17. (S) Warner stated that paragraph 27 in the U.S.-proposed JDT defined the term "sequential inspection." However, the issue was bracketed, since the Russian side does not accept the use of sequential inspections in SFO. Warner again noted that he believed that the low annual quota for inspections proposed by the Russian side was tied to their rejection of sequential inspections; however, once the sides agreed on what were likely to be substantially higher quotas for inspection types, he was confident the Russians would recognize the utility of sequential inspections. Ilin asked Warner how high the annual quota would have to be in order for sequential inspections to make sense. Warner replied "28." (Begin comment: The U.S. position calls for an aggregate quota of 28 NWI, data update, and formerly declared facility inspections. End comment.) Ilin immediately asked whether 27 inspections per year would be enough for sequential inspections; Warner replied that he believed that total inspection quotas of "some number in the 20s" would be sufficient to make sequential inspections attractive. ¶18. (S) The discussion on sequential inspections continued, with Warner noting that sequential inspections are a more efficient way to use an inspection team. Ilin agreed, but added that there was another way to be efficient in addition to sequential inspections--the more rational Russian approach of establishing a smaller annual inspection quota, which would force the Parties to be very judicious about which places to inspect. Ilin asked whether the United States wanted to bracket paragraphs 27 and the first two versions of paragraph 28, which also applied to sequential inspections. Warner replied that a new paragraph 28 had been inserted. This new paragraph represented the effort of Warner's staff to pull together all sequential inspection provisions from START into one convenient and easily readable location. The new paragraph 28 should be placed into tier 3, and would be very useful if sequential inspections are ultimately agreed to in the treaty. -------------- TRANSPORT TIME TO THE SITE -------------- ¶19. (S) The Russian side agreed that the new paragraph 28 represented a marked improvement in readability and clarity and complimented the U.S. side on its development. Ilin noted the 18-hour time period for transporting an inspection team to the site, and asked whether the U.S. side had agreed to the Russian position on this matter from paragraph ((9))1((6))2 of Section V of the JDT. Warner replied that the United States had not accepted the Russian position of 18 hours for transporting the inspection team from the point of entry (POE) to the inspection site; rather, the 18-hour period in paragraph 28 referred to site-to-site movement associated with sequential inspections. The U.S. side continues to believe the 9-hour period cited in paragraph ((9))1((6))2 was sufficient to transport a team from the POE to the initial inspection site. The U.S. side had determined that 18 hours was necessary to transport a team from site to site for a sequential inspection that goes directly from one site to another, particularly when crew rest considerations were taken into account. ¶20. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Party transporting a team to an inspection site has the incentive to accomplish it as fast as possible, since the site is effectively "closed" one hour after it has been designated for inspection, which hampers the operation of the site. The Russian proposal for 18 hours was made with the huge geographic scope of Russian territory in mind; the Russian side wanted to avoid rushing to get a team to the site in a manner that might endanger its safety and security. He asserted that the Russian side had made this proposal without any intention to cheat, and added that the Russian position on notifying a site that an inspection team would be arriving at the POE was similar in that it allowed the inspected site to arrange for hotels and meals for the team prior to its arrival. (Begin comment: The Russian position on inspection arrival notification provides for 72-hour advance notification, vice the U.S. proposal for 24 hours. End comment.) "Why squeeze ourselves?" he asked, adding that Russia had no other motives or reasons in mind. Warner agreed to take the Russian position under consideration. ¶21. (S) Turning next to the departure of the inspection team from the POE, Warner stated that the United States could agree to use the Russian formulation. Ilin added that the Russian side would like to add the phrase "unless otherwise agreed" at the end of the sentence to cover those situations in which the inspection team was unable to depart the POE within 24 hours. Ryzhkov cited an instance at the Ulan Ude POE in which the inspection aircraft had technical difficulties and could not leave within the 24-hour period provided for in START; the addition of the phrase "unless otherwise agreed" would provide additional flexibility. Warner agreed to accept the addition of the phrase, after which Ryzhkov added that, in fact, it was the Russian side that was delayed from departing the POE more often than the U.S. side. ¶22. (S) Closing out the detailed work on Section V of the IP, Warner noted that both versions of paragraph 29 were related to continuous monitoring and would be placed in the tier three Annex on Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring, awaiting the decision on continuous monitoring overall, and paragraph 31 had been deleted, as it was incorporated in paragraph 27 on sequential inspections. -------------- ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY -------------- ¶23. (S) Ilin stated that, before Amb Antonov had left for Moscow, he had asked that the IPWG focus on Article XI of the treaty, which addresses inspection activities. At this time, only the first paragraph represented common text and he suggested the IPWG needed to help develop a joint draft text for the rest of the article. Warner immediately replied that it would not be very useful to attempt that in the IPWG since so much had changed. Ilin proposed that instead of trying to work on creating a JDT from the proposal of the two sides, the IPWG could just rewrite Article XI from scratch. ¶24. (S) Warner walked through the Russian text of Article XI, agreeing that the first paragraph was the only one where both sides had similar formulations. Paragraph two of the Russian text referenced their Annex (the IP in the U.S. treaty structure),while paragraph 3 contained a provision which pointed toward the Russian equivalent of the IP as the place to find the sizes of the inspection teams for various types of inspection activities. Warner reiterated that the third paragraph could remain in Article XI if the sides were able to agree on a common number of inspectors for all types of inspection activities, or it could remain as a "hook" to the IP if the numbers would vary depending on the type of inspection activity. The United States agreQ with the content of paragraph 4, which referenced inspectors' privileges and immunities, but believed it belongs in the IP (tier two). Warner noted that paragraph 5, which limits the number of inspections, visits, and exhibitions that can take place at one time, would remain bracketed for the time being; he further noted that resolution of this issue ultimately depended on agreement on annual inspection quotas for the major types of inspections. Paragraph 6 on non-disclosure of information was similar to paragraph 4, Warner stated, in that the sides agreed on the content of the paragraph but not where it should be located in the treaty. ¶25. (S) Ms. Kotkova stated that the sides had previously discussed this issue, and that the information in paragraphs 4 and 6 is located in two places, Article XI and the IP. She proposed that paragraph 6 on non-disclosure be removed from Article XI but retained in the IP. Warner stated that the IPWG would need to coordinate its work on Article XI with the Treaty Text and DefinQons Working Group, and asked Kotkova whether paragraph 4 on privileges and immunities could also be removed from Article XI. She did not agree to do so, stating that the Russian side would need to discuss the matter further. ¶26. (S) Warner continued reviewing Article XI, noting that the more substantive closing portion of the article is a description of the major categories of inspection activities and these matters would be discussed during that afternoon's one-on-one meeting between Ilin and him. Ilin asked whether Article XI should just list the types of inspection activities, or should it include the goals and objectives of each type of inspection? Warner replied that, at a minimum, the purpose of each type of inspection activity would need to be included in Article XI. -------------- WRAP-UP -------------- ¶27. (S) Warner noted that it was too close to the end of the meeting to begin detailed work on Section VI of the IP, which addresses nuclear warhead inspections (NWIs) on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, but added that the United States believes that the differences between NWIs of ICBMs and SLBMs versus NWIs of heavy bombers are sufficient to warrant separate sections in the IP. The biggest difference was the number of missiles to be inspected in order to confirm the number of reentry vehicles/warheads mounted on them. The Russian side included a footnote pointing out this difference in the table they had given to the U.S. side that compares the sides' positions on types of inspection activities. Warner concluded the meeting by stating that the United States would provide the Russian side with an edited version of the Russian chart. ¶28. (U) DocumentsQxchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text for Inspection Protocol Section V, paragraph ((25))1((9))2. ¶29. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Couch Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dwyer Maj Johnson Mr. Rust Mr. Smith Dr. Tarrasch Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Ivanov Col Izrazov Col Kamenskiy Ms. Kotkova Ms. Melikbekian Mr. Novikov Mr. Pischulov Mr. Poznihir Col Ryzhkov Ms. Zharkih Mr. Gayduk (Int) ¶30. (U) Ries sends. GRIFFITHS